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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the characteristics of a good safety culture is a definable commitment to 
the improvement of safety behaviours and attitudes at all organisational levels. 
A second characteristic of an organisation with excellent safety culture is free 
and open communication. The general understanding has been that safety 
culture is a part of organisation culture.  
 
In addition to safety culture thinking, proactive programmes and displays of 
proactive work to improve safety are required. This work needs to include, at a 
minimum, actions aiming at reducing human errors, the development of human 
error prevention tools, improvements in training, and the development of 
working methods and the organisation’s activities. Safety depends not only on 
the technical systems, but also on the people and the organisation. There is a 
need for better methods and tools for organisational assessment and 
development.  
 
Today there is universal acceptance of the significant impact that management 
and organisational factors have over the safety significance of complex 
industrial installations such as nuclear power plants. Many events with 
significant economic and public impact had causes that have been traced to 
management deficiencies. 
 
The objective of this study is development of new methods to increase safety of 
nuclear power plant operation.  The research has been limited to commercial 
nuclear power plants that are intended for electrical power generation in 
Finland. Their production activities, especially operation and maintenance, are 
primarily reviewed from a safety point of view, as well as human performance 
and organisational factors perspective. This defines the scope and focus of the 
study. 
 
The research includes studies related to knowledge management and tacit 
knowledge in the project management context and specific studies related to 
transfer of tacit knowledge in the maintenance organization and transfer of tacit 
knowledge between workers of old generation and young generation.  
 
The empirical results of the research are presented in research papers which 
are enclosed in this thesis.  
 
 
Keywords: Nuclear Safety, Safety Culture, Safety Management, Knowledge 
Management, Organisational Culture, Co-Evolute Methodology 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
IAEA The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the 
world´s center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It 
was set up as the world´s "Atoms for Peace" 
organisation in 1957 within the United Nations family. 
The Agency works with its Member States and 
multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure 
and peaceful nuclear technologies. 
 
INPO The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations is a not-for-
profit organisation headquartered in Atlanta estab-
lished by the nuclear power industry in December 
1979. 
 
Management system A set of interrelated or interacting elements (system) 
for establishing policies and objectives and enabling 
the objectives to be achieved in an efficient and 
effective manner. 
  
NRC The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was 
created as an independent agency by Congress in 
1974 to enable the nation to safely use radioactive 
materials for beneficial civilian purposes while 
ensuring that people and the environment are 
protected. The NRC regulates commercial nuclear 
power plants and other uses of nuclear materials, 
such as in nuclear medicine, through licensing, 
inspection and enforcement of its requirements. 
 
Nuclear safety The achievement of proper operating conditions, 
prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident con-
sequences, resulting in protection of workers, the 
public and the environment from undue radiation 
hazards.  
 
OECD/NEA The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is a specialised 
agency within the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), an intergovern-
mental organisation of industrialised countries, based 
in Paris, France. 
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Organisation Dynamic, multi-faceted human system that operate in 
dynamic environments in which what exactly suits at 
one time and one place cannot be generalised into a 
detailed universal truth (Dawson 1996, p. 162). 
 
Performance indicator  Characteristic of a process that can be observed, 
measured or trended to infer or directly indicate the 
current and future performance of the process, with 
particular emphasis on satisfactory performance for 
safety. 
 
Periodic safety review A systematic reassessment of the safety of an existing 
facility (or activity) carried out at regular intervals to 
deal with the cumulative effects of ageing, modifi-
cations, operating experience, technical developments 
and siting aspects, and aimed at ensuring a high level 
of safety throughout the service life of the facility (or 
activity). 
 
Safety culture The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organisations and individuals which establishes that, 
as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance 
(IAEA’s definition). 
 
Safety indicator A quantity used in assessments as a measure of the 
radiological impact of a source or practice, or of the 
performance of protection and safety provisions, other 
than a prediction of dose or risk. 
 
Self-assessment  A routine and continuing process conducted by senior 
management and management at other levels to 
evaluate the effectiveness of performance in all areas 
of their responsibility.Self-assessment activities 
include review, surveillance and discrete checks, 
which are focused on preventing, or identifying and 
correcting, management problems that hinder the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives, particu-
larly safety objectives. Self-assessment provides an 
overall view of the performance of the organisation 
and the degree of maturity of the management 
system. It also helps to identify areas for improvement 
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in the organisation, to determine priorities, and to set a 
baseline for further improvement. 
 
WANO The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) 
is an organisation created to improve safety at every 
nuclear power plant in the world.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One factor connecting utility companies and nuclear power plants, contractors, 
regulators, and researchers working in the field of nuclear power is the 
recognition of the paramount importance of safety. This is manifested in the 
form of extensive and conservative norms, procedures, and laws that control 
nuclear power-related activities worldwide. The safety of nuclear plants has 
been developed and refined over a period of more than 35 years. A report by 
the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group contains fifty specific safety 
principles (INSAG-3, 1988). Until the Chernobyl accident, no commercial 
nuclear power plant had ever had an accident causing radiation injury to 
members of the public or to the workers at the plant. However, when analysing 
the causes of the accident, it was established that the role of plant management 
cannot be underestimated because formal requirements alone do not guarantee 
safe operations. This is why active safety management is needed (OECD/NEA 
1999a; OECD/NEA 1999b).  
 
1.1. Background 
 
V. C. Marshall has presented a historical review of the development of the 
management of hazards and risks in the energy-generating and distribution 
industries. In its early history, energy generation or, more strictly, the 
transformation of primary sources of energy into a form that is utilisable by the 
manufacturing industry, took place close to the point of use. This was no doubt 
due to an instinctive appreciation of the need to minimise transmission losses. 
Both water mills and wind mills had generating capacities of up to about 10 kW 
per unit. Factories, mainly for the manufacture of textiles, came into existence in 
the UK long before there was any system of centrally generated power and thus 
power had to be generated on the spot. Eventually some water-powered 
factories generated up to 150 kW. When steam power replaced water power the 
same basic system of energy transmission was used. However, the scale was 
larger, with some power houses developing up to 1500 kW (Marshall 1992, pp. 
63-85). 
 
These changes were accompanied by a corresponding increase in the hazards 
associated with the mechanical systems involved. Although statistics are 
lacking, there seems little doubt that these developments brought about a heavy 
toll of death and injury. This was reflected in the introduction of factory 
legislation which enacted, inter alia, that prime movers, flywheels, and 
transmission machinery must be securely fenced and that provision must be 
made for power to be shut off from the workplace in the case of an emergency. 
The introduction of steam power brought about the widespread use of steam 
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boilers of the shell type. This brought into existence the hazard of steam-boiler 
explosions which had the capability of injuring not only employees but also the 
members of the public living nearby. The first Act of Parliament to regulate 
boilers on land was the Boiler Explosions Act of 1882 which still remains in 
force. Eventually, scientific input began to come from boiler insurance 
companies, which were started in order to provide this service in the middle of 
the century. Insurance inspectors noted that on their rounds they found many 
examples of boiler safety valves which had been deliberately disabled. There 
was no specialist safety management as a staff function; safety management 
and line management were one and the same thing (Marshall 1992, pp. 63-85).  
 
1.1.1. Development of safety management 
 
The inauguration of public electricity-supply systems around 1880 was the 
beginning of a new era. Electricity was able to provide power, heat, light and, 
eventually, the means of operation of systems of communication such as the 
telegraph. One effect was to sweep away locally generated power for driving 
factory machinery with a consequent reduction in risk to factory workers who 
were no longer exposed to danger from steam power and mechanical 
transmission systems. From its inception, the supply industry had to come to 
terms with the dangers arising from electric shock (the first fatality from electric 
shock was recorded in 1879 in France) or from the overheating of conductors of 
inadequate capacity. Such inventions as fuses and circuit breakers came early. 
Conductors had to be either insulated or out of reach. Thus, management had 
to be in the hands of technically competent staff; the Institution of Electrical 
Engineers in its present form dates from 1888. This high level of managerial 
skill must have contributed to the good record of the industry (Marshall 1992, 
pp. 63-85). 
 
The introduction of nuclear power for generating electricity after 1956 produced 
a major change in the responsibilities of management. Before this time, the 
hazard of steam-boiler explosions existed but these were unlikely to give rise to 
danger to life outside of a radius of, say, 0.5 km which for most large generating 
stations would confine the hazard to the factory site. With the coming nuclear 
power, the hazard radius was greatly increased and thus there came into being 
a major public dimension. As a consequence, the responsibilities of 
management also greatly increased. This was because a new technical 
dimension had appeared. The hazards of steam-raising plants remained, but 
now the far more serious hazards of nuclear reactors were added to them. This 
required a major upgrading of managerial skills and knowledge (Marshall 1992, 
pp. 63-85). 
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Safety culture, or safety climate as it can also be called, represents the flesh 
and blood and nerves and sinews where the skeleton is the formal structure of 
safety. Safety culture also represents, and perhaps even more importantly, the 
spirit of safety management in any organisation. For no matter how well 
worked-out the structures and procedures may be, they cannot be fully effective 
unless there is a spirit of co-operation between all of those concerned. Top 
managers must also set a personal example. Criticism of organisations for 
deficiencies in their safety culture has been a constant theme in the reports of 
inquiries into disasters, although in the past this term was not used. There was 
such criticism in the reports on the Flixborough disaster (Parker 1976), the 
Clapham rail disaster (Hidden 1989) and the Piper Alpha disaster (Cullen 1990), 
(Marshall 1992, pp. 63-85). 
 
On the basis of this historical review by Marshall, corrective actions to enhance 
safety have often been reactive. They should be proactive to avoid the 
catastrophic consequences of accidents. Nuclear industry and other high risk 
industries should take care of the development of risk management methods in 
such a way that they are compatible with the increased risk of developed 
technology. 
 
1.1.2. Management and organisational factors 
 
Today, there is universal acceptance of the significant impact that management 
and organisational factors have over the safety significance of complex 
industrial installations such as nuclear power plants. Many events with 
significant economic and public impact had causes that have been traced to 
management deficiencies. The Rogovin report on the TMI-2 accident underlined 
the importance of problems associated with the management, organization, and 
institutional structure (Rogovin 1980). The Chernobyl accident is an example of 
multiple institutional, organizational, and management flaws, identified as 
determining contributors to the accident (Martin 1999). 
 
In developing safety management methodologies they should be based on 
scientific analyses to identify and understand the individual causes involved and 
their effects. We should focus on the importance of this approach to safety 
management using the potential of human behaviour and management 
sciences (Martin 1999). While technical performance at nuclear power plants 
has benefitted from the significant improvement in the knowledge of materials, 
equipment and systems performance, etc. there has not been a similar general 
improvement of management practices. For many years it has been considered 
that managing a nuclear power plant was mostly a matter of high technical 
competence and basic managerial skills. The field of nuclear technology has 
been dominated by hard sciences while individual, organizational, and 
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managerial factors were considered in the realm of “soft sciences” whose 
potential contribution lasted to gain the acceptance needed. Some degree of 
frustration also became apparent after earlier research efforts (Martin 2002). 
 
In high risk industrial environments such as nuclear power plants, chemical 
factories, railways or the aircraft industry, people in charge of work organisation 
tend to be engineer-technicians of a very homogeneous scientific background. 
For a number of decades, engineers have structured the organisation of high-
risk industries. This has been achieved in a highly technical-bureaucratic 
fashion through successive reforms and as a result of fairly unilateral thinking. 
The resulting organisational innovations are hardly ever submitted to external 
criticism, let alone reliability assessments (of the organisation itself). No 
diagnosis is ever attempted. Organisations are generally modified, adjusted, 
and amended, without any prior justification or debate. Most of these changes 
are implemented top-down and yet the way they reach the bottom suggests that 
there is much variety in the way reforms are received, understood, and really 
implemented (Bourrier 2005). 
 
In addition, many companies have observed differences in the actual working 
practices from one plant to another. This reality suggests there is a limit to 
homogeneous managerial rhetoric and in reality a great diversity of 
organisational practices exists, both on paper and on site. However, there 
appear to be few analyses and comparisons, or much questioning of this 
variety, not necessarily to determine the “best model”, but at least to try to 
assess each individual model in order to better understand its own logic and 
forecast its possible evolution. Designing work organisation in high-risk 
industries has rarely been a subject matter for organisation science – despite 
interest in these questions over the years (Bourrier 2005).  
 
1.1.3. Safety culture 
 
From a research point of view, safety culture is a challenging concept. Safety 
essentially depends on how people perform in their work. Is safety valued in 
general? How is it visible? Safety culture has been shown to be a difficult 
concept. It is especially vague to those carrying out practical safety work. Those 
involved in practical safety work require explanations concerning how safety 
culture will alter their work, and how it relates to any earlier means of promoting 
safety in a company. There are also many different definitions and emphasis 
areas in research. Researchers are still involved in the analysis of the concept 
and its neighbouring concepts (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
During the past decade, it has been widely recognised that different factors 
controlled by the organisation of a nuclear power plant have an important 
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influence on the safety attitudes and the safe behaviour of individuals. With the 
development of the concepts of safety culture and quality management, interest 
in these influences started to increase. The importance of organisational 
performance has been demonstrated when some nuclear power plants were 
shut down due to significant organisational problems. The increasing focus on 
organisational factors led to the consequence that event analyses more 
frequently identified organisational factors as root causes and contributing 
causes of events (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
In nuclear power plants, various versions of the functional organisation model 
are usual. There are some weaknesses which are inherent in the functional 
organisation. These are connected to processes and behaviours that cross 
organisational boundaries and that address organisational integration and 
interfaces. 
 
1.1.4. Knowledge management 
 
Today, increased attention is being given to phenomena such as learning 
organisations, human and organisational performance improvement, change 
management; knowledge management, and integrated management systems. 
As companies are increasingly recognising employees as being their most 
valuable assets, increased focus is being put on the critical roles that humans 
play in each of these phenomena. The increasing recognition of the invaluable 
nuclear power plant asset known as human or intellectual capital is having an 
enormous impact on the attention being paid to knowledge management (IAEA 
2006). 
 
Some of the knowledge management challenges that are faced by the nuclear 
industry include a complex technology base with a design basis as well as 
operation and management infrastructure. The nuclear power plant life cycle is 
very long, and there is a dependence on multidisciplinary technologies and 
extensive expertise. Stringent requirements for safety, nuclear quality 
assurance, and equipment and design configuration management must be 
maintained and achieved. A further question arises on how knowledge should 
be transferred to the younger generation. Knowledge transfer must be 
encouraged. National governments and also nuclear power companies should 
ensure that adequate education and training is made available in the nuclear 
industry (IAEA 2005). 
 
1.2. Research objective and propositions 
 
The objective of this study is the development of new methods to increase the 
safety of nuclear power plant operation. The research has been limited to 
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commercial nuclear power plants that are intended for electrical power 
generation in Finland. Their production activities, especially operation and 
maintenance, are primarily reviewed from a safety point of view, as well as 
human performance and organisational factors perspective. This defines the 
scope and focus of the study. 
 
When analysing the root causes of major accidents, including nuclear power 
plant accidents, it has been established that factors related to the organisation 
have often been significant. As the number and generation power of nuclear 
power plants increase, the risk of accidents also increases. In addition to the 
nearby areas, the effects of recent major nuclear power plant accidents have 
spread far into other countries’ territories. The general public is worried about 
the catastrophic outcomes of a nuclear power accident. The design basis of 
nuclear power plants will need to be adjusted, since earlier criteria have not 
been sufficient to ensure safety. Changes are especially required in areas 
related to human performance and organisational factors. Safety management 
at nuclear power plants needs to become more transparent in order to enable 
us to ensure that issues are managed correctly. Ensuring the safety of the 
nearby population is the best type of corporate responsibility. Answers to these 
questions are sought on a general level. 
 
In 1984, Charles Perrow, an organisational theorist, published a highly 
influential book, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, in which 
he advanced the bleak proposition that accidents are inevitable in complex, 
tightly-coupled systems like nuclear power plants – regardless of the skills of 
the operators and managers. Hence the title: accidents in such systems are 
“normal” (Perrow 1984; cf. also Kharbanda & Stallworthy, 1988). 
 
Reason (1997) lists as examples of organisational accidents and maintenance 
failures:  
• Apollo 13  
• Flixborough  
• Three Mile Island  
• American Airlines Flight 191 at Chicago O’Hare  
• Bhopal  
• Japan Airlines Flight JL 123 at Mount Osutaka  
• Piper Alpha   
• Clapham Junction. 
 
Two more can be added to the list: 
• Texas City refinery explosion 
• The Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
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We can conclude that as technology develops, the analysis, methods, and 
procedures to ensure safety must also be developed accordingly. Earlier, the 
human-machine interface has been a central object of study for control room 
design. The emphasis has mainly been on the control room operator’s technical 
means of receiving information about the production process and controlling it. 
As the analogue technology in the reactor protection and control systems is 
converted to digital technology, this brings about changes to the organisation of 
the activities. A more abstract I&C environment requires quality assurance 
methods and quality control that are similar to more concrete machine 
technology. The human-machine interface also needs to become a more 
generic human-organisation-machine interface, which is not limited to the 
control room, but rather refers to the entire operating organisation. However, 
this is only one of the future challenges. In general, new thinking and new 
methods are required to provide a versatile approach to ensuring safety. This is 
the goal for this research. The study has developed some methods that can in 
part aim to bring about improvements in safety. 
 
The starting point of the research is the definition of safety culture that IAEA has 
adopted (INSAG-4, 1991): 
 
“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations 
and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant 
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.” 
  
The general starting point has been that safety culture is a part of organisation 
culture. The concept-analytical part of the study discusses the background of 
the safety culture concept in order to understand how safety culture can be 
deduced from the basic principles of organisation culture. Cooper states that 
“Unless safety is the dominating characteristic of corporate culture, which 
arguably it should be in high-risk industries, safety culture is a sub-component 
of corporate culture, which alludes to individual, job, and organisational features 
that affect and influence health and safety” (Cooper 2000). According to this, 
safety culture should have more emphasis on high-risk industries. This study 
proposes that safety culture is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient 
condition in itself in order to ensure the safety of nuclear power plant operation. 
 
In addition to safety culture thinking, proactive programmes and displays of 
proactive work to improve safety are required. This work needs to include, at a 
minimum, actions aiming at reducing human errors, the development of human 
error prevention tools, improvements in training, and the development of 
working methods and the organisation’s activities. Safety depends not only on 
the technical systems, but also on the people and the organisation. There is a 
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need for better methods and tools for organisational assessment and 
development.  
 
This study presents knowledge management issues broadly, based on 
Nonaka’s model. The idea is that, as an analogous counterpart to the Japanese 
“quality circles”, a “safety circle” should be introduced; this would allow for 
having discussions on safety issues related to the work, and for making 
improvement proposals related to them. A second analogy that should be 
followed is the “Systematic Approach to Training” that is used for training 
activities; as a result of the development, the nuclear power plant would have a 
documented “Systematic Approach to Safety”. This documentation would 
describe how safety is related to practical work. This would turn safety culture 
into a concrete tool. Documented safety thinking provides the organisation with 
a common starting point for future development.     
 
It follows from the definition of safety culture that the organisation’s competence 
is of great importance. The issues important for safety must be identified, and 
the correct actions must be taken. Training must be renewed because society 
no longer provides a sufficient amount of trained personnel through its 
universities. As an advanced business, the nuclear industry must use its own 
training to ensure that the power plant organisation has sufficient qualifications 
for its duties. The nuclear power plant organisation has a large amount of 
information that needs to be preserved, developed, and utilised. Therefore, 
traditional training must become knowledge management. 
 
Technology has been the main focus from the very beginning, while the 
enhancement of human performance has mainly been a concern in reporting 
and analysing human errors. The United Kingdom has been a pioneer in the 
development of human error prevention tools and techniques.  
 
A depth-oriented defence with consecutive barriers has been the starting point 
for nuclear power plant design. Administrative actions have been seen to 
supplement these barriers. However, since a safety analysis in its purest form 
has not credited administrative protections, its development has been sidelined. 
Such administrative actions should form a similar system of consecutive 
barriers. If such a system has not been analysed or described, and the different 
actions have not been placed in order of priority, the personnel cannot have a 
mental image of the system structure, and the development of the common 
cause cannot proceed. 
 
This research has been carried out over twelve years. The research has been 
closely connected with master’s theses, in which the researcher has been 
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involved in the design, implementation, guidance and results analysis. These 
master’s theses are:  
 
• Liikamaa (2000): Activated use of tacit knowledge in project 
management 
• Isotalo (2002): Competence development through the transfer of formal 
and tacit knowledge 
• Alatolonen (2000): Conceptions of safety among nuclear power plant 
employees 
• Nurminen (2003): Deltoid – competencies of nuclear power plant 
operators 
• Nirhamo (2002): Towards human-oriented computerised maintenance 
management system 
• Saarela (2002): Decision-making in maintenance with the help of 
multimedia 
• Paajanen (2003): Lituus – a system for the evaluation of learning and 
knowledge creation in a business context 
• Mäkiniemi (2004): Conchoid – self-evaluation system for maintenance 
personnel's competencies 
• Rinne Päivi (2008): Ontology of maintenance 
 
They form an area of research where the central themes are safety culture, 
competence, tacit knowledge, data systems supporting activities, and 
participation in the development of the Co-Evolute methodology as well as 
developing applications related to methodology. The empirical material is 
included in the attached ten research papers. They are joined together by the 
researcher’s own experience and tacit knowledge from a total of 36 years in 
different management and supervision tasks in a nuclear power plant 
organisation. This experience was gathered from the following areas: reactor 
physics, reactor technology, reactor operational supervision, nuclear fuel 
handling, nuclear safety supervision, deterministic safety assessments, 
probabilistic safety assessments, nuclear power plant operation and 
maintenance, general training, and simulator training.  
 
The researcher has worked for twelve years as the Manager of Operation for 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, and as the substitute for the responsible 
director who is referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act. From this time, he has 
experience in co-operation with all of the nuclear power plants in Sweden, 
Germany, and Switzerland, and with the boiling water reactor plants in Japan. 
Other types of co-operation have existed with some of the nuclear power plants 
in the United States, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and China. During the 
last ten years, the researcher has worked as a Project Manager for the 
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European Commission’s On-Site Assistance projects at three Russian power 
plants and the Bulgarian nuclear power plant, and participated in the co-
operation of nearby regions funded by the Government of Finland. This co-
operation has consisted of annual workshops with the Kola and Leningrad 
NPPs, where the methods of Finnish nuclear power plants, related to control 
room personnel training programmes, licensing, safety culture, and 
maintenance activities, have been presented. Different language versions of the 
Co-Evolute applications have been created, and they have been tested at the 
Russian nuclear power plants, for example.       
 
The objective of this research can be divided into the following two goals: 
 
• Goal 1. The first goal is to explore the theories related to the 
organisational culture, safety culture, and nuclear safety culture. 
 
• Goal 2. The second goal is to construct the ontologies for assessing 
competencies of operation and maintenance personnel. 
 
The following five propositions have been identified: 
 
• Proposition 1. Safety culture as a management tool does not work unless 
in the task analysis safety relevance of each task is specified in advance 
 
• Proposition 2. Human performance related training should be more 
adequately  taken into account in the training programme of nuclear 
power plant operators 
 
• Proposition 3. Importance of nuclear power plant maintenance to safety 
should be more adequately  taken into account in the training programme  
   
• Proposition 4. In the design of work organisation, also learning from 
experience should be taken into account to prevent risks of 
organisational accidents   
 
• Proposition 5. Knowledge management, knowledge transfer, and 
knowledge creation  is integrated part of safety management  
 
This research is limited to review nuclear power plant operating organisations 
only from the viewpoint of nuclear safety.  
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1.3. Research strategy 
 
The research in the field of Industrial Engineering and Management often seeks 
to answer the question of what the world should be and it also emphasises the 
relevance of the research problem instead of methods. As a result – various 
approaches, research methods, and explaining mechanisms are used in 
different research themes. 
 
In this research, a conceptual approach is used to define the concepts, which 
are included in the framework of organisational culture, safety culture, and 
safety management. In the context of the nuclear power plant’s operation, these 
concepts have been analysed from the safety point of view.  
 
A constructive research approach is used when building assessment systems 
for nuclear power plant operation personnel and maintenance personnel. It is 
assumed that developed constructs can contribute to the enhancement of an 
organisation’s operating competence and thus also enhance the safety of 
operation. Several case studies are used to demonstrate how constructs work 
in practice.  
 
1.4. Content of thesis 
 
Chapter 1 contains an introduction to the research. This chapter also deals with 
the background of the research, research objectives, problem formulation, and 
research strategy. The content of the thesis is also presented in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical framework of the research. Chapter 2 
outlines the concepts related to organisational culture, safety culture, safety 
management, and knowledge management.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the results of the research covering safety culture, 
knowledge management, competencies of control room operators and 
competencies of maintenance personnel. It also presents a summary of the 
research papers. Research papers deal with different case studies and methods 
to review evaluation results. This chapter also presents the results of the 
discussion related to operation, maintenance, and safety management and 
presents how well the research objective was realised. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical contribution of the research and proposes 
topics for further research. 
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Appendix. Ten research papers are attached to this thesis. The author's 
contribution in each publication is also presented.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter is based on a literature review related to organisational culture, 
safety culture, and knowledge management. 
 
2.1. Organisational culture 
 
Many of the debates about organisational culture are caused by people’s use of 
different concepts and definitions. This chapter seeks to clarify matters by 
examining just what organisational culture is (Ott 1989, p. 49). 
 
2.1.1. Concepts and definitions 
 
There are two very basic ways to go about defining complex concepts (Ott 
1989, p. 49): 
 
• Inductively building a generalised theoretical definition from one’s  
experiences, preferences, and assumptions; and  
• Working deductively from a generalised theory, analysing realities to see 
how they fit with theory, and modifying theory based on the results of 
analyses. 
 
While this chapter uses both deductive and inductive approaches, deduction 
predominates. Keesing (1974) and Schein (1981, 1984, 1985, 2010) provide the 
theory for creating an initial classification system, or a typology of organisational 
culture elements (Miles & Huberman 1984), which is then used to analyse and 
compare a wide array of concepts of organisational culture that has been 
proposed by writers. The typology is used as the analytical framework for 
understanding different aspects of organisational culture, such as the 
relationships between organisational culture, leadership, change strategies, and 
research methodologies (Ott 1989, p. 49). 
 
Organisational culture can be characterised as follows (Ott 1989): 
• Organisational culture is the culture that exists in an organisation, 
something akin to the societal culture. 
• It is made up such things as values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions, 
behavioural norms, artefacts, and patterns of behaviour. 
• It is a socially constructed, unseen, and unobservable force behind 
organisational activities. 
• It is a social energy that moves organisation members to act. 
• It is a unifying theme that provides meaning, direction, and mobilisation 
for organisation members. 
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• It functions as an organisational control mechanism, informally approving 
or prohibiting behaviours. 
 
There is no consensus about organisational culture and the unanimity of 
concepts among proponents of the organisational culture perspective. There 
are very important substantive disagreements. The most fundamental of these 
involves the contents or composition of an organisational culture: what are the 
elements, constructs, and attributes of an organisational culture? The 
differences are more than semantic debates. They reflect serious 
disagreements about how one views, investigates, manages, and changes 
organisations (Ott 1989, p. 50). 
 
The first step towards understanding the essence of organisational culture is to 
appreciate that it is a concept rather than a thing. This distinction is crucial. A 
thing can be discovered and truths established about it, for example, through 
empirical research. Unlike a thing, however, a concept is created in people’s 
minds – that is, it must be conjured up, defined, and refined. Thus, ultimate 
truths about organisational culture cannot be found or discovered. There is no 
final authoritative source or experiment to settle disagreements about what it is 
or what comprises it (Ott 1989, p. 51). Therefore, when someone claims to have 
identified an organisational culture, that discovery represents nothing more than 
the results obtained from applying that person’s concept of organisational 
culture in a given organisation. Another discoverer who uses a different 
concept-driven deciphering process will find a different culture in the same 
organisation (Van Maanen 1979, 1983; Herbert 1987). 
 
The second important thing to remember is that how one looks at organisational 
culture largely determines what it is. When we start thinking about 
organisational culture structurally, we create structural typologies that, in turn, 
cause us to forget that organisational culture is not just structural elements. It 
also is a dynamic process – a social construction that is undergoing continual 
reconstruction. 
 
Organisational culture’s definitional problems mirror longstanding arguments in 
anthropology, archaeology, and cultural anthropology about the general concept 
of culture. In 1952, the cultural anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
identified 164 different definitions of culture existing in their search of the 
literature (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952). 
 
As recently as 1982, Ian Hodder described and bemoaned the problems caused 
by continuing debate between anthropologically oriented and materially oriented 
archaeologists over what culture is. The situation is perhaps even less clear 
relative to organisational culture. 
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There are very few areas of general consensus about organisational culture. 
They include the five assumptions stated earlier in this chapter: 
 
• Organisational cultures exist 
• Each organisational culture is relatively unique 
• Organisational culture is a socially constructed concept (Berger & 
Luckmann 1966; Holzner & Marx 1979; Mead 1934) 
• Organisational culture provides organisation members with a way of 
understanding and making sense of events and symbols 
• Organisational culture is a powerful lever for guiding organisational 
behaviour. It functions as “organisational control mechanisms, informally 
approving or prohibiting some patterns of behaviour” (Martin & Siehl 
1983). 
 
However, beyond these five basic points, agreement is very limited, and the 
points say nothing about what organisational culture is. Consensus is restricted 
to its existence, relative uniqueness, and a few functions that it performs. In a 
summary, there are seventy-three words or phrases used to define 
organisational culture from the fifty-eight different published sources. It is easy 
to see why Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) found 164 definitions of culture. 
Clearly the concept has not been clarified very much since 1952, at least not by 
those who have written about organisational culture. 
 
The study of organisational culture has become one of the major domains of 
organisational research. The rise of research on organisational culture came 
about because Japanese firms were, during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, 
widely considered to have superior operating characteristics, but the forms of 
organisational research that were dominant emphasised a formal structure and 
so they failed to uncover any difference between Japanese and Western firms. 
As a consequence, scholars began to examine the possibility that the different 
national cultures might have penetrated modern corporate forms, thus creating 
differences in organisational culture. Several early studies gave credence to this 
approach, which led next to the possibility that even within a single national 
culture there might be local differences in the culture of firms. 
 
A casual inspection of the contemporary literature suggests that most of those 
who study organisational culture trace their intellectual roots to a few key 
anthropologists. Both the point of view and the method of the anthropologist 
might seem to have been heavily borrowed by the respective researcher of 
organisation. It is undeniable that anthropological style and method have been a 
great, perhaps the single greatest, influence on contemporary studies. 
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The contemporary study of organisational culture may be best understood as a 
continuation of the main line of organisational sociology, which has always 
focused on the normative bases and the shared understandings that, through 
subtle and complex expression, regulate social life in organisations (Ouchi & 
Wilkins 1985). 
 
2.1.2. The intellectual foundations of organisational culture  
 
The contemporary study of organisational culture appears to amalgamate 
several points of view, rather than to constitute one branch of a single 
disciplinary family of scholarship. There is no single dominant point of view or 
method but rather a rich mixture of ideas and approaches. In 1983, three 
collections of articles on organisational culture appeared: an anthology on 
Organizational Symbolism (Pondy et al. 1983) and special issues of 
Administrative Science Quarterly (Vol. 28, No. 3) and of Organizational 
Dynamics (Vol. 12, No. 2). In all, these comprise 32 articles. Of the seven most 
frequently cited works, one was written by an anthropologist; three were 
authored or co-authored by sociologists, and three by management scholars. 
Most frequently cited works were (Ouchi & Wilkins 1985): 
 
• Geertz 1973, The Interpretation of Cultures – ten citations; 
• Berger & Luckman 1966, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
in the Sociology of Knowledge – seven citations; 
• Clark 1970, The Distinctive College: Antioch, Reed, and Swarthmore – 
seven citations; 
• Deal & Kennedy 1982, Corporate Cultures – seven citations; 
• Ouchi 1981, Theory Z – six citations; 
• Pettigrew 1979, On Studying Organizational Culture – six citations; 
• Weick 1979, The Social Psychology of Organizing – six citations. 
 
2.1.3. The concept of corporate culture 
 
Much management thinking in recent decades has focused on the concept of 
corporate culture. Some of the writings on the topic (e.g. Peters & Waterman 
1982, Ouchi 1981, Pascale & Athos 1981, Deal & Kennedy 1982, Hofstede 
1990) have been extremely influential among practising managers, mainly via 
its assumed relationship with organisational performance. It is generally thought 
that a well-developed and business-specific culture into which managers and 
employees are thoroughly socialised will lead to stronger organisational 
commitment, more efficient performance and generally higher productivity (Deal 
& Kennedy 1982, Graves 1986, Hampden-Turner 1990).  
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Usually based upon a blend of visionary ideas, corporate culture appears to 
reflect shared behaviours, beliefs, attitudes, and values regarding organisational 
goals, functions, and procedures which are seen to characterise particular 
organisations (Furnham & Gunter 1993). The maintenance of the dominating 
corporate culture within any organisation, therefore, is supported by on-going 
analyses of organisational systems, goal-directed behaviour, attitudes, and 
performance outcomes (Fry & Killing 1989). However, due to a general lack of 
information on how culture works, or how it can be shaped, changed, or 
otherwise managed in practice (Furnham & Gunter 1993), there is no consistent 
definition of what corporate culture might be (Williams et al. 1989).  
 
Williams et al. (1989) take the issue with the notion that organisational culture 
reflects shared behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and values. They argue that not all 
organisational members respond in the same way in any given situation. 
Beliefs, attitudes and values about the organisation, its function or purpose can 
vary from division to division, department to department, workgroup to 
workgroup, and from individual to individual. Several different sub-cultures will 
emerge from, or form around, functional groups, hierarchical levels and 
organisational roles, with very few behaviours, beliefs, attitudes or values being 
commonly shared by the whole of the organisation’s membership.  
 
2.1.4. The influence of anthropology on organisational culture 
 
Most of the current work on organisational culture draws upon the spirit, if not 
details, of the functionalist tradition in anthropology. This influence can be 
further divided between two rather distinct forms of contemporary work. 
 
Radcliffe-Brown (1952) and Malinowski (1961) represent a school of thought in 
anthropology that encourages the scholar to consider a group or society as a 
whole and see how its practices, beliefs, and other cultural elements function to 
maintain social structure.  
 
A second school of thought in anthropology is perhaps best represented by 
Clifford Geertz (1973). Along with other contemporary anthropologists, such as 
Goodenough and Lévi-Strauss, Geertz emphasises the importance of 
discovering the “native point of view”. This approach has been called “semiotic” 
for its focus on language and symbols as the principal tools for apprehending 
the native’s perspective. Geertz (1973, p. 24) suggests that “the whole point of 
a semiotic approach to culture is to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual 
world in which our subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the 
term, converse with them”.  
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Goodenough (1971) and others have developed an approach labelled 
“ethnoscience”, “componential analysis”, or “cognitive anthropology”. While their 
aim is similar to that expressed by Geertz, they differ considerably in method. 
Culture for ethnoscientists is the system of standards or rules for perceiving, 
believing, and acting that one needs to know in order to operate in a manner 
acceptable to the members of the culture. Anthropologists in this tradition have 
been strongly influenced by linguists (e.g. Chomsky 1972). They have in mind 
that just as a learnt, and usually implicit, grammar helps people generate 
acceptable sentences, cultural rules and categories and principles also help 
people to generate acceptable behaviour. The methods suggested by Geertz 
require a great deal of artistic ability and intuition while Goodenough’s methods 
are more systematic and thus easier to learn.  
 
2.1.5. The influence of organisational sociology on organisational culture 
 
The review of Ouchi and Wilkins (1985) suggests both that the study of large 
firms is in a period of experimentation and that it draws upon many insights that 
anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have developed in the study of 
other forms of social organisation. Several points of view are now in active 
contention for dominance among researchers of organisational culture. One 
contest is over whether culture is a dependent or an independent variable 
(Ouchi & Wilkins 1985).  
 
Among those who prefer to study organisational culture as a dependent 
variable, some take a natural-systems point of view and conclude that the 
culture of a firm is the natural outgrowth of its particular time and place and is 
not subject to human attempts at manipulation, while others assert that critical 
features of organisational culture may be systematically altered by a determined 
management (Ouchi & Wilkins 1985). 
 
Those who view culture as an independent variable tend to ignore these 
possibilities and instead seek to explicate the variety of forms through which the 
subtle and implicit features of organisation influence the thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour of individual participants (Ouchi & Wilkins 1985). 
 
A second contest is over the appropriate methods of study. Some hold that the 
method of lengthy field observation must be employed, while others assert that 
the whole point of contemporary study of organisational culture is to go beyond 
the method of the anthropologist by applying multivariate statistical analysis to 
these issues (Ouchi & Wilkins 1985). 
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2.2. Safety culture 
 
In 1991, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) introduced 
the concept of safety culture in its report (INSAG-4, 1991). Since then, many 
papers have been written on safety culture, as it relates to organisations and 
individuals, its improvement and its underpinning prerequisites. Variations in 
national cultures mean that what constitutes a good approach to enhancing 
safety culture in one country may not be the best approach in another. 
However, INSAG seeks to provide pragmatic and practical advice of wide 
applicability in the principles and issues presented in the report INSAG-15 
(INSAG-15, 2002). 
 
2.2.1. The concept of safety culture  
 
The concept of safety culture was initially introduced in the “Summary Report on 
the Post-Accident Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident” (INSAG-1, 1986). The 
concept was further expanded in the report “Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear 
Power Plants” (INSAG-3, 1988, later replaced by INSAG-12, 1999) and finally in 
the report, “Safety Culture” (INSAG-4, 1991). 
 
It is loosely used to describe the corporate atmosphere or culture in which 
safety is understood to be, and is accepted as, the number one priority (Cullen 
1990). Unless safety is the dominating characteristic of corporate culture, which  
arguably it should be in high-risk industries, safety culture is a sub-component 
of corporate culture, which alludes to individual, job, and organisational features 
that affect and influence health and safety (Cooper 2000). 
 
IAEA definition: “Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes 
in organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, 
nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance” 
(INSAG-4, 1991). 
  
In all types of activities, for organisations and for individuals at all levels, 
attention to safety involves many elements: 
 
• Individual awareness of the importance of safety. 
• Knowledge and competence, conferred by training and instruction of 
personnel and by their self-education. 
• Commitment, requiring demonstration at the senior management level of 
the high priority of safety and adoption by individuals of the common goal 
of safety. 
• Motivation, through leadership, the setting of objectives, systems of 
rewards and sanctions and through individuals’ self-generated attitudes. 
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• Supervision, including audit and review practices, with readiness to 
respond to individuals’ questioning attitudes. 
• Responsibility, through formal assignment and description of duties and 
their understanding by individuals. 
 
Safety Culture has two general components. The first is the necessary 
framework within an organisation and the responsibility of the management 
hierarchy. The second is the attitude of the staff at all levels in responding to 
and benefiting from the framework. 
 
The concept of safety culture that is defined in INSAG-4 emerged from 
discussions of the Chernobyl Accident (cf. INSAG-7), and understandably has a 
strong nuclear connotation. Another definition by the ACSNI Human Factors 
Study Group in the UK that is similar in spirit, but which also describes more 
explicitly the characteristics of an organisation that has a positive safety culture 
is: 
 
“Safety culture is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and 
the style and proficiency of an organisation’s health and safety programmes. 
Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by 
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures.” 
 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defined safety culture in a somewhat 
similar but more succinct way: 
 
“A good safety culture in a nuclear installation is a reflection of the values, which 
are shared throughout all levels of the organisation and which are based on the 
belief that safety is important and that it is everyone's responsibility.” 
 
Anyone interested in analysing safety culture can refer to these definitions or 
apply the Three Level model by Schein (IAEA 2002). 
 
2.2.2. A review of the literature 
 
Gadd and Collins (2002) review the literature on safety culture, focusing 
particularly on research carried out from 1998 onwards. The objectives were to 
review the main features of safety culture and safety climate within the existing 
academic and applied literature and to explore the links between safety culture 
and safety performance. The main findings were the following: 
 
• Culture can be seen as a concept that describes the shared corporate 
values within an organisation which influences the attitudes and 
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behaviours of its members. Safety culture is a part of the overall culture 
of the organisation and is seen as affecting the attitudes and beliefs of 
members in terms of health and safety performance (Cooper 2000). 
Safety climate is a distinct yet related concept which can be seen as the 
current surface features of safety culture which are discerned from the 
employee’s attitudes and perceptions (Flin et al. 2000). However, in 
reality, the terms are not so clear cut and many writers use the terms 
safety culture and safety climate interchangeably. 
• From the literature it emerged that management was the key influence of 
an organisation’s safety culture. A review of the safety climate literature 
revealed that employees’ perceptions of management’s attitudes and 
behaviours towards safety, production and issues, such as planning, 
discipline etc. was the most useful measurement of an organisation’s 
safety climate. The research indicated that different levels of 
management may influence health and safety in different ways, for 
example managers through communication and supervisors by how fairly 
they interact with workers (Thompson 1998). Thus, the key area for any 
intervention of an organisation’s health and safety policy should be 
management’s commitment and actions towards safety. Ultimately 
management’s attitudes and behaviour in terms of safety influence many 
aspects of safety behaviour. 
• Many definitions of safety culture (e.g. ACSNI 1993) present a view of 
employees having a shared set of safety values and beliefs. However, a 
number of studies have found the presence of subcultures within an 
organisation which suggest an absence of a cohesive safety culture. 
Subcultures are likely to develop when employees within the same 
organisation experience different working conditions. Work groups within 
an organisation are likely to view risk differently depending on the type of 
work they do. In general, subcultures are not seen as undesirable and it 
can be argued that they provide useful contextual insight into the 
different risk and hazards experienced by workgroups. 
• The literature on bonus schemes suggests that financial incentives to 
improve productivity or to compensate for working in hazardous 
conditions can lead to safety being compromised. Employees who were 
eligible for hazard pay were found to be at greater risk of having an 
accident, and it may be seen as an inducement to take risks (Sawacha et 
al. 1999). Productivity bonus schemes have been found to act as an 
incentive to work faster and thus to commit unsafe acts (Sawacha et al. 
1999). Collective bonus schemes can lead to workers being pressured to 
not report an accident by colleagues who are unwilling to lose their 
bonus (Collinson 1999). 
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2.2.3. Three main directions in research 
 
Safety culture has been shown to be a difficult concept. The word is used 
commonly and fluently, but it still remains vague. There are also many different 
definitions and emphasis areas in research. Ruuhilehto & Vilppola (2000) 
summarise three main directions which can be found in organisation safety 
culture research. These include 1) case studies, 2) comparative studies, and 3) 
psychometric surveys (Cox & Flin 1998). In the following, these three directions 
are connected to the present theories. 
 
Case studies 
 
Case studies consist of qualitative research using in-depth interviews and 
observation that is often participatory in nature. The research often focuses on 
a) companies where a major accident has occurred, b) companies operating in 
high-risk fields with a low accident frequency, or c) companies undergoing 
extensive changes. 
 
The most common finding from case studies performed on accident companies 
is the lack of visible management commitment. There have also been clues of 
an approaching accident, clear symptoms that have gone unnoticed due to 
shortcomings in information transfer, or ambiguities in task distribution, for 
example. The problem with these “post hoc” studies, however, is that they 
cannot demonstrate direct relationships between the characteristics of the 
organisation and the accident. It is difficult to say for sure as to whether the 
organisation’s characteristics and conditions are a consequence of the accident 
or its cause. 
 
Companies with low accident frequencies have been studied in order to receive 
further information for establishing the cause and effect relationship. These 
“good” companies have been studied using observations, interviews, survey 
forms, and document analysis. The research of companies with low accident 
frequencies can be criticised for the fact that the explicable factor has been 
considered to be accident statistics, which are poorly compatible with the 
culture by nature. An additional problem has been said to be that low accident 
figures can also be due to low reporting. In other words, a cause and effect 
relationship is similarly difficult to demonstrate using this research method 
(Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
The third case study type relates to change processes in companies. The 
current state of safety culture is established in companies undergoing change, 
and recommendations for improvement during the change are made. Usually, 
the methods used include interviews, surveys, and document analysis. A result 
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of this study direction is that personnel participation has been found to be an 
essential requirement for success (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
Comparative studies 
 
Another main direction of research, comparative study, usually compares 
companies with high and low accident frequencies (as the name implies). The 
literature presents several combined lists of features for “good” and “bad” 
companies. The features have been interpreted to be indicative of safety 
culture. Low accident rates have been used as a benchmark for good safety. 
Companies with a good safety level have the following features (Lee 1998): 
 
• Plentiful, good communication between the different levels and task 
areas of the organisation. Changes occur frequently and they are 
performed flexibly. Safety aspects are brought up during the discussions. 
The managers make field tours, both to signal their interest in safety 
issues and to observe the situation and encourage better performance. 
• The learning of organisations has been arranged well: they identify the 
needs for change and can respond to them. 
• Safety issues have a central role in the minds of all the organisation 
members, and in the activities of the organisation. 
• Senior management is heavily committed to safety, prioritises safety 
highly, appoints the necessary resources, and aims to actively promote 
safety. 
• Management methods are democratic, cooperative, participatory, and 
they value individuals. 
• A large amount of high-quality training related to safety and quality is 
available. In addition to separate safety training, safety issues are also 
emphasised during work induction and other work task related training. 
• Good cleanliness and order, good working conditions 
• High level of work satisfaction. Basis for human resource decisions 
(promotions, temporary layoffs, rewards) is considered justified. 
• Safe working, not only peak productivity, is taken into account when 
recruiting and rewarding personnel. 
 
The problem with comparative studies is that it is often difficult to eliminate the 
effects of confusing factors. Most often, the only benefits received from such 
studies are development activities for the companies involved. Commonly 
usable information is not really achieved (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
Psychometric surveys 
 
A research direction that is quickly gaining popularity is called psychometric 
surveys. Here, the material received from a survey is processed using statistical 
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methods. The regularly repeated opinion or attitude surveys are common when 
monitoring the development of work satisfaction or the organisation’s 
atmosphere. Many safety researchers also prefer the term “safety atmosphere” 
to “safety culture” during psychometric surveys. Atmosphere is considered an 
indicator of culture (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000).  
 
Surveys related to safety can be compared to condition monitoring for 
equipment. For a company, monitoring the condition of equipment and 
preventing damage is much cheaper than observing the problems only after an 
accident has occurred. Likewise, surveys can be used to monitor the “condition” 
of safety, such as people’s ideas, attitudes, and behaviour. Usually, the 
questions cover the attitudes and behaviour of colleagues, supervisors, and 
managers in addition to those of the interviewee. For the surveys to be useful, 
they would need to reliably identify the critical factors that affect the “condition”. 
Most often, collections of questions or statements from earlier research are 
repeated in the studies, with very little variation (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
So far, little evidence exists for the predicting abilities of the question batteries. 
Usually, the comparison variable has been the reported number of accidents; 
due to low frequencies, this is a very problematic benchmark for safety. The 
number of questions or statements usually ranges from a few dozen to a couple 
hundred. During the analysis of the documentation, individual questions are 
compiled into unified structures and factors. The number of factors and factor 
structures vary between studies. Recurrent themes of the surveys include 
leadership, management commitment, safety system, risk-taking, workload, 
qualification, working methods and procedures, and the role of work 
management (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
Further study 
 
The results of case studies, comparative studies, and psychometric surveys 
have been used to determine that it might be possible to determine a core 
group of factors, variables, and for the assessment of an organisation’s safety 
culture. At present, there is very little evidence to either confirm or dismiss this. 
What is open to further research is the question of whether one field of business 
can only have a single, best possible way for safety management or whether 
there can be several ways. That is, can there be several different, successful 
safety cultures (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000)? 
 
It can also be deduced that a safety culture means merely applying good 
management practices in the field of safety. By doing so, we are limiting our 
understanding of culture to the outward appearance of culture, and the cognitive 
structures that manifest themselves in the attitudes of people. According to 
some research approaches, operating at such “superficial” levels does not 
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actually qualify as cultural research. However, the more in-depth means of 
researching organisation culture are expensive and time-consuming. Company 
executives want quick results and changes. These two views are incompatible. 
Therefore, it can be expected – and indeed, seen – that practical method 
development and scientific research will take different paths (Ruuhilehto & 
Vilppola 2000). 
 
The challenges for the scientific research of safety culture include introducing 
methods from more in-depth cultural research, a closer connection to 
management research, reviewing accumulated individual research, meta-
analysis (especially as regards the factor structure of attitude surveys), and 
cultural studies in multinational corporations (Cox & Flin 1998). 
 
The largest challenge is how research can assist company executives in their 
work towards changing and developing safety culture, i.e. change management 
and leadership. The open questions related to this include, for example, if there 
exists only one, unified safety culture that can achieve a high level of safety 
culture, or if different organisations and fields of business have different safety 
cultures that provide good results (Hale & Hovden 1996). 
 
According to the different schools, there are two options for change: culture 
either changes or it is changed. Those who feel that the culture itself changes, 
consider the underlying structure of culture to be so complex and deep that it 
cannot be consciously led or changed. It can only change by itself, over time. 
The changes are slow. Those who feel that organisation culture can be 
changed have presented different types of means. On the surface level, the 
goal is to change management, then to change the value system and, on the 
deepest level, the goal is to change the symbolic field and basic assumptions of 
organisation culture, cf. leadership and knowledge creation (Ruuhilehto & 
Vilppola 2000). 
 
Choudhry et al. (2007) have examined a number of past studies, in order to 
better understand safety culture. It is thought that a summary of safety culture 
research undertaken since 1998, twenty-seven (27) selected studies, constitute 
a true representation of the concept. A major shortcoming with most of these 
safety culture models is the lack of their integration into general models of 
organisational culture. Most investigators (Thompson et al. 1998; Sawacha et 
al. 1999; Flin et al. 2000; Sorensen 2002) appear to agree that the elements of 
safety culture include senior management’s commitment to safety, good 
communications, organisational learning, a working environment that rewards 
identifying safety issues, and participative management leadership style 
(Choudhry et al. 2007). 
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2.2.4. Organisational factors related to safety  
 
During the past decade, it has been widely recognised that different factors 
controlled by the organisation of a nuclear power plant have an important 
influence on the safety attitudes and safe behaviour of individuals. Interest in 
these influences began to increase with the development of the concepts of 
safety culture and quality management. The increasing focus on organisational 
factors has led to the consequence that event analyses more frequently have 
identified organisational factors as root causes and contributing causes of 
events (OECD/NEA 1999a).  
 
The removal of an organisational problem is only the reactive part of the 
problem solving process. However, it is important to detect early signs of 
deteriorating safety performance in order to prevent the degradation of the 
safety of nuclear power plants. In order to be proactive, the links between the 
organisational factors and the safe behaviour of individuals have to be 
identified, as well as the mechanisms which increase the reliability of the 
organisation to manage safety. The objective of the report is to identify the 
organisational factors, their links to the individual and their influence on human 
performance, as well as the mechanisms important for organisational reliability 
(OECD/NEA 1999a). 
 
The various approaches discussed in the report reflect the perspective of 
people with different profiles (i.e. organisational behaviour and sociology 
researchers, utility representatives, regulators or technical support organisation 
representatives, coming from 12 countries). They searched in a predictive or 
proactive manner in order to identify effective methods for determining reliability 
in organisations. Organisational factors have been defined in the area of 
organisational and behavioural sciences but the results are not widely known 
outside the research community. Furthermore, only a few research results were 
developed into assessment methods. The report presents an overview of the 
organisational factors regarded as important to safety. Some factors are well 
known and could be well defined, whereas other factors, such as 
“organisational culture”, “organisational knowledge”, and “organisational 
learning”, have slightly different interpretations and will need further discussions 
to reach a common definition. The report identifies twelve major organisational 
factors. The order of the factors does not reflect their level of importance. The 
twelve factors are (OECD/NEA 1999a): 
 
• External influences 
• Goals and strategies 
• Management functions and overview 
• Resource allocation 
• Human resources management 
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• Training 
• Co-ordination of work 
• Organisational knowledge 
• Proceduralisation 
• Organisational culture 
• Organisational learning 
• Communication.  
 
The goal of the report was to define a comprehensive list of factors which can 
influence safety. There are interdependencies and overlays amongst the factors 
as they are in the organisational environment. For each of the factors a 
definition is provided (OECD/NEA 1999b).  
 
In 1999, the state-of-the-art report was supplemented by additional information 
contributed by countries and institutions which were not represented at the 
workshop in 1998. In the revised report, as recognised from experience and 
information exchange, it was stated that (OECD/NEA 1999c & 1999d): 
 
• Unfortunately, there are almost no tools available for the self-assessment 
of organisations, and neither research institutes (with the main interest to 
continue research) nor consulting companies (for commercial reasons) 
show significant motivation to improve this situation. 
• Cultural differences between the evaluator and the evaluated 
organisation shall not be underestimated. They heavily influence the 
urgently required possibility of an understanding of the organisation to be 
evaluated. Even the application of a method from another country 
requires high attention. 
• The organisations in nuclear power plants are subject to change in the 
near future because of the need for optimisation due to external 
economic pressure. There is an urgent need for tools for self-assessment 
and change-management to help utilities to evaluate their future 
organisational changes in advance and to judge the effect of the change. 
 
2.2.5. Safety culture versus safety climate 
 
Safety culture can be viewed as the overarching policies and goals set by an 
organisation relating to the overall safety of their facility or environment. Safety 
climate is often used interchangeably and in conjunction with safety culture. 
While both can be used to describe the underlying safety attitude of an 
organisation, safety climate generally refers to the attitude that the people in the 
organisation have towards safety. It describes the prevailing influences on 
safety behaviours and attitudes at a particular time (Olive et al. 2006). 
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By organisation culture it is meant here as the shared values and beliefs of an 
organisation ─ commonly described as “the way we do things here”. This 
concept is widely understood, but what is less widely understood is the 
relationship between organisational culture and safety climate. Both are 
critically important. Where organisational culture comprises unstated 
assumptions that govern how we do things around here, climate is the 
prevailing influences on a particular area of functioning (such as safety) at a 
particular time. Thus, culture is something that is more deeply embedded and 
long term, which takes a longer time to change and influence organisational 
performance across many areas of functioning.  Climate, on the other hand, 
changes faster and more immediately reflects the attention of leadership. 
Culture can be viewed as the background influence on the organisation, while 
climate is the foreground. Climate changes faster than culture. Organisational 
climate often changes very quickly after a significant incident, but the underlying 
organisational culture may not change sufficiently to prevent further incidents 
from occurring (Behavioural Science Technology 2004). 
 
If the underlying culture is not sufficiently, and accordingly, altered to support 
the climate, further incidents are inevitable. The primary example of such a 
phenomenon can be found in the duality of the Challenger and Columbia 
disasters experienced by NASA. Following the Challenger explosion, the 
climate at NASA was strongly oriented towards improving safety performance. 
However, because the underlying culture did not adequately promote the 
importance of placing safety as a priority, the safety climate degenerated to 
such a dangerous degree that the Columbia disaster resulted (Olive et al. 
2006). 
 
There are three main components to safety culture; psychological, situational 
and behavioural, and there are a number of tools available, qualitative and 
quantitative, which can be used to measure them (Cooper 2000). Situational 
aspects of safety culture can be seen in the structure of the organisation e.g. 
policies, working procedures, management systems etc. Behavioural 
components can be measured through self-report measures, outcome 
measures and observations. The psychological component is most commonly 
examined by safety climate questionnaires which are devised to measure 
people’s norms, values, attitudes and perceptions of safety.  
 
Safety climate measures have been widely researched and tend to be used as 
substitute measures of safety culture. Recent interest in the measurement of 
safety culture has resulted in a number of reviews of the area. These reviews 
demonstrate the wide range of assessment tools, typically self-report 
questionnaires from large scale surveys that have been developed. Such 
assessment tools are often customised to a particular industry, principally the 
energy industry but also manufacturing and health.  
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As Flin et al. (2000) point out the dimensions of climate measures vary 
considerably in terms of criteria, statistical analysis, size and composition of 
workers and industry. Thus, drawing comparisons between the measures is 
difficult not only because of the methodological differences outlined but also 
because of language and cultural variations. Consistency amongst safety 
climate measurements is difficult (Gadd & Collins 2002). 
 
2.2.6. Characteristics of a good safety culture 
 
One of the characteristics of a good safety culture is a definable commitment to 
the improvement of safety behaviours and attitudes at all organisational levels. 
A second characteristic of an organisation with excellent safety culture is free 
and open communication. Resilience is another feature of a good safety culture. 
An organisation with ideal safety culture should be able to easily process small 
incidents or errors within the system and then continue operating. By doing so, 
the organisation and the system will be ultimately stronger. The final 
characteristic of an organisation with excellent safety culture is a prevailing 
attitude of vigilance (Olive et al. 2006). Preparedness for and the prevention of 
accidents must be maintained with a constant unremitting watch (Kharbanda & 
Stallworthy 1988).  
 
2.2.7. Assessment of safety culture 
 
A situational approach to assess safety culture 
 
Semmer and Regennass argue that many approaches to the study of safety 
culture focus on values and social norms and their underlying assumptions 
(Semmer & Regennass 1999). Most existing research tools and instruments are 
designed to collect data on norms and assumptions. However, social science 
research has long demonstrated that the correlation between general 
preferences and specific behaviour is rather modest. As the researchers 
explain, “Responses to general questions do not guarantee that the aspects 
salient in the measurement situation are the same ones that are salient in a 
real-life situation. Moreover, it has been shown that actors do not behave 
according to one single norm; they are rather confronted to different and often 
competing norms. Which norm will dominate cannot be determined from 
understanding the norms, but rather by careful consideration of situational 
aspects”. 
 
The Situational Approach suggests that the emphasis should be put on 
collecting data on actual practices, real dilemmas and decisions (what is also 
called “theories in use”) rather than on social norms. Acknowledging that values 
and assumptions are expressed in situations, Semmer and Regennass propose 
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a situational approach, in which subjects are not directly questioned about 
values and norms, but are confronted with a dilemma that stems from conflicting 
social norms and various costs and benefits associated with different types of 
behaviour. The subjects are asked what they do in such a situation, what they 
think others would do what reactions they would expect their behaviour to elicit 
from others, and so forth. 
 
A socio-technical model of safety culture: total safety management 
 
Grote and Künzler (1997) are combining a theoretical framework of the socio-
technical systems approach with an audit methodology. The researchers claim 
that mixing the two can be fruitful in order to assess safety culture but more 
importantly the organisation as a whole. It is Grote and Künzler’s opinion that 
models of safety culture after the Chernobyl Accident suffer from a lack of 
integration into general models of organisation and of organisational culture. In 
addition, the connection between safety-related characteristics of a system and 
more general characteristics like job and organisational design and the use of 
technology, is missing. This gives the impression that safety can be looked 
upon and promoted as something detached from the make-up of the socio-
technical system as a whole.   
 
For Grote and Künzler (1997), the socio-technical approach describes work 
systems as having a technical and a social subsystem which together 
determine how well the primary task of a work system can be accomplished. In 
this perspective, maximum effectiveness can be achieved only if the two sub-
systems are jointly optimised.  
 
Both researchers argue that on at least two levels the socio-technical approach 
can be linked to safety: 
 
• The definition of the primary task   
• The degree of self-regulation of sub-units in the system. 
 
From this follows: 
 
• The definition of the primary task should include safety in order to foster, 
in analogy to the Total Quality Management approach, a Total Safety 
Management 
• A high degree of self-regulation of work teams is beneficial to safety, 
because it fosters flexibility, initiative and ownership, which are all crucial 
qualities to adequately deal with problems or incidents. 
 
Therefore, a model of safety culture should be incorporated into a more general 
model of organisational culture, emphasising complex interactions between an 
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organisation’s material and immaterial reality. Secondly, characteristics of the 
work system not directly related to safety should be included, especially 
characteristics of job and organisational design influencing the degree of self-
regulation on the shop floor. 
 
Two main results emerge from field-work in four chemical plants and one 
transportation company: 
 
• The integration of safety into day-to-day operations is easier in 
organisations whose primary task is defined in terms of quantity, quality 
and safety of production, as opposed to organisations whose primary 
task is only defined in terms of quantity and quality. 
• There is evidence that safety system awareness, organisational and 
technical designs are positively correlated. 
 
A sociological approach to study organisational reliability 
 
Bourrier’s (1994, 1996, and 1998) research is an attempt to contribute to the 
study of organisational reliability in high-risk industries through a sociological 
analysis, using organisation theory and anthropological methods. The goal is to 
identify crucial social nodes, supporting and fostering organisational reliability in 
a given organisation. Using the concept of “Strategic compromises” that have 
proved to be at the core of organisational reliability, the primary task of the 
research is to determine the conditions under which these compromises are 
emerging in order to assess their strengths and weaknesses, their costs and 
benefits. This will give access to a deeper understanding of dysfunctional 
patterns in organisations for early detection. 
 
The research background is the following. Too often, organisational analyses 
are carried out only after a catastrophe has occurred. While very interesting, 
this perspective has serious limitations: it is always easier to explain and 
reconstruct events after they have taken place. It is more essential to 
understand the mechanisms of normal functioning, because having a correct 
perception of their normal operation can help to prevent future dysfunctions and 
possible errors. In this way, it should be possible to predict in what areas 
failures are more likely to occur. To do so, organisational reliability should be 
researched through the study of social interactions and professional relations.  
 
Bourrier’s claim is that organisational reliability is highly dependent upon the 
quality and nature of social relations, which are driven in turn by self-interest 
and, therefore, by power and strategies (which could introduce dissent, 
compartmentalisation, power struggles and goals displacement, poorly reliable 
features of most organisational life). Bourrier points out that organisational 
reliability issues should be investigated and seen as properties of the social 
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systems embedded in reliability-seeking organisations. The social construction 
of organisational reliability can best be analysed through a systemic analysis 
thus helping to focus on systemic effects. 
 
2.3. Safety management 
 
Safety management is the term used for the organisational measures applied to 
ensure that an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of an 
installation. Management is responsible for recognising the safety significance 
of both the design of the installation and the way in which it is operated and 
maintained, and to put in place suitable organisational processes to manage 
risk. This requires that the organisation is well structured with clear lines of 
authority and well defined responsibilities. In addition, the safety policy, 
requirements and procedures need to be well established, understood and 
observed by all (INSAG-13, 1999).  
 
2.3.1. Concept of safety management  
 
All these features of control and operation need to be considered 
systematically, and this leads to the general definition of Safety Management 
System as offered in INSAG-13 (1999): 
 
“The safety management system comprises those arrangements made by the 
organisation for the management of safety in order to promote a strong safety 
culture and achieve good safety performance.”  
 
The Organisation and Management Review Method (Haber & Barriere 1998) 
allows the generation of a behavioural profile of the organisation through those 
processes and management functions related to the safety performance of 
nuclear facilities (OECD/NEA 2006). The Organisation and Management 
Review Method is used to measure five Safety Culture characteristics within a 
nuclear organisation. Those characteristic areas are as follows: 
 
• Safety is a clearly recognised value 
• Accountability for safety in the organisation is clear 
• Safety is integrated into all activities in the organisation 
• A safety leadership process exists in the organisation 
• Safety culture is learning driven in the organisation 
 
The method uses a functional model of the organisation. Five organisational 
components identify the key organisational and management processes that 
relate to safety, their primary functions, key coordinating mechanisms, and the 
way that information flows throughout the organisation. Organisational 
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behaviours within those components are measured both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. 
 
The behaviours include attention paid to safety, coordination of work, decision-
making, goal/priority-setting, resource allocation, time urgency, aggressive-
defensive culture style (high perfectionist), roles and responsibilities, 
performance quality, management emphasis on safety, employee awareness of 
risk, external communication, formalisation, training, organisational knowledge, 
constructive style, cohesion, hazard, offsite consequences, on-site 
consequences, organisational culture, communication (interdepartmental and 
intradepartmental), commitment, job satisfaction, organisational learning, 
problem identification and resolution, performance evaluation, personnel 
selection, and passive-defensive style (low avoidance). The Organisation and 
Management Review Method is published under the Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission Research document, RSP-0060 (Haber & Barriere 1998). 
 
This methodology was originally developed with the support of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission to assess the influence of organisation and the 
management of safety performance. In 2003, the existing safety culture at the 
Davis-Besse Nuclear Generating Station was evaluated against the 
characteristics identified to be important for the promotion of a positive safety 
culture in a nuclear facility (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) 
2003). The method is well-founded through extensive international research. 
However, the evaluation process is labour-intensive, with a long planning cycle 
and data analysis period. Because of the unique skills required to perform the 
evaluation, staff must be appropriately trained to use this method. 
 
Guidelines of regulatory expectations (performance objectives and criteria) 
should be developed in the area of safety culture and safety management. 
Safety Management programmes should be developed by nuclear power plant 
organisations to meet those expectations and to perform their own 
assessments. The achievement of a learning organisation should be a goal 
(OECD/NEA 2006). 
 
In some countries, the Total Quality Management system, EFQM (business 
excellence model developed by European Foundation for Quality Management) 
or Quality Management Systems compatible with the ISO-9000:2000 or IAEA 
Safety Series 50-C/SG-Q Quality Management (IAEA 1996, later replaced by 
IAEA 2006) are applied for safety management.  
 
Total Quality Management (TQM) is a set of management practices throughout 
the organisation, geared to ensure the organisation consistently meets or 
exceeds customer requirements. TQM places a strong focus on process 
measurement and controls as means of continuous improvement. 
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The EFQM Excellence Model is a non-prescriptive framework based on nine 
criteria. Five of these are “Enablers” and four are “Results”. The “Enabler” 
criteria cover what an organisation does and how it does it. The “Results” 
criteria cover what an organisation achieves. “Results” are caused by 
“Enablers” and “Enablers” are improved using feedback (Learning, Creativity 
and Innovation) from “Results”. 
 
Safety management refers to organisational measures that seek to identify, 
assess and control risks in order to guarantee nuclear, personnel and 
environmental safety. These risks include, among others, occupational 
accidents, accidental releases of radioactive substances and in the worst-case 
scenario, a meltdown of the reactor core. 
 
The IAEA guidelines are very valuable as a starting point, but they show some 
limitations. First of all, they provide a top down structured approach to safety 
culture, focused on formal management tools such as feedback system, 
management commitment, and quality assurance and not on the point of view 
and experience of those who act in the organisation. Personnel should be given 
the possibility to reach and seize easily those actors and perception of the 
organisation (Mengolini & Debarberis 2010). The difficulty of measuring the 
safety culture concept is undeniable. However, there is a need, expressed by 
many authors, to establish a positive relationship between safety culture and 
safety performance (Sorensen 2002; Vinnem et al. 2005; Apostolakis & Bonaca 
2004). 
 
2.3.2. Safety management in the nuclear industry 
 
Dr Zack Pate has stressed the following principle: “An organisation is strongly 
influenced by and is very responsive to perceived expectations from the top. 
And these perceived expectations can and often do have a profound impact on 
the behaviour of individuals in the organisation.” 
 
One factor connecting utility companies and nuclear power plants, contractors, 
regulators and researchers working in the field of nuclear power is the 
recognition of the paramount importance of safety. This is manifested in the 
form of extensive and conservative norms, procedures and laws that control 
nuclear power-related activities worldwide. However, the role of plant 
management cannot be underestimated because formal requirements alone do 
not guarantee safe operations. This is why active safety management and 
leadership are needed (OECD/NEA 1999a, OECD/NEA 1999b, Reason 1995). 
 
The Three Mile Island accident occurred in March 1979 and highlighted the 
shortcomings in the relationships between the plant owner, the licensee, and 
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the project organisation. Several actions were undertaken in response to the 
accident. The corrective actions were mainly focused on human engineering 
aspects such as technological, procedural, training and man-machine interface 
aspects. The increase in requirements and regulations thereafter is well known, 
and shaped the approach taken by the nuclear industry to the introduction of the 
discipline of human factors for several years. However, subsequent analyses on 
the causes of the accident pointed out the influence of factors related to deeper 
underlying organisational aspects such as project management, plant 
management and resources. It was increasingly believed that these aspects 
could have a significant impact on plant safety because they set the context 
under which plants are designed and operated, and the way in which plant 
hardware is utilised, maintained and understood by plant operators.  
 
It is instructive to note that, even organisational weaknesses were identified as 
significant in the investigation reports: 
 
• As the evidence accumulated, it became clear that the fundamental 
problems are people-related problems and not equipment problems 
(Kemeny 1979) 
• The responsibility of management at all levels should be integrated in a 
consistent way (Kemeny 1979) 
• There are structural problems in the organisations, there are deficiencies 
in various processes and there is a lack of communication between key 
individuals and groups (Kemeny 1979) 
• The principal deficiencies in commercial reactor safety today are not 
hardware problems; they are management problems (Rogovin 1980) 
• The kinds of changes needed to cope with these problems and attitudes 
are institutional, organisational, and managerial (Rogovin 1980) 
• Individuals managing and operating nuclear plants constitute a relevant 
safety system (Rogovin 1980). 
 
The human and organisational factor focus is shifting gradually from the 
individual operator performance towards the performance of the organisation. 
 
The Kemeny Commission – set up by President Jimmy Carter to investigate the 
March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant – had also 
recommended that: 
 
• The (nuclear power) industry should establish a programme that 
specifies the appropriate safety standards, including those for 
management, quality assurance, and operating procedures and 
practices, and that conducts independent evaluations. 
•  There must be a systematic gathering, review, and analysis of operating 
experience at all nuclear power plants coupled with an industry-wide 
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international communications network to facilitate the speedy flow of this 
information to the affected parties.  
 
In addressing those recommendations, the nuclear power industry in the US: 
 
• Established the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 
• Charged INPO with a mission that we continue to pursue today: To 
promote the highest levels of safety and reliability – to promote 
excellence – in the operation of commercial nuclear power plants (INPO 
website). 
 
The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) is an organisation created 
to improve safety at every nuclear power plant in the world. After the accident at 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986, nuclear operators realised 
worldwide that the consequences had an effect on every nuclear power plant 
and international co-operation was needed to ensure that such an accident can 
never happen again. WANO was formed in May 1989 by nuclear operators 
worldwide uniting to exchange operating experience in a culture of openness, 
so that members can work together to achieve the highest possible standards of 
nuclear safety. The culture of openness allows each operator to benefit and 
learn from others’ experiences, challenges and best practice, with the ultimate 
goal of improving nuclear plant safety, reliability and performance levels for the 
benefit of their customers throughout the world.  
 
WANO’s mission is: 
 
“To maximise the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants worldwide by 
working together to assess, benchmark and improve performance through 
mutual support, exchange of information and emulation of best practices.” 
 
“With safety as the only goal, WANO helps operators communicate effectively 
and share information openly. Experience shows many accidents could have 
been prevented if lessons had been learned from previous incidents. Ultimately, 
this will raise the performance of all operators to that of the best.” 
 
A workshop on “Organisational Factors Identification and Assessment” was 
initiated by the Expanded Task Force on Human Factors. The objective of this 
workshop is to identify the organisational factors, their links to the individual and 
their influence on human performance, as well as the mechanisms important for 
organisational reliability (OECD NEA 1999a). 
 
In 2002, OECD/NEA organised a workshop, which sought to present state-of-
the-art information on organisational theory and to determine which approaches 
may be suitable in terms of application to nuclear installations. The workshop 
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also provided a wide forum for exchanging experiences of, and approaches to, 
the issue of safety management. Following the workshop, a survey was 
developed to collect information and experiences on systematic approaches to 
safety management used by licensees and regulators. The “State-of-the-art 
report on systematic approaches to safety management” sets out the principal 
outcomes of the workshop and the survey practices in Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US 
(OECD/NEA 2006). 
 
The principal objectives of the report are (OECD/NEA 2006): 
 
• To clarify the concept of safety management and its role and influence in 
nuclear facility operations, with respect to other concepts such as human 
factors, quality management and safety culture 
• To identify approaches used by utilities and regulators from different 
countries, and to discuss specific tools and applications related to 
detection, prevention, monitoring, correction and mitigation of safety 
related issues 
• To identify needs for further research and development. 
 
The Special Experts’ Group on Human and Organisational Factors (SEGHOF) 
of the Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) has examined the 
role and influence of safety management in nuclear plant operations. The state -
of-the-art report provides a brief explanation of the relationship between safety 
management and safety culture, and reinforces the need to develop and sustain 
a robust safety management system as a part of the management system as a 
whole.  
 
A questionnaire-based survey was prepared to investigate licensee methods 
and tools and regulatory expectations. The principal findings of the survey are 
summarised as follows (OECD/NEA 2006): 
 
• There is a clear trend for regulatory bodies to develop regulatory 
requirements and guidelines on safety management 
• There is a move towards developing integrated management systems in 
which safety, quality and business management are not perceived as 
separate activities to be managed in different ways 
• A number of areas warranting further research and development in the 
area of safety management have been identified. 
 
What should be developed or done? For what purpose is safety management 
needed? The principal proposals of the survey are summarised as follows 
(OECD/NEA 2006): 
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• Development of internationally accepted models (or standards) for safety 
management against which existing management systems could be 
assessed 
• Development of tools to evaluate the performance of safety management 
(specific indicators and assessment methods) 
• Knowledge on safety management is not restricted to the nuclear 
industry. Concepts and methods developed for and applied in other high-
risk industries could be explored 
• Guidelines of regulatory expectations (performance objectives and 
criteria) in the area of safety culture and safety management 
• Safety Management programmes developed by each licensee to meet 
those expectations and to perform their own assessments 
• A standard or other prescriptive document may not attain the desired 
results, i.e. the achievement of a learning organisation 
• There is a need for methods, tools, which may be used for evaluating 
management of safety. It is difficult to measure what is a good 
management and what is not. There is a need for criteria. Some data 
may come from operational experience feedback 
• To establish a common understanding of the concept 
• To identify the relationships between safety management and traditional 
management systems 
• To incorporate human and organisational factors in safety management 
systems 
• To integrate safety management and safety culture 
• To update safety management systems with modern scientific 
approaches 
• In Knowledge Management systems to address the problem of 
knowledge losses due to early retirement or ageing workforce 
• Moving towards a Learning Organisation is a must for any today’s 
organisation.  
 
During the NEA/SEGHOF workshop on safety management, which was held in 
2002, a set of recommendations for future work was identified. They were 
structured in six main areas (OECD/NEA 2006): 
 
• Operating experience 
• Indicators and diagnosis 
• Intervention and improvement tools 
• In-depth research for specific issues 
• Regulatory activities needs 
• Other fields experience as related to nuclear safety. 
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The report also explores the development of current organisational theories and 
their application to nuclear plant safety management. It identified areas where 
future work should be considered (cf. INSAG-18, 2003). 
 
2.4. Knowledge management 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out that “knowledge” is not easily defined in an 
exact manner. Wittgenstein further warns us that this lack of definition may lead 
us to believe that since we do not know what it means we have no right to use 
it. His reply would be that: “There is no exact usage of the word knowledge; but 
we can make up several such usages, which will more or less agree with the 
ways the word is actually used” (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 27). 
  
2.4.1. What is knowledge? 
 
In the theory of the knowledge-creating process, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
adopt the traditional definition of knowledge as “justified true belief”. However, 
the focus is on the “justified” rather than the “true” aspect of belief. In traditional 
Western epistemology (the theory of knowledge), “truthfulness” is the essential 
attribute of knowledge. It is the absolute, static and non-human view of 
knowledge. This view, however, fails to address the relative, dynamic and 
humanistic dimensions of knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). 
 
Knowledge is dynamic, since it is created in social interactions amongst 
individuals and organisations. Knowledge is context-specific, as it depends on a 
particular time and space (Hayek 1945). Without being put into a context, it is 
just information, not knowledge. Knowledge is also humanistic, as it is 
essentially related to human action. Knowledge has the active and subjective 
nature represented by such terms as “commitment” and “belief” that is deeply 
rooted in individuals’ value systems. Information becomes knowledge when it is 
interpreted by individuals and given a context and anchored in the beliefs and 
commitments of individuals. Hence, knowledge is relational: such things as 
“truth”, “goodness” and “beauty” are in the eye of the beholder. In this study, we 
consider knowledge to be a dynamic human process of justifying personal belief 
toward the “truth” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). 
 
There are two types of knowledge: explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge can be expressed in formal and systematic language and 
shared in the form of data, scientific formulae, specifications, manuals and such 
like. It can be processed, transmitted and stored relatively easily. In contrast, 
tacit knowledge is highly personal and hard to formalise. Subjective insights, 
intuitions and hunches fall into this category of knowledge. Tacit knowledge is 
deeply rooted in action, procedures, routines, commitment, ideals, values and 
emotions (Schön 1983). It is difficult to communicate tacit knowledge to others, 
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since it is an analogue process that requires a kind of “simultaneous 
processing”. 
 
As Michael Polanyi (1967) wrote in The Tacit Dimension, we should start from 
the fact that “we can know more than we can tell”. He termed this pre-logical 
phase of knowing “tacit knowledge”. Tacit knowledge comprises a range of 
conceptual and sensory information and images that can be brought to bear in 
an attempt to make sense of something. Many bits of tacit knowledge can be 
brought together to help form a new model or theory. This inevitably led him to 
explore connoisseurship and the process of discovery (rather than with the 
validation or refutation of theories and models - in contrast with Popper, for 
example) (Smith 2003; cf. Polanyi 1969). 
 
Western epistemology has traditionally viewed knowledge as explicit. However, 
to understand the true nature of knowledge and knowledge creation, we need to 
recognise that tacit and explicit knowledge are complementary, and that both 
types of knowledge are essential to knowledge creation. Explicit knowledge 
without tacit insight quickly loses its meaning. Knowledge is created through 
interactions between tacit and explicit knowledge, rather than from tacit or 
explicit knowledge alone. 
 
Management scholars today consider knowledge and the capability to create 
and utilise knowledge to be the most important source of a firm’s sustainable 
competitive advantage (Drucker 1993). However, in spite of all the talk about 
knowledge-based management and in spite of the recognition of the need for a 
new knowledge-based theory there is little understanding of how organisations 
actually create and manage knowledge. 
 
This is partly because we lack a general understanding of knowledge and the 
knowledge-creating process. The knowledge management that academics and 
business people talk about often means just information management. In the 
long tradition of Western management, the organisation has been viewed as an 
information processing machine that takes and processes information from the 
environment to solve a problem and adapts to the environment based on a 
given goal. This static and passive view of the organisation fails to capture the 
dynamic process of knowledge creation. 
 
Instead of merely solving problems, organisations create and define problems, 
develop and apply new knowledge to solve the problems, and then further 
develop new knowledge through the action of problem solving. The organisation 
is not merely an information processing machine, but rather an entity that 
creates knowledge through action and interaction (Cyert and March 1963, 
Levinthal and Myatt 1994). It interacts with its environment, and reshapes the 
environment and even itself through the process of knowledge creation. Hence, 
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the most important aspect of understanding a firm’s capability concerning 
knowledge is the dynamic capability to continuously create new knowledge out 
of existing firm-specific capabilities. 
 
According to Nonaka et al. (2000), with this view of an organisation as an entity 
that creates knowledge continuously, we need to re-examine our theories of the 
firm, in terms of how it is organised and managed, how it interacts with its 
environment, and how its members interact with each other. The goal is to 
understand the dynamic process, in which an organisation creates, maintains 
and exploits knowledge. Knowledge is created in the spiral that goes through 
two seemingly antithetical concepts, such as order and chaos, micro and 
macro, part and whole, mind and body, tacit and explicit, self and other, 
deduction and induction, and creativity and control. Nonaka et al. (2000) argue 
that the key in leading the knowledge-creating process is dialectical thinking, 
which transcends and synthesises such contradictions. 
 
By expounding, discussing and illustrating organisational knowledge the 
objective of Georg von Krogh and Johan Roos (1995) is to present an 
observation scheme to better understand organisational knowledge 
development on the individual and the social scale. This observation scheme is 
intended for the knowledge development. 
 
The conceptual system distinguishes between individual knowledge and social 
knowledge, and describes the properties of both. It also makes two further 
attempts: first, to innovate a language that can describe the properties of 
knowledge, without resorting to conventional nomenclature; and, second, to 
innovate a language that can describe the messy, complex, and iterative 
processes that give rise to organisational knowledge (von Krogh, G. & Roos, J., 
1995). 
 
The word “epistemology” comes from the Greek words episteme (knowledge) 
and logos (theory). Epistemology has traditionally been conceived of as a 
branch of one of the grand divisions of philosophy, methodology, or ways we as 
human beings come to know the world. Epistemology is concerned with 
understanding the origin, nature and validity of knowledge: it seeks to provide 
knowledge about knowledge, and hence some refer to epistemology as theory 
of knowledge (von Krogh, G. & Roos, J., 1995). 
 
Von Krogh’s (von Krogh, G. & Roos, J., 1995) interpretation of organisational 
epistemology is, a collection of perspectives, theories and concepts related to 
the following set of issues: 
 
• How and why individuals within organisations come to know 
• How and why organisations, as social entities, come to know 
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• What counts for knowledge of the individual and the organisation 
• What are the impediments to organisational knowledge development 
 
2.4.2. Concept of knowledge management 
 
Knowledge management is an integrated, systematic approach to identifying, 
managing and sharing an organisation’s knowledge and enabling groups of 
people to create new knowledge collectively to help in achieving the 
organisation’s objectives. 
 
Knowledge may be applied for such purposes as: problem solving and learning; 
forming judgments and opinions; decision making, forecasting and strategic 
planning; generating feasible options for action and taking actions to achieve 
the desired results. Knowledge also protects intellectual assets from decay, 
augments intelligence and provides increased flexibility. Knowledge 
Management, Classic and Contemporary Works, provides an introduction to the 
field of knowledge management. Taking a learning-centric rather than 
information-centric approach, it emphasises the continuous acquisition and 
application of knowledge. 
 
2.4.3. Nonaka’s SECI model of knowledge creation 
 
In the dominant Western philosophy, the individual is the principal agent who 
possesses and processes knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi show that the 
individual interacts with the organisation through knowledge. Knowledge 
creation takes place at three levels: individual, group, and organisational. 
Therefore, the discussion of organisational knowledge creation consists of two 
major components: the forms of knowledge interaction and the levels of 
knowledge creation. The two forms of interactions – between tacit knowledge 
and explicit knowledge and between the individual and the organisation – will 
then bring about four major processes of knowledge conversion, which all 
together constitute knowledge creation: (1) from tacit to explicit; (2) from explicit 
to explicit; (3) from explicit to tacit; and (4) from tacit to tacit. The distinctive 
approach of Western philosophy to knowledge has profoundly shaped the way 
organisational theorists treat knowledge. The Cartesian split between subject 
and object, the knower and the known, has given birth to a view of the 
organisation as a mechanism for “information processing” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 
1995).  
 
Some knowledge that is quite complex and initially tacit can be externalized and 
embedded in a company’s products or services. The knowers use their 
expertise to develop a process or product that contains at least some of what 
they know. Any manufacturing process, whether automated or formalized in a 
set of procedures, is constructed from what was once the knowledge of 
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individuals. In theory, this embedded knowledge is independent of those who 
developed it and therefore has some organizational stability–an individual 
expert can disappear without bringing the process to a halt or reducing the 
company’s stock of embedded knowledge. In practice, however, it is difficult to 
locate the dividing line between knowledge that is fully embedded in a process 
and the tacit, human knowledge that keeps the process going (Davenport & 
Prusak 1998, p.83).  
 
Knowledge that is in part explicitly bound to the functions is relatively easy to 
transfer using documents and databases. Transferring tacit knowledge, on the 
other hand, requires extensive personal contact and interaction, allowing for the 
transfer of both tacit and explicit knowledge. As a general rule, the more rich 
and tacit knowledge is, the more technology should be used to enable people to 
share that knowledge directly (Davenport & Prusak 1998, pp.95-96). 
 
An organisation creates knowledge through the interactions between explicit 
knowledge and tacit knowledge. The interaction between the two types of 
knowledge is called ‘knowledge conversion’. Through the conversion process, 
tacit and explicit knowledge expands in both quality and quantity (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi 1995).  
 
There are four modes of knowledge conversion. The four modes of knowledge 
conversion are S=socialisation (from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge), 
E=externalisation (from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge), C=combination 
(from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge), and I=internalisation (from 
explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge) (Nonaka et al. 2001b, p. 16). The modes 
of knowledge conversion are presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. SECI model of knowledge creation (Nonaka & Toyama 2003, p. 5). 
 
Socialisation is a process of converting new tacit knowledge through shared 
experiences. Since tacit knowledge is difficult to formalise, tacit knowledge can 
be acquired only through shared experience. Socialisation typically occurs in a 
traditional apprenticeship, where apprentices learn the tacit knowledge needed 
in their craft through hands-on experience, rather than from written manuals or 
textbooks. Socialisation may also occur in informal social meetings outside of 
the workplace. Socialisation also occurs beyond organisational boundaries. 
Firms often acquire and take advantage of the tacit knowledge embedded in 
customers or suppliers by interacting with them (Nonaka et al. 2000, pp. 9-12). 
 
Externalisation is a process of articulating tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge. When tacit knowledge is made explicit, knowledge is crystallised, 
thus allowing it to be shared by others, and it becomes the basis of new 
knowledge. Concept creation in new product development is an example of this 
conversion process. Another example is a quality control circle, which allows 
employees to make improvements on the manufacturing process by articulating 
the tacit knowledge accumulated on the shop floor over years on the job. 
(Nonaka et al. 2000, pp. 9-12). 
 
Combination is a process of converting explicit knowledge into more complex 
and systematic sets of explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is collected from 
inside or outside the organisation and then combined, edited or processed to 
form new knowledge. The new explicit knowledge is then disseminated among 
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the members of the organisation. Creative use of computerised communication 
networks and large-scale databases can facilitate this mode of knowledge 
conversion. When information is collected from throughout the organisation and 
put together in a context to make an analysis report, that report is new 
knowledge in the sense that it synthesises knowledge from many different 
sources in one context. The combination mode of knowledge conversion can 
also include the breakdown of concepts thus creating systemic, explicit 
knowledge (Nonaka et al. 2000, pp. 9-12). 
 
Internalisation is a process of embodying explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge. Through internalisation, explicit knowledge created is shared 
throughout an organisation and converted into tacit knowledge by individuals. 
Internalisation is closely related to ‘learning by doing’. For example, training 
programmes can help trainees to understand an organisation and themselves. 
By reading documents or manuals about their jobs and the organisation, and by 
reflecting upon them, trainees can internalise the explicit knowledge written in 
such documents to enrich their tacit knowledge base. When knowledge is 
internalised to become part of individuals’ tacit knowledge bases in the form of 
shared mental models or technical know-how, it becomes a valuable asset. This 
tacit knowledge accumulated at the individual level can then set off a new spiral 
of knowledge creation when it is shared with others through socialisation 
(Nonaka et al. 2000, pp. 9-12).  
 
2.4.4. Expertise and learning organisation 
 
As Vaherva states, up to 80% of the new things learnt during one’s working 
career are learnt outside of formal training or different courses. Even if formal 
training is well planned and executed, it cannot guarantee how much of the new 
information learnt during training transfers to preparedness that is taken into 
use in the work (Vaherva 1999, pp. 93-94). For this reason, organisations have 
started to emphasise continuous, individual learning alongside traditional, 
individually focused training programmes (Launis & Engeström 1999, p. 67). 
 
However, it must be noted that informal learning cannot replace traditional 
learning based on formal training. It can only complement it. Today, formal 
training alone is not sufficient simply because it is usually based on very 
general, widely applicable training that focuses on thinking above acting 
(Vaherva 1999, p. 159). 
 
In practice, however, both informal and formal training are required. Nowadays, 
the pace of working in many organisations is very hectic, and there is no time 
for separate formal training. Therefore, personnel seek different means of 
informal learning, such as conversations, seminars, visits, and conferences, in 
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order to meet any competence requirements that have been brought up 
(Vaherva 1999, p. 99). 
 
An expert is a person who can solve problems in his or her field by analysing 
the field of problems, and form optimal solutions by synthesising and evaluating 
possible solutions. An expert knows the field so well that he or she has a 
structured overall idea of the field, its basic concepts, and processes as well as 
its main principles, their effects, and consequences. This requires learning-to-
learn skills and higher order thinking skills, as expertise is not a permanent 
status. Expertise, or expert-level knowledge and skills, must be continuously 
maintained and refreshed. Important factors affecting the development of 
expertise include personal metacognitive and learning-to-learn skills as well as 
the content, variety, and challenge of work, and the social network. This kind of 
learning at work can be promoted with job rotation and by forming interactive 
multi-disciplinary teams and workgroups (Alamäki 2000a; Alamäki 2000 b). 
 
Expert organisation is an organisational type whose main purpose is to 
continuously produce and maintain new information and special know-how for 
developing and maintaining systems or services. Ultimately, organisational 
learning depends on its experts’ ability and desire to learn and share 
information together. Company management has an important part in creating 
and maintaining such a system. Organisations and practices cannot change if 
the individuals’ thinking and the resulting behaviour remain the same. Practices 
are often guided by the organisational memory, culture, and current values. 
There are several examples of companies trying to change their functions with 
external factors, such as by providing more resources and time or creating 
better training plans and performing new tests. Experts and trainers may be 
involved in the change process. However, practices will not change if the 
employees only appear to be working according to the new system but their 
actions are still guided by the old thinking and operations models (Mäenpää 
1995). 
 
Two types that are essential in the analysis of the persistence and change of 
behaviour can be identified in how organisations, groups, and individuals 
behave. These two types are the espoused theory, or how people say they act, 
and the theory-in-use, or how people actually act. The espoused theory is 
easier to understand. It describes what people think and believe and how they 
say they act. It is often on a conscious level and can be easily changed by new 
ideas and information. However, it is difficult to be aware of the theory-in-use, 
and it is difficult to change (Mäenpää 1995). 
 
For Senge (1990, p. 3), learning organisations are the kinds of organisations 
where people have the opportunity to continuous development in order to 
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achieve the results they want, where the birth of new thinking models is 
encouraged and where people continuously learn how they can learn together. 
 
2.4.5. Core competency of groups and the organisation 
 
As the tasks in an organisation become more complex, it is more difficult for 
individual employees to manage the field of know-how required for their duties. 
The actual or perceived environmental unpredictability, rapidly changing 
information, requirements of efficiency, and binding strategic solutions have 
increased. Today, an organisation cannot maintain its ability to change only by 
satisfying individuals’ growth needs (Mäenpää 1997).  
 
Organisational learning and learning organisation have become central 
frameworks and goals for organisational development (Argyris & Schön 1978; 
Senge 1990; Senge 1991; Mäenpää 1997). According to Senge (1990), a 
learning organisation can set its know-how targets above the minimum required 
level of knowledge and skills. He argues that, unlike an organisation following a 
survival strategy, a learning organisation can maintain a learning process that is 
able to create new know-how. In the process of organisational development, the 
new know-how is joined with the previous know-how. Without an in-depth 
understanding of an organisation’s fields of know-how, development may easily 
become the obtaining of new, disconnected pieces of information. 
 
The concept of core competency 
 
The concept of core competency includes the following meanings, for example: 
an organisation’s collective skills, complex social skills, the ability to 
communicate and convey know-how vertically and horizontally inside the 
organisation and between interest groups, and the ability to combine existing 
and potential skills innovatively for producing new, significant know-how about 
the organisation’s processes or products. An organisation’s core competency is 
formed through a complex learning event, which is very significant only for the 
organisation in question (Prahalad & Hamel 1990; Teece et al. 1990; Leonard-
Barton 1992). Previously, a key question for business organisations was “What 
is the field of business that we are in? When analysing an organisation’s 
competitive advantage dynamically, the question is: “What special know-how 
does our organisation have that could form a basis for our business?” 
 
Mäenpää (1997) has analysed the way business organisations and researchers 
approach the concept of core competency. At least the following approaches 
are identifiable (Mäenpää 1997): 
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• Core competencies are mostly seen as static, latent properties – tacit 
knowledge and invisible assets; the focus is on the competency of 
individual employees 
• Core competencies are seen as process know-how, core processes 
(core capabilities); the first step of the analysis is to define the core 
processes  
• Core competencies combine the skills and processes in this order; core 
competency is mostly seen as collective know-how  
• Core competencies in the context of a learning organisation. Core 
competency includes processes that progress at different speeds. The 
organisation and group interact as an open system with their 
environment.  
 
Several approaches show a transition to finding and inspecting processes. First, 
the processes are defined and then the necessary know-how is located in the 
processes. In process know-how, managing the relationships between 
processes has developed into a kind of meta know-how (see e.g. Stalk et al. 
1992). One advantage of process thinking is that it emphasises the dynamic 
nature of know-how. However, focusing on process thinking includes a risk of 
treating know-how as if it were something that could be processed on a 
production line. The traditional process thinking is controlled by a strict systems 
theory. It is also difficult to separate content from the process. Moreover, 
defining processes involves a risk of incorrect definition and prioritisation 
(Mäenpää 1997). 
 
In general discussion, the concept of core competency has sometimes been 
used to describe the qualifications of individual employees. However, almost 
without exception, the current literature on organisational development defines 
core competency as collective know-how. The difference between core 
competency and group competency could be compared to the individual 
difference between an expert and a novice. Core competency is an 
organisation’s special competency related to advanced social skills that occurs 
on the group and organisational levels. Instead of “owning” information, core 
competency is the ability to share information. Even the same researchers use 
the concept to emphasise different sides of core competency; to describe an 
organisation’s specifically defined competencies, or its advanced social skills in 
general (Mäenpää 1997). 
 
In the organisational learning process, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) define core 
competency as one learning skill of an organisation, which enables it to co-
ordinate different production skills and combine different technological currents. 
They also list several features related to core competency (Mäenpää 1997): 
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• Core competency involves the skill to communicate and commit to work 
across organisational borders.  
• Core competencies develop as they are used and their use is expanded. 
• Core competency is cumulative, and it inspires new know-how and 
insights. 
• Core competency is difficult for competitors to imitate.  
• A medium-sized organisation can usually only have 2 to 5 fields of core 
competence. 
• Core competency exists in an organisation just as the superior know-how 
that is set as the competency target. 
   
Leonard-Barton (1992) describes the concept of core capabilities as four 
“intertwined” dimensions: 1) employees’ knowledge and skills, 2) technological 
systems, 3) the process of producing, controlling, and guiding the information 
included in management systems, and 4) values and norms related to 
knowledge, skills, and the processes of controlling and producing information. 
Unlike many other models, the values and norms are included in her model of 
core competency. She mentions that values are usually separated in the 
management literature. However, she understands that they are relevant to the 
development of core competencies. 
 
Two central fields of know-how that must be taken care of are: 
• New know-how needed for meeting strategic goals 
• Know-how required for the effective implementation of current 
operations. 
 
Group competence 
 
Meaningful information and knowledge transfer require the effective interaction 
of formal training, learning at work, and subconscious learning. Understanding 
group dynamics and social interaction is essential, as the information is quite 
often socially structured and formed. Therefore, know-how management 
includes the organising skills and system for sharing, classifying, and storing 
information, and methods related to know-how management. However, it is 
even more important to create a social and information technological system 
that enables obtaining and creating new information and know-how while 
performing duties (Mäenpää 1997). 
 
The company production process is usually split into task groups according to 
different organisational bases. A group comprises a fixed competency resource, 
which is expected to deliver a certain performance. Although the results rarely 
show who has performed which part of the work, everyone’s contribution is still 
essential in achieving the end result. When aiming to improve the contribution of 
a group, the best results are achieved if each member understands his or her 
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significance to the group. Each member’s contribution is important even if 
different duties require different levels of skill. This is something that should be 
emphasised when aiming to improve a group’s competency (Mäenpää 1997).  
 
As all people are different, we have different capacities and attitudes towards 
learning. Some see continuous learning as a challenge, while small 
improvements every now and then are enough for others. It is likely that people 
have applied for the duties that match their capabilities. Each employee’s 
contribution should be appreciated, and this appreciation should be clearly 
shown to the employee. When developing a group’s competency, it would be 
good to clarify right from the outset that not everyone needs to be good at 
everything. It is enough that the members can together perform what is 
expected of the group, but the workload needs to be distributed fairly inside the 
group (Mäenpää 1997). 
 
The people working in different phases of the production process are 
interconnected and dependent on others’ work performances. Therefore, the 
different production phases should be working together as smoothly as 
possible. The duties of each production phase contribute to the end result, and 
no phase can perform poorly. However, in some organisations, the borders 
between groups stop information transfer. Managers face a challenge of 
preventing the formation of uncooperative groups. The challenge is especially 
difficult as sometimes team spirit is an inspiration that drives the group to 
outperform other groups but, when taken too far, this may cause employees to 
start withholding information in order to highlight the performance of their own 
group (Mäenpää 1997).  
 
Team spirit can be utilised in engaging people and shaping attitudes. 
Previously, a strategy was considered a declaration issued from the top down. 
Understanding the values of the personnel is important in order to commit them 
to the company strategy. People act according to their values. People’s values 
are formed in the environment they belong to and, therefore, identification with 
the group should be promoted. Values are also formed by actions, and they can 
be shaped through participation. Therefore, a strategy process is optimally a 
dialogue between the management and the employees. A too specific strategy 
can diminish employee creativity, and so groups must have some say in the 
formation of the strategy (Mäenpää 1997). 
 
It is also unnecessary to impose on employees those values and strategies that 
they cannot identify with. The strategy process includes presenting upper-level 
visions to workgroups/teams with the discussion of the implications for and 
implementation in their work. Instead of taking a whole section of the company 
strategy at once, the visions could be broken down for the groups and 
discussed from each group’s perspective. The critical and core competencies 
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are also discussed from each group’s perspective in order to identify the 
competency needs and best working practices. Instead of individual 
competency, the focus should be placed on organisational competency. 
Developing competency is the slowest process in an organization (Mäenpää 
1997).  
 
2.4.6. Knowledge management in the nuclear industry 
 
The nuclear industry is knowledge based, similar to other highly technical 
industries, and relies heavily on the accumulation of knowledge. Recent trends, 
such as workforce ageing and declining student enrolment numbers, and the 
risk of losing accumulated knowledge and experience, have drawn attention to 
the need for better management of nuclear knowledge. 
 
The draft glossary of terms for knowledge management compiled by the IAEA 
was used as the basis for a discussion by the participants on issues and 
terminology related to knowledge management. A practical exercise was also 
conducted on the aspects of capturing tacit knowledge. The results of the 
discussion and the practical exercise are highlighted below (IAEA 2005):  
 
• Tacit knowledge refers to the accumulated knowledge held by re-
searchers, scientists, technologists, engineers, plant managers and 
operators who are working, or have worked, within the industry. 
Capturing tacit knowledge is one of the most important elements of the 
preservation of nuclear knowledge (cf. Nonaka 1995). 
• There are knowledge management experts who are optimistic that 
technical solutions can eventually be found to overcome the difficulties in 
eliciting tacit knowledge and transforming it into explicit knowledge. 
Others are sceptical about the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge as they believe that it is futile and that the endeavour should 
be abandoned altogether because it would never be possible to capture 
the rich common-sense knowledge that underlies all human reasoning. 
Hence, these researchers tend to focus on shaping corporate culture to 
encourage the sharing of knowledge (cf. Nonaka 1995). 
 
As a field, knowledge management is relatively new. It is an amalgam of 
concepts borrowed from the artificial intelligence/knowledge based systems, 
software engineering, business process re-engineering, human resource 
management and organisational behaviour fields. Knowledge management has 
been the most visibly introduced to the nuclear industry as a response to the 
ageing nuclear industry workforce in IAEA member states, where the generation 
that designed, commissioned and initially operated these plats has begun to 
reach retirement age. Knowledge management tools for capture and transfer of 
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fundamental nuclear knowledge from the ageing workforce to its younger 
replacement have been emphasized (IAEA 2005). 
 
A threat to sustaining nuclear competence, recognised for quite some time, has 
been the declining number of appropriately qualified young professionals 
entering the field. This trend has an adverse impact on preserving and further 
developing the accumulated nuclear knowledge and expertise. In nuclear power 
plant organisations the loss of institutional memory of nuclear knowledge could 
become the precursor of problems in nuclear safety. Therefore, the decline in 
the number of students of nuclear sciences and a growing number of 
universities giving up their nuclear education programmes have given rise to 
understandable concerns (IAEA 2005).  
 
Many nuclear power plant experts around the world are retiring, taking with 
them a great deal of knowledge and corporate memory. The people retiring are 
those who can answer questions easily and have tacit knowledge that was not 
extracted from them previously. Loss of employees who hold knowledge that is 
critical either to operations or safety poses an internal threat to the safety and 
operation of nuclear power plants. The primary challenge of preserving 
knowledge is to find ways in which tacit knowledge might be captured or at least 
be transferred to successors (IAEA 2005).  
 
Maintaining competences in the nuclear industry and nuclear regulatory 
authorities will be one of the most critical challenges in the near future. There 
have been very few orders for new nuclear power plants in the Western world in 
the past few decades. The ability of universities to attract top quality students to 
nuclear programmes, meet the future staffing requirements of the nuclear 
industry and conduct leading edge research in nuclear topics is becoming 
seriously compromised in industrialised countries. National studies undertaken 
by several member countries of the OECD/NEA have shown that in spite of 
several initiatives undertaken by them, more engineers and scientists with 
nuclear knowledge are required than are graduating. For example, in Germany, 
the number of students graduating in nuclear related subjects dropped to almost 
zero in 2001. Maintaining competence is a high priority issue. Continuous 
technical training, succession planning and effective implementation of a 
knowledge management strategy are of paramount importance in coping with 
the adverse impact of the increasing rate of retirement of nuclear workers (IAEA 
2004). 
 
In recent years, knowledge is increasingly being recognised as a primary 
source of wealth. The nuclear industry has been losing its attractiveness to 
young professionals over the last few decades, thereby causing an adverse 
impact on preserving and further developing the accumulated nuclear 
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knowledge and expertise over the last six decades. It could also negatively 
affect future potential to apply nuclear techniques and methods in important 
areas. A number of initiatives have been implemented in order to maintain 
competency, capture and preserve existing knowledge, advance nuclear 
technology, develop future nuclear workers and maintain a critical level of R&D 
capabilities (IAEA 2005). 
 
Knowledge management (KM) is defined within the IAEA as an integrated, 
systematic approach to identifying, acquiring, transforming, developing, 
disseminating, using, sharing and preserving knowledge, relevant to achieving 
specified objectives. Knowledge management consists of three fundamental 
components: people, processes and technology. Knowledge management 
focuses on people and organisational culture in order to stimulate and nurture 
the sharing and use of knowledge; on processes or methods to find, create, 
capture and share knowledge; and on technology to store and make knowledge 
accessible and to allow people to work together without being together. People 
are the most important component, because managing knowledge depends 
upon people’s willingness to share and reuse knowledge (IAEA 2005). 
 
The Fraunhofer Reference Model for knowledge management has been 
recognised as one of the few holistic knowledge management frameworks for 
standardisation in Europe. The model is a three-layer schema that depicts the 
relationships between value-adding business processes, four knowledge 
management core processes, and six design fields of knowledge management 
(IAEA 2005).  
 
Heisig (2002) presents several approaches towards Knowledge Management: 
 
• Spiral of Knowledge Creation by Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995 
• Three Pillars of Knowledge Management by Wiig 2000 
• Four KM Pillars Conceptual Model by Stankosky 1999 
• The Knowledge Life Cycle (KLC) Framework developed by KMCI, 
Firestone, McElroy 2002 
• Levers for the Development of a Knowledge Enterprise, Booz, Allen & 
Hamilton 2001 
• Framework of Intellectual Capital Management by IBM Corp. 2001 
• Knowledge Management as Organisational Competence by Cranfield 
School of Management 2001 
• Knowledge Management Media Reference Model by mcm-institute St. 
Gallen, Eppler et al. 2001 
• Knowledge Management Framework by APQC/Arthur Andersen 1996 
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• Building blocks of Knowledge Management by Probst, Raub, Romhardt 
1997 
• Knowledge Enabling: The 5x5 Grid by von Krogh, Ichijo, Nonaka 2000 
• Business Knowledge Management Framework by Bach, Vogler, Österle 
1999 
• Knowledge Management Process Framework by Bukowitz, Williams 
1999 
• Knowledge management event chain by Despres, Chauvel 1999 
• Knowledge Value Chain by Weggemann 1999 
• Different components of the structure of operations on knowledge by van 
der Spek, Spijkervet 1997 
• Knowledge Management approach of CommonKADS by Schreiber, 
Akkermans et al. 2000 
• Nine Success Factors (hypotheses) for Knowledge Projects by 
Davenport, Prusak 1998 
• Central concepts of process oriented KM by Remus 2002 
• Tasks of Knowledge Management by Allweyer 1998 
• Basic model of KM by Amelingmeyer 1999 
• Components of KM by VBM 2000 
(Association of Bavarian Metal and Electro Industry – KM Guideline for 
SMEs) 
• The Fraunhofer IPK Reference Model for KM by Heisig 2000 
• The Movement of Knowledge in the I-Space by Boisot 1998 
• Knowledge Management Process Model by Kucza 2001 
• Four perspectives which form Knowledge Management by Rivero 2002 
• Know-Net Framework 2002 
• Knowledge Ecology 2002 
• Knowledge Production System Activities Global Knowledge Economics 
Council KM Framework 
• The Design fields of the Knowledge Management Maturity Model 
(KMMM®) 
• The Intellectual Capital of the Firm by Sullivan 1998 
• EKMF KM Framework – Version 1.4 (2002). 
 
The following definition of Knowledge management complements the earlier 
definition provided (IAEA 2006a): 
 
“Knowledge management includes all methods, instruments and tools that 
contribute to the promotion of an integrated core knowledge process — with the 
following four core activities as a minimum, to generate knowledge, to store 
knowledge, to distribute knowledge, and to apply knowledge — in all areas and 
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levels of the organisation in order to enhance organisational performance by 
focusing on the value creating business processes.” 
 
Note the pervasive impact of KM across the entire organisation. Succinctly put, 
“Knowledge management is the process through which organisations generate 
value from their intellectual and knowledge-based assets (IAEA 2006a).”  
 
2.4.7. Knowledge Management developments at the IAEA 
 
The IAEA is developing a series of guidance documents on knowledge 
management, including knowledge preservation, knowledge loss risk 
assessment, and knowledge transfer in the nuclear sector. The IAEA 
knowledge management initiative has developed a dual objective: an external 
one oriented to the needs of member states to manage nuclear knowledge and 
competence, and an internal one focused on knowledge management inside 
the organisation. The external knowledge management objective relates to how 
the IAEA involves nuclear knowledge management in programmatic activities 
with member states (IAEA 2005). 
 
The four discernible elements of external knowledge management activities, 
which have been identified by the member states, are (IAEA 2005): 
 
• Enhancing nuclear education and training 
• Preserving and maintaining nuclear knowledge 
• Pooling and analysing nuclear knowledge 
• Promoting policy and guidance for nuclear knowledge management 
 
The objective of the IAEA in the medium term is to be the independent, credible 
and authoritative international source of nuclear data, nuclear information and 
knowledge, and to maintain an adequate potential to meet the needs for 
capacity building, analysis and technology transfer in support of the peaceful, 
economically beneficial and safe use of atomic energy. A strategic framework 
for developing nuclear knowledge management involves six areas for the 
development of projects and activities (IAEA 2005): 
 
• New partnerships for the advancement of nuclear knowledge 
• Networks for education, training and knowledge transfer in nuclear 
science and technology 
• Support in preserving, maintaining and widening the knowledge base 
• Developing a coherent set of methodologies, guides and services for 
nuclear knowledge management 
• Introducing knowledge management as a tool to strengthen safety and 
security 
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• Knowledge packages and knowledge organisation systems in areas of 
interest to the IAEA member states. 
 
The IAEA internal knowledge management objective for the medium term is the 
development of a systematic and integrated approach for identifying, managing 
and sharing the organisation’s knowledge, and creating new knowledge to 
enable maintaining a high level of competence in the areas of interest to 
member states. Fulfilling the knowledge management objective will make the 
collective knowledge and experience of the organisation available and 
accessible to individual staff members, who are expected to use it wisely and to 
help replenish the knowledge stock by sharing their individual knowledge and 
experience. Such an ongoing cycle will encourage learning at work, will 
stimulate collaboration, and will empower members of staff to continually 
enhance their performance. The successful and efficient operation of any 
nuclear power plant is highly dependent on effective knowledge management 
processes (IAEA 2005; cf. Paajanen 2006; cf. Viitala 2005). 
 
A clear distinction between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge is the fact 
that explicit knowledge is easily duplicated and distributed while tacit knowledge 
is not. One of the potential benefits of knowledge management is the elicitation 
of tacit knowledge and its conversion to explicit knowledge. A general 
conclusion is that elicitation is difficult and results in incomplete (explicit) 
knowledge. It is difficult because people find it hard to fully describe what they 
know and it is incomplete because it always assumes background knowledge 
with the reader. The danger then is that the tacit knowledge converted to explicit 
knowledge might imply a level of comprehensiveness that it does not have. 
These difficulties have divided knowledge management experts into two camps 
(IAEA 2005). 
 
The first camp views failures as largely technical. These experts are commonly 
technological optimists who believe that solutions will be found for the elicitation 
of knowledge as technology improves. They tend to focus on issues such as 
knowledge bases (IAEA 2005). 
 
In the second camp are the technological sceptics. They believe that elicitation 
of tacit knowledge is futile and that the endeavour should be abandoned 
altogether because it would never be possible to uncover and capture the rich 
common sense knowledge that underlies all of human reasoning. Hence, these 
researchers tend to focus on corporate culture and its effects on the sharing of 
knowledge (IAEA 2005). 
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The criteria and guidelines for an assessment of knowledge management 
functions in nuclear power plant operating organisations are given in the 
following. The particular areas of interest include (IAEA 2005): 
 
• Knowledge management policies and strategies 
• Knowledge capture/transfer methods and techniques 
• Training and qualifications 
• Communication methods and techniques 
• Human resource management 
• Methods for effectively learning from operating experience 
• Work control methods to facilitate knowledge management 
• Human performance improvement 
• Implementing procedures and documentation 
• Information technology solutions supporting knowledge management. 
 
By the early 1990s, it was clear that there were two distinct branches of 
Knowledge Management. 
 
First-generation Knowledge Management involves the capture of information 
and experience so that it is easily accessible in a corporate environment. 
Managing this capture allows the system to grow into a powerful information 
asset. This first generation had its roots in the use of information technology. In 
this view, Knowledge Management is an issue of information storage and 
retrieval. It uses ideas derived from management theory. Typically, first-
generation Knowledge Management involved developing sophisticated data 
analysis and retrieval systems with little thought as to how the information they 
contained would be developed or used. This led organisations to invest heavily 
in technological fixes that had either little impact or a negative impact on the 
way in which knowledge was used (IAEA 2006a). 
  
Faced with the theoretical and practical difficulties of first generation techniques 
to live up to their promise, theorists began to look more closely at the ways in 
which knowledge is created and shared. Along with this realisation came a 
change in metaphor. Organisations came to be seen as capable, and so a link 
grew between learning theory and management (IAEA 2006a). 
  
Second-generation Knowledge Management gives priority to the way in which 
people construct and use knowledge. It is closely related to organisational 
learning. The goal of Knowledge Management in its second generation is to 
improve an organisation’s effectiveness by leveraging three learning processes 
in smart and lasting ways (IAEA 2006a): 
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• Learning from successes and failures at the individual, team and 
organisational levels 
• Learning from peers and colleagues in the organisation 
• Learning from the outside: suppliers, customers, competitors, and non-
nuclear enterprises. 
 
Knowledge Management should empower the plant staff to integrate these 
learning processes into their work practices and habits. However, learning 
should take place in a focused, relevant way because learning itself is not the 
goal, but, rather, is a tool to improve the organisation’s performance and 
capabilities (IAEA 2006a; cf. Nonaka et al. 2008). 
 
2.4.8. Nordic perspective 
 
An objective of “Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Workshop on Knowledge 
Management in Nordic Nuclear Power Plants” was to explore if and how 
knowledge retention activities could be coordinated between the various Nordic 
utilities. The main conclusions of the workshop can be summed up as follows: 
Establishing good knowledge management routines is recognised by many 
utilities today. However, there seems to be no real consensus on what should 
be focused on in the present situation. Maybe the most pressing problem is to 
avoid undesirable consequences of the massive retirement soon to follow. Still, 
there is no consensus on what those consequences might be, and what should 
be done to avoid them. There is also no clear signal from the safety authorities 
on how to approach the problem. Without clear indications from the safety 
authorities it is doubtful that the utilities will prioritise knowledge management to 
the degree that will be needed to deal systematically with the problem. It is the 
impression of the author that there is still some way to go before the Nordic 
nuclear power plants industry has decided on priorities and solution strategies 
for the knowledge management problems of the future (Nilsen 2005). 
 
During the first few years of Knowledge Management, the main focus was 
placed on the role of technology. Changes to the organisation were not 
considered effective means to improve Knowledge Management. This view 
prevailed almost 10 years from the beginning of the 1990s to the new 
millennium. The predominant philosophy during this first period was the 
assumption that knowledge problems were caused by ‘not-enough-of-explicit-
knowledge’ (Articulating and integrating innovation in business, IBM Global 
Services website). Consequently the challenge was to extract, codify, organise, 
index, and retrieve knowledge, from data, from people, from documents etc. 
Technology/software was available to support those tasks to a certain degree, 
and appeared as an easy way toward a working solution (Nilsen 2005). 
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After the first wave of Knowledge Management enthusiasm, reports on failures 
started to seep in, and the suspicions that Knowledge Management was 
another consultant’s fad started to spread. At the same time, some people 
started to look for an explanation as to why so many Knowledge Management 
initiatives failed. As part of this process, new viewpoints on knowledge emerged 
(Nilsen 2005): 
 
• Knowledge is not really the asset, but the people owning the knowledge 
and being able to exploit it are the asset. 
• Knowledge is not only explicit, but also implicit and tacit, actually it could 
happen that the most valuable knowledge is tacit and so people started 
to suggest that an important part of knowledge could never be codified. 
• Knowledge is extremely dynamic, technology often ended in creating 
repositories difficult to update. 
• Instead of managing knowledge it is necessary to look at the knowledge 
process. 
 
This led to a big change in perspectives, and today some theoreticians talk 
about a first generation Knowledge Management and the second generation. 
The shift of focus to the human and organisation does not mean that technology 
has become irrelevant, or that the first technological phase was a big mistake. 
Experiences collected during the first Knowledge Management generation era 
are still useful since they enabled a more focused exploitation of the technology 
during the second generation era, which is the era that we are currently 
experiencing (Nilsen 2005). 
 
 
2.5. Summarising this chapter 
 
Organisational culture’s definitional problems mirror longstanding arguments in 
anthropology, archaeology, and cultural anthropology about the general concept 
of culture. There is continuing debate between anthropologically oriented and 
materially oriented archaeologists over what culture is. The situation is perhaps 
even less clear relative to organisational culture. 
 
There are very few areas of general consensus about organisational culture. 
They include the five assumptions stated earlier in this chapter: 
 
• Organisational cultures exist 
• Each organisational culture is relatively unique 
• Organisational culture is a socially constructed concept 
• Organisational culture provides organisation members with a way of 
understanding and making sense of events and symbols 
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• Organisational culture is a powerful lever for guiding organisational 
behaviour. It functions as “organisational control mechanisms, informally 
approving or prohibiting some patterns of behaviour”. 
 
Beyond these five basic points agreement is very limited, and the points say 
nothing about what organisational culture is. Consensus is restricted to its 
existence, relative uniqueness, and a few functions that it performs. 
 
The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) introduced the 
concept of safety culture in its report (INSAG-4, 1991). It is used to describe the 
corporate atmosphere or culture in which safety is understood to be, and is 
accepted as, the number one priority. In high-risk industries safety should be 
the dominating characteristic of corporate culture. Safety culture is a sub-
component of corporate culture, which alludes to individual, job, and 
organisational features that affect and influence health and safety. Nuclear 
safety culture is a sub-component of safety culture. 
 
There are three main components to safety culture; psychological, situational 
and behavioural, and there are a number of tools available, qualitative and 
quantitative, which can be used to measure them. Grote and Künzler’s claim 
that models of safety culture suffer from a lack of integration into general 
models of organisation and of organisational culture. In addition the connection 
between safety-related characteristics of a system and more general 
characteristics like job and organisational design and the use of technology, is 
missing. The definition of the primary work tasks should include safety, to foster 
in analogy to the Total Quality Management approach a Total Safety 
Management. This idea will be further modified and developed in this thesis.  
 
It can be concluded that theories related to nuclear safety culture give little 
guidance on how to apply this concept to enhance safety of nuclear power plant 
operation. 
 
Knowledge management is a process used to create, acquire, store, share and 
apply knowledge. Knowledge management is an integrated, systematic 
approach to identifying, managing and sharing an organisation’s knowledge and 
enabling groups of people to create new knowledge collectively to help in 
achieving the organisation’s objectives. In spite of all the talk about knowledge-
based management and in spite of the recognition of the need for a new 
knowledge-based theory there is little understanding of how organisations 
actually create and manage knowledge. 
 
Nonaka and Takeuchi show that the individual interacts with the organisation 
through knowledge. Knowledge creation takes place at three levels: individual, 
group, and organisational. Therefore, the discussion of organisational 
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knowledge creation consists of two major components: the forms of knowledge 
interaction and the levels of knowledge creation. The two forms of interactions – 
between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge and between the individual and 
the organisation – will then bring about four major processes of knowledge 
conversion, which all together constitute knowledge creation: (1) from tacit to 
explicit; (2) from explicit to explicit; (3) from explicit to tacit; and (4) from tacit to 
tacit (SECI model of knowledge creation). 
 
As David Stamps states: “Companies need to quit thinking in terms of training 
and start thinking about knowledge creation and knowledge transfer as distinct 
and important business processes.” This is outstandingly important in the 
nuclear power plant organisations. 
 
An analogy that should be followed is the “Systematic Approach to Training” 
that is used for training activities; as a result of the development, the nuclear 
power plant would have a documented “Systematic Approach to Safety”. This 
documentation would describe how safety is related to practical work. This 
would turn safety culture into a concrete tool. Documented safety thinking 
provides the organisation with a common starting point for future development.  
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3. RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
3.1. Studies on knowledge management  
 
“The new paradigm is that the basic economic resource is no longer capital, nor 
natural resources, nor labour. It is and will be knowledge” (Drucker 1993). The 
use of nuclear technology relies on the accumulation of knowledge and is 
characterised by long time scales and technical excellence. 
 
The following studies deal with knowledge management problems and are 
based on master’s theses by Liikamaa (2000), Isotalo (2002), Alatolonen 
(2000), and Paajanen (2003), in addition to specific studies by Alamäki and 
Mäenpää (2002) and Koskinen (2001) related to transfer of tacit knowledge in 
the maintenance organisation and transfer of tacit knowledge between the 
workers of the old generation and young generation.  
 
3.1.1. Human resource management 
 
Issues related to human resource management are generally considered the 
important. Essential questions are: 
 
• How to attract new employees?  
• How to retain competent workers? 
 
For attracting new employees, the nuclear power industry should better utilise 
the fact that it is, after all, a rather secure employer. However, people have 
different expectations: career, money, working in power generation rather than 
at a decommissioning plant, etc. A good salary is maybe too easy a solution. In 
general, utilities should be able to market the industry more effectively. A steady 
intake of new recruits helps to avoid many problems (Alamäki & Mäenpää 
2002). 
 
A further question arises on how knowledge should be transferred to the 
younger generation. It is very difficult because formal training can never replace 
experience, which is essential. Knowledge transfer must be encouraged. The 
real challenge is how essential knowledge can be transferred without 
transferring all the outdated practices and thinking. National governments 
should ensure that adequate education and training is made available in the 
nuclear industry, but this is not always the reality (Alamäki & Mäenpää 2002). 
 
Nuclear power plants in Western Europe and North America are facing major 
problems due to the retirement of many employees. This is especially significant 
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considering that, as a working environment, a nuclear power plant requires 
special knowledge that cannot be obtained elsewhere. In the course of their 
long careers, the retiring personnel have developed a very high level of 
expertise and understanding of the plant. The personnel seem to be worried 
about who can continue their life’s work and take care of the plant after them, 
expressing responsibility. Moreover, they are on average highly committed and 
demonstrate a strong work ethic (Alamäki & Mäenpää 2002). 
 
Almost without exception, it takes 2–3 years to train and familiarise new 
employees until they can start to take responsibility independently. It is essential 
for safety and the duties of operation and maintenance that the employees 
understand the plant’s operation as a whole and are familiar with their own 
duties as well. Performing the duties independently in a safe and efficient 
manner is demanding in most positions. There is no room for error, so expertise 
must be thoroughly ensured. For new employees, this job requires patience and 
care – especially since actual disturbances or maintenance-related repair tasks 
occur rarely. Therefore, learning the duties and working methods requires 
managers to have patience towards new employees, and the employees to 
have the right attitude and personality. Experienced employees, many of whom 
have been working at the plant since its early days, have in the course of their 
work become highly trained specialists. They are experts in their field. It is 
typical of these experts that they themselves are not even aware of how deep 
their knowledge and expertise really is. One reason for this is that these 
experienced professionals have obtained their practical know-how through tacit 
knowledge, which is sometimes difficult to articulate into words (Alamäki & 
Mäenpää 2002).  
 
Because of economic pressures, often when an employee retires, others share 
the work. Currently, experienced long-time employees are able to do the work 
of two people due to their extensive knowledge and good understanding about 
the operation of the plan. They have developed a so-called extended working 
memory, which enables them to keep in mind and process more separate 
matters than usual, and they have an improved ability to perceive things. In the 
future, risks emerge when the long-term employees are replaced with less 
experienced employees who are not capable of handling two tasks at once. 
Professionals produce results always on time with good quality. The educational 
framework that young people have experienced shows also some dissimilarity 
with the educational framework existing thirty years ago (Alamäki & Mäenpää 
2002).  
 
In order to ensure that the special knowledge in a nuclear power plant 
organisation is transferred forward, the organisation will always need younger 
people to whom the knowledge and skills, which are obtained through 
experience, can be transferred. The recruitment of new personnel and 
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knowledge transfer should be started already a few years before the personnel 
retire. In knowledge transfer, it is relevant to understand that most of the 
practical knowledge that an organisation has is undocumented. One example is 
the observation that if NASA wanted to make a quick trip to the Moon right now, 
they would have to hire many of the experts who were employed over 30 years 
ago to plan and carry out the lunar mission. It is difficult to document the 
complex and detailed knowledge and understanding of the system as a whole 
that are obtained through experience. Human thinking and knowledge is such 
an intricate process that all attempts to store and document it will omit relevant 
information. Especially if performing something that requires a team or a large 
organisation, all the related dynamics, non-verbal processes, and streams of 
information are not yet known (Alamäki & Mäenpää 2002).   
 
The following problems may arise in the transfer of knowledge and expertise 
(Koskinen 2001): 
 
• There is no clear definition of less experienced people to whom 
knowledge should be transferred 
• The company does not understand that, for instance, transferring the 
understanding about a plant to new personnel takes several years  
• Even good thesis students are only offered a six-month contract, which is 
why young people do not remain with the company 
• Documentation is partially outdated and cannot be transferred as is 
• Individual persons have been responsible for different fields of know-how 
• Separate closed cliques have been formed inside the company 
• The direction of learning goals is not always clear 
• Senior employees do not always understand that many things they 
consider self-evident are clear obstacles for learning to young 
employees. 
 
Usually senior employees are motivated to work. Reasons that reduce the 
motivation for young employees include (Koskinen 2001): 
 
• The company has old-fashioned working methods 
• They cannot see the next step that they could try to reach in their career 
• The duties are too familiar to them and not challenging enough 
• The relationships between people are weak 
• Personnel management is weak 
• Underlying problems are not acknowledged. 
 
For the most part, senior employees feel that at least the company 
management appreciates their expertise. Younger employees do not feel the 
appreciation very clearly. The company should avoid forming units that only 
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include long-term employees and very young persons. This is because people 
of around the same age usually share similar values and attitudes, so they tend 
to interact more with one another and avoid interacting with people of a different 
age (Koskinen 2001). 
 
3.1.2. Maintaining competences in the nuclear industry 
 
New employees should be recruited a few years before they have to take 
independent responsibility for their duties. According to the interview results, it 
takes 2–3 years for new employees to learn the new duties well enough that 
they can take responsibility independently. This is quite a credible statement in 
the light of scientific studies. For all experts, work itself is a much more 
important way of learning than any course or training programme. Naturally, 
education is important, but its role should be seen as one teaching theoretical 
basics, which are elaborated upon and developed through practical work 
(Alamäki & Mäenpää 2002; Koskinen 2001). 
 
The planning of training requires the reinforcement of pedagogic expertise, as 
the experts in a technical field are not teachers or educators – nor should they 
be, if they are supported by experts in that field. It should be mentioned here 
that teaching and training are not considered knowledge transfer, as the taught 
or trained information is not transferred as is into the minds of the learners to 
become know-how. Knowledge is not a concrete object or matter; it is an 
individual’s own construction about something. Learners who can remember 
and list information are not necessarily ready to apply and use that information 
in an actual context if they have not yet understood and observed its structure 
and content themselves. The purpose of pedagogic expertise is to help convey 
and transfer technical substance knowledge to learners using the right methods 
and phasing so that the learners can prepare for action. 
 
Knowledge and know-how transfer should utilise the master and apprentice 
model, which combines several proven training and pedagogy-related elements. 
This model transfers both so-called tacit knowledge obtained through 
experience and more codified knowledge that can be expressed more easily.  
 
A true master can simplify things and convey them in a clear and concise way. 
He or she can show the learner where to find information, explain things in an 
understandable way, correct misconceptions, and evaluate the learning process 
and the learner’s abilities to learn.   
 
The special in-depth know-how needed at a nuclear power plant cannot be 
taught fully by an outsider. The nuclear power plant technology and the related 
safety culture are something that requires knowledge and understanding of the 
field for teachers, even if they are experts in their own field. Employees need 
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freedom for retraining and self-development in their special field. Therefore, 
training methods should discuss developing learning-to-learn skills and the 
principles of lifetime learning. 
 
The work itself and its contents are the most significant thing for the 
development of expertise. Learning at work is the most important method in 
expert development. It can and should be supported with theoretical training 
courses and online training resources. Becoming an expert in a field does not 
happen in a few months. Even in a diverse working environment it takes many 
years. Understanding and analysing things is not enough; an expert must be 
able to independently solve even surprising problems that he or she encounters 
and to assess their impact and consequences (Alamäki & Mäenpää 2002). 
 
Working method and process knowledge is required in addition to the 
necessary basic competency, for instance, on the nuclear power plant 
technology. Working methods include knowledge that is partially instructed, but 
mostly methods, learnt through experience, that are not reasonable to convey 
by instructions. The basic training can be utilised effectively only after these 
competencies (Vähämäki 2008). 
 
Core competencies are a company’s working methods and procedures that 
ensure that the approved strategic targets and visions can be realised. Core 
competencies can also include the following: 
 
• Procedures that ensure the expertise of the interest groups on which the 
operation is dependent in the future 
 contractors 
 research institutes 
 universities 
 technical support organisations 
• Ensuring personnel resources 
 resource availability at educational institutions of different levels 
 training personnel to become highly qualified specialists in their 
duties  
• Good (productive) management of community relations 
• Inspiring and engaging personnel (learning organisation) 
 improving information transfer 
 improving human resources management 
 
3.1.3. Transfer of formal and tacit knowledge   
 
Isotalo (2002) has studied the experiences of new employees on their expertise, 
learning in the organisation, and information transfer and sharing inside the 
organisation. The empirical material of the study was collected via survey forms. 
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The study focused on persons who had entered permanent employment at a 
nuclear power company after 1998. The focus group comprised 34 persons. 
This survey study used a quantitative method to analyse the results (cf. 
Tannenbaum 1997).  
  
The majority of the participants in the survey seem to have also used other 
methods of informal learning. Most of the respondents (65%) felt that official 
training was not the best way to receive induction. The reasons for this cannot 
be found in the results of this study; instead, we need to examine the 
developments in the induction training during earlier years. Initially, the 
commissioning of the nuclear power plant, fine adjustment of control systems, 
and the elimination of operational disturbances consumed a significant amount 
of resources. In addition, training was not the responsibility of an external 
organisation unit; instead, it had been delegated to the organisation units. 
Therefore, induction training has been mostly limited to compulsory entrance 
training, which is a requirement for the access card. The rest has been the 
responsibility of the supervisor and colleagues. The implementation of the 
training may have often been delayed due to other work pressures, and it has 
not been as systematic as it is now.  
 
During the years of recession in the early 1990s, very few new employees were 
hired. During this time, however, the contractor training programme and its 
related documentation were renewed in Finnish, English, and German. The 
purpose was to familiarise the external outage personnel with the power 
company’s procedures, especially to ensure safety. This documentation has 
been later supplemented to include a general technical description of the plant 
and the general design basis of its safety systems. The sections concerning 
safety culture, occupational safety, human error prevention, and the reporting of 
defects have been added. This material has been developed into more 
extensive induction documentation for in-house personnel. 
  
The reason why the actual induction training has only later on been developed 
is partially explained by the fact that the number of new employees has only 
started to increase in recent years. Therefore, only a small number of the 
respondents (those who started in 2002) have been able to participate in actual 
induction training. The lack of systematic induction training is also evidenced by 
the fact that, when the participants were asked whether “trial and error” is more 
important for work initiation than official training, the variation in the responses 
was very high. However, most of the respondents felt that “trial and error” 
affected their work induction more than official training. 
 
For on the job learning, important factors also include reflecting on one’s 
working methods and learning from mistakes, following the work of others, and 
learning from informal conversations with colleagues, in addition to participating 
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in formal training at the worksite. Utilising informal learning at the worksite is 
important, when the aim is to develop the working organisation and to develop 
the skills related to the work of individual employees (Aittola 1998, pp.71-72). 
 
Following the work of others also came up in this study. Over one fourth (26%) 
of the respondents considered that following the work of other people is an 
important factor for their personal learning. 58% of the respondents considered 
that following other people working was of some importance in their induction. 
When reviewing the respondent’s understanding of the provided training, the 
respondents considered the laws and regulations concerning the operation of a 
nuclear power plant and working at one. Table 1 below shows the percentage of 
the respondents who considered that training in the area was sufficient. When 
looking at the table, it must be borne in mind that this is by no means a 
complete list of the content areas of the provided training. The study has mainly 
been performed to survey the opinions of new employees concerning a few, 
broadly defined areas (Isotalo 2002). 
 
Table 1. Sufficiency of training concerning a few, broadly defined areas (Isotalo 
2002). 
I find that training for a new employee 
is sufficient in the following areas: 
Strongly 
agree 
No clear 
opinion 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Technical competences required 
for the work (technical skills 
required for the work) 
29% 62% 9% 
 
Cognitive competence 
 
35% 62% 6% 
Maintaining working ability 
 
26% 62% 12% 
Team/group work skills 
 
9% 65% 24% 
Self-development 
 
15% 67% 18% 
Increasing professional skill 
29% 50% 21% 
Adopting working methods 
12% 71% 18% 
Laws and regulations that apply to 
work in a nuclear power plant 
environment 
62% 24% 15% 
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Even this highly superficial analysis shows that, ranked by percentage, all the 
“humanist” topics take the bottom places. The respondents find that the 
company emphasises technical knowledge and cognitive competence rather 
well, but topics related to applying the know-how, such as group work skills, 
have been left in their shade. A technically inclined environment explains this in 
part, but it is by no means a justification. New employees feel that developing 
working life related skills is as important as the actual technical, cognitive, and 
professional issues. In the future, training should also emphasise using the 
skills acquired by formal learning in the organisation. Group work skills, for 
example, are essential for informal learning. Without the necessary social skills, 
informal learning is practically impossible. The need for social skills is further 
emphasised when we study the results of the study regarding the relationship 
between formal learning (official channels) and informal learning (unofficial 
channels). According to the participants of the study, only 33% of their work-
related learning has taken place through formal learning. This in turn means 
that 67% of learning has taken place by means of informal learning. The table 
has been combined based on the dichotomy, formal and informal learning, 
established by the respondents. In the form, the focus group was asked to 
divide 100% according to how much of the learning has taken place through the 
above channels. The result clearly shows that, as stated above, the company 
had no induction programme before 2002 (Isotalo 2002). 
 
The fact that respondents gave such large importance to unofficial channels, or 
tacit knowledge, also gives cause to note the coming generation change. If 
nearly 70% of all learning takes place through informal channels, how can the 
company survive the change of the generation without losing an enormous 
amount of information? The company has already awakened to this reality, 
however. The old idea of master and apprentice learning has been 
reintroduced. In the autumn of 2002, the company started a mentoring pilot 
project to find a means of transferring tacit knowledge. The project aims to 
develop a method for offering each new employee an opportunity to have their 
own mentor relationship (Kannisto 2002). 
 
The focus group of the study was a group of 34 people. This can be considered 
a comprehensive sample, since it included – with the exception of two people – 
all the new employees who started permanent employment with the company in 
the past few years. However, efforts have been made to avoid excessive 
generalisation, since the new employees only represent 7% of the company’s 
entire personnel. However, since the study includes all of the new employees, 
the research information provides clear clues as to how the new employees 
have experienced induction training and other training. These results provide 
information on how personnel training for new employees should be developed 
(Isotalo 2002). 
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3.1.4. Transfer of knowledge in project work 
 
The aim of the master’s thesis by Liikamaa (2000) was to develop a method to 
activate the transferring of companies’ important tacit knowledge between the 
project manager and the staff in his/her working environment. The study was 
based on recognising the invisible intellectual capital. The aim was to find 
factors that influence the effective transfer of tacit knowledge. The study also 
included an empirical part, wherein the knowledge transferred to the project 
managers was categorised and the amount of tacit knowledge was determined. 
In addition, the commitment, experience, organisation culture, and interaction 
between the project manager and the people in his/her working environment 
were studied. A total of nine project managers were selected for the study; their 
experience in project management varied between two and 26 years. The 
average experience in project management was 14 years. The study included 
smaller and larger projects, as well as projects from different fields of expertise.   
 
There are many cultural factors that inhibit knowledge transfer. Table 2 presents 
the most common friction and ways of overcoming them.  
 
Table 2. Obstacles for knowledge transfer and the means to remove obstacles 
(Davenport & Prusak 1998, p.97) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Friction Possible solution 
 
Lack of trust. Build relationships and trust through 
face-to-face meetings 
 
Different cultures and vocabularies Create common ground through 
education, discussion, team formation, 
job rotation 
 
Lack of time and meeting places  Establish times and places for 
knowledge transfers: fairs, discussion 
rooms, conference reports 
 
Status and rewards go to knowledge  Evaluate performance and provide 
owners  incentives based on sharing knowledge 
 
Lack of absorptive capacity in recipients  Educate employees for flexibility; 
provide time for learning, encourage 
openness 
  
The belief that knowledge is a privilege  Encourage nonhierarchical approach 
of a certain group, “not from here.” to knowledge; quality of ideas more 
important than status of source  
 
Intolerance for mistakes or need for help Accept and reward creative errors and 
collaboration; no loss of status from not 
knowing everything 
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Davenport and Prusak (1998, pp.101-102) specify that knowledge transfer 
consists of two functions: 
 
• Transmission; sending or presenting knowledge to a potential recipient 
• Absorption by that person or group. 
 
If the knowledge is not received, it has not been transferred. The purpose of 
knowledge transfer is to improve the organisation’s ability to function and to 
increase its value. The speed of transfer and the content of the knowledge are 
significant factors in terms of knowledge transfer. Only knowledge transfer that 
affects behaviour or the creation of new ideas is meaningful. The reasons as to 
why the received knowledge is not used may include the following (Davenport & 
Prusak 1998, pp.101-102): 
 
• Lack of confidence in the meaningfulness of the knowledge 
• Pride prevents receiving the knowledge 
• Knowledge that differs from one’s own viewpoint is not wanted 
• Lack of time 
• Lack of opportunities 
• Fear of risk-taking. 
 
Communication is important for knowledge transfer, but we must also know 
where the necessary knowledge is located inside the company, and who can 
help solve the problem (von Krogh et al. 1996, p. 42). Effective communication 
and knowledge exchange are dependent on the formation of suitable 
conditions, structures, and routines. Information and knowledge can easily be 
distributed into the organisation and within the organisation, if a suitable 
information infrastructure has been established. According to von Krogh et al. 
(1996, p.60-66), the transfer of tacit knowledge between one or more persons is 
affected by four factors: openness, channel of interaction, trust, and experience. 
 
The project managers were asked whether the workplace culture supports 
interaction with other employees. The opinions were divided both ways. It must 
be noted here that nearly half of the interviewees felt that the organisation 
culture at the worksite did not support interaction. This is an important feature 
for the transfer of tacit knowledge. If the employees cannot discuss things freely 
at the workplace, it may prevent the transfer of tacit knowledge. However, the 
social activeness of a person may also affect the results of the interview 
(Liikamaa 2000). 
 
The project managers were also asked about the amount of collaboration at the 
workplace. It was somewhat surprising that up to one third of them thought that 
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not everyone was working towards a common goal. Creating team spirit and 
finding common goals is important for work success. When such a problem is 
observed, it must be solved as quickly as possible, as it presents a clear 
obstacle for the transfer of tacit knowledge (Liikamaa 2000). 
 
To summarise, it can be stated that although the atmosphere at the workplace 
is considered to be relatively open, it did not support open discussion and 
interaction during working hours. Meetings that discuss project issues have time 
limits, and they do not necessarily offer the best possible conditions for the 
transfer of tacit knowledge. Therefore, the atmosphere at the workplace should 
be open, and everyone should be aware of the common goals. Communication 
outside the meetings assists in knowledge transfer if people working on the 
same problem can also meet under informal circumstances (Liikamaa 2000).   
 
Activities at the nuclear power company are controlled and are precisely based 
on explicit knowledge. The tasks are clearly defined, and the uncompromising 
application of commands and orders guarantees high-quality operation. The 
normal operation of a power plant takes place in a highly technical environment. 
Project activities, on the other hand, are largely based on personnel 
competence that is transferred to the organisation through social interaction. 
This necessitates the horizontal transfer of information. It may be stated that 
projects take place in a business environment that represents both the 
mechanical and organic context. The effective transfer of tacit knowledge could 
be supported by the development of organisational culture and improvement of 
personnel’s communication, interaction, and commitment as follows (Liikamaa 
2000): 
 
• More get-togethers should be arranged because informal interaction 
assists the activities during the project. These get-togethers should be 
aimed at strengthening the social interaction between persons from 
different groups.  
 
• It must be ensured that each employee is carrying out work that they feel 
is purposeful and motivating. Internal “training” for project managers 
would help in transferring tacit knowledge between project managers. 
The theme could be reviewing and analysing technical, commercial, and 
project management related problems. 
 
• It is important to make the employees aware of the common goals. 
Nearly half of the project managers found it difficult to create common 
goals. There are many reasons for this, and it absolutely requires 
management’s improvement actions. 
 
  
73
 
• Based on the interviews, it may be stated that the working community 
was considered to be open, but the workplace culture was not seen to 
support worker interaction. An example of this is the line organisation 
supervisor group; they estimated the transferred tacit knowledge to be on 
average 57% of the total amount of knowledge. It may be stated that, 
although the project managers have received a large amount of 
knowledge from the line organisation’s supervisor, it is not completely 
meeting the goals.  
 
• Although the atmosphere is considered to be open, the study shows that 
a feeling of collaboration is missing. There may be many reasons for this, 
including poor work motivation and a lack of common goals.  
 
• A project manager is responsible for many different types of things and 
deals with many different people. As work experience increases, a 
routine develops. The positive consequences of this are the increase in 
the amount of knowledge, and the use of tacit knowledge from the 
environment. The project managers should also aim to increase their 
own expertise, task by task.  
 
• Assisting persons, even in issues that may be of small significance, in 
co-operation environments and between co-workers alike, is highly 
recommended.  
 
• The project managers’ co-operating groups must take into account the 
project manager’s starting points for managing the project. Based on the 
interviews, the amount of work experience in project management tasks 
affected the expectations that the project managers had in terms of the 
transfer of tacit knowledge. Less experienced project managers expected 
widespread experiential knowledge, with backgrounds and justifications. 
Experienced project managers expected a dialogue between experts and 
comparing experience, resulting in the transfer of tacit knowledge.  
 
The study did not address the typical features of an operating organisation and 
a project organisation; these features are formed according to the goals set for 
the organisation. By virtue of its normal activities, an operating organisation is 
not very dynamic. Its standard tasks have no major schedule pressure, and cost 
supervision is not essential. Therefore, an operating organisation does not 
usually meet the requirements for more versatile project activities. 
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3.2. Competencies of the control room operators 
 
The objective of this research is to develop a management tool that enables the 
better monitoring of shift personnel’s responsibility and commitment to work. 
The tool supports individual development by focusing on the competencies 
required for successful performance in the task, and by identifying the 
individual’s current state and personal goals. By understanding these personal 
qualities, shift personnel development and training can be better targeted 
according to the desired and actual needs (Nurminen 2003). 
 
3.2.1. Basic requirements for operators 
 
The Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK) issues detailed 
regulations concerning the safety of nuclear power plants. Regulatory Guide on 
Qualification of control room operators for nuclear power plants YVL 1.6 defines 
the requirements related to recruitment and general competence of operators 
as follows:  
 
“The licensee shall have systematic procedures for the recruitment of those to 
be trained as operators. The procedures shall contain the objectives of the 
choice of persons, the selection criteria and the personal assessment methods 
based on the first two. The selection criteria shall include requirements for 
education, previous work experience, health and other suitability. 
  
An operator shall have a polytechnic degree or other technical degree suitable 
for his duties. A shift supervisor shall have a minimum work experience of five 
years in tasks that support his intended duties, with at least three years in the 
nuclear sector. Furthermore, a shift supervisor shall work as a control room 
operator for a minimum of six months, with at least three months as a reactor 
operator. Other operators shall have a minimum work experience of three years 
in duties that support the task of a control room operator, with at least one year 
in the nuclear sector. 
  
The health and other suitability of those selected as operators should enable 
them to work as superiors or members of their shift teams under normal 
operational conditions and during transients and accidents. This requires good 
communicative and co-operative skills, tolerance to pressure as well as normal 
sight and hearing. Operators shall be reliable, and they shall not be inclined to 
abuse intoxicants. 
  
The doctor who makes a physical examination shall be aware of the examined 
person’s duties in the nuclear power plant and of the suitability requirements 
related to these duties. In addition to the pre-employment examination, the 
licensee is obliged to arrange a regular and appropriate physical examination 
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for the persons in question. An aptitude assessment by a psychologist is 
recommended when selecting persons as operators and to other positions 
directly related to plant operations significant for safety. To ensure reliable 
personal assessment, sufficient expertise shall be available to the licensee in 
selecting and interpreting the assessment methods and in monitoring them in 
the long term. The reliability of shift supervisors and operators shall be regularly 
monitored by available means.” 
 
3.2.2. Competency requirements 
 
Competency is described as a characteristic quality of an individual who has a 
causal relationship with an excellent or efficient performance at work or in a 
certain situation. Individuals’ competencies are necessary, but not enough for 
an efficient work performance. The inadequacy of competencies is shown in 
how a review of the efficiency of an individual’s performance must also take into 
account the factors affecting the performance, environment and situation, the 
requirements of the work, and the ethical and developmental factors. This way, 
competency can be defined in relation to achieving the set goals in a specific 
working environment using acceptable and appropriate methods, while 
providing positive results (Boyatzis 1982, pp. 10–16; Ford 1992, pp. 67, 247; 
Spencer & Spencer 1993, pp. 9–11). 
 
Intention is an essential part of competency. It is a force resulting from motives 
or characteristics, which leads to action and the action’s consequence. If there 
is no intention related to behaviour, it is not considered a competency. 
 
The shift personnel are responsible for operating and monitoring the plant as 
required by good operation and practice, in accordance with the Technical 
Specifications, administrative procedures, operating manuals, and operating 
requirements. Each shift includes a shift supervisor, reactor operator, turbine 
operator, area work supervisor, and two or three field operators. The shift must 
meet the Technical Specifications’ requirements on minimum staffing. The 
reactor operator, turbine operator, and area work supervisor must know each 
other’s duties well in theory and in practice, so that they can perform the duties 
of a substitute, if necessary. Ideally, a shift can work as a team in which each 
person knows and performs their duties without a separate request. 
 
The shift personnel must have a good feel of the plant. The shift supervisor, 
reactor operator, and turbine operator must maintain their technical system 
knowledge and make sure that they understand what happens in the plant when 
operating procedures are performed. The shift supervisor must be aware of how 
the shift personnel move around the plant. The shift must work on its own 
initiative and perform its duties effectively and on time. Common sense must be 
used actively and responsibly, and the next shift cannot be left in trouble. 
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Information transfer must be transparent and smooth not only within the shift 
and between different shifts but also between the shifts and operation 
management and other personnel.  
 
Skilled and qualified personnel are a very important resource for all companies, 
and appropriate training is required to create and maintain this resource. For 
many reasons, training is more significant in nuclear power plants than in the 
Finnish industry in general. A nuclear power plant is an expensive investment 
whose operation depends on skilled personnel. From the safety perspective, 
operations in the nuclear power industry require especially skilled personnel. 
 
All shift supervisors and operators undergo simulator training at least ten days 
per year. In simulator training, the shift personnel can also train for rare 
operation situations and prepare for different accident conditions. However, 
simulator training does not only focus on disturbances. It is rare for specific 
unusual disturbances to repeat in the operation of the plant. Thus, one goal of 
simulator training is to teach the operators to act reasonably in all situations that 
they encounter. Training for different disturbances helps the operators to 
understand the behaviour of the plant even better. The simulator is an essential 
tool in the basic training of new shift personnel because it allows training the 
operation and monitoring of the plant without disturbing normal operation. 
 
3.2.3. Operation of the plant during disturbances 
 
Evaluating shift performance during disturbances is a central area of training. 
The plant specific full-scope simulator provides excellent opportunities for this. 
When operating personnel and trainers work together, the training programmes 
become more meaningful. Usually, the shifts have one day reserved for 
simulator training that they consider necessary. 
 
Regulatory Guide on Qualification of control room operators for nuclear power 
plants YVL 1.6 defines the requirements related to the demonstration of 
professional skill at a training simulator as follows:  
 
“The demonstration of professional skill is to ensure that the trainee control 
room operator has the necessary expertise as well as working methods that 
take nuclear and radiation safety aspects into account. The operator is also 
required to have the skills and co-operation capability necessary to function as 
a member of his team so that the shift team can manage normal operational 
conditions of the nuclear power plant and perform the actions necessary during 
transients and accidents. 
  
The demonstration of professional skill shall be given at a training simulator. 
Two types of operational conditions are run: 
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• Situations requiring interpretation of the Operational Limits and 
Conditions during which the trainee/operator, by means of plant alarm 
system signals and other data, assesses the plant state and deviations 
from normal operational conditions as well as determines and carries out 
the necessary actions 
• Situations relating to the transient and emergency procedures during 
which the trainee/operator identifies the disturbance, performs first 
actions required by the procedures, detects an abnormally functioning 
component, corrects the situation and determines the necessary further 
actions. 
  
The demonstration of professional skill shall be arranged for the trainee control 
room operator before the oral examination and thereafter at least every second 
calendar year. Furthermore, a demonstration of professional skill shall always 
be arranged after extensive modifications that affect control room work.” 
  
During several years, a methodology has been developed to be able to 
demonstrate professional skill of the shift crew in a reliable way. The researcher 
as an operation manager has participated in this development work. The 
scientific basis of this methodology has been described in several publications 
(Hukki & Norros 1994.; Norros & Hukki 1995; Norros and Hukki 1996; Norros & 
Hukki 1997; Hukki & Norros 1998; Norros & Nuutinen 1999). 
 
The methodology is shortly described in the following. The tools, which are 
forms, diagrams and tables, serve several functions in simulator training. They 
provide general frameworks for the description of a specific task situation, give 
general criteria for the observation and evaluation of the crew’s activity, afford 
informative ways of giving feedback to the operators and serve as a means of 
documentation. 
 
During the preparation phase, after the task situation has been chosen by the 
trainers they, in addition to the normal design of the simulator programme, 
conceptualise the task situation of the simulated scenario from the decision-
making point of view. The main task of the crew in the disturbance situations is 
to stabilise the process. At first, with the help of the description of the general 
process control task demands the trainers define what are the concrete task 
demands in that situation. After that, they describe the availability and 
informativeness of the process information and the availability and usability of 
the alternate operating methods in relation to the concretised demands. At last, 
they define the situational cognitive task demands by concretising the general 
cognitive criteria provided by the method. 
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During the simulator run, the crew’s activity is videotaped and trainers observe 
the verbalisations and operating actions of the crew. If the operators’ 
verbalisations or actions do not reveal their diagnostic and operational bases of 
interference, the trainers try to find them by asking for them immediately after 
the run, before debriefing session. 
 
During and immediately after the run, the trainers evaluate the adequacy of the 
crew’s task performance and the characteristics of the operator’s habits of 
action with the help of the concretised criteria. On the basis of the evaluation, 
summary profiles of the crew’s habits of action are created. These profiles 
express to what extent the concrete criteria are fulfilled. The evaluations of the 
trainers are preliminary and may change as a result of discussion in the 
debriefing phase. 
 
In the debriefing session, the trainers show the trainees the relevant periods of 
their task performance with the help of the videotape. They also introduce their 
preliminary evaluations of the adequacy of the crew’s task performance and of 
the characteristics of the operator’s habits of action. It is important that these 
are considered both from the trainers’ and trainees’ point of view.  
 
The following items are evaluated for the shift’s disturbance management:  
 
• Identifying the situation (identifying faults, determining trigger conditions 
and establishing an understanding of the disturbance, and contacting the 
outside of the control room) 
• Operative actions (accuracy and timing of operation activities, use of 
procedures and following the reactor pressure and water level, 
maintaining mass and energy balances, and trend analysis) 
• General evaluation. 
 
The assessment of the shift supervisor’s operating strategy is based on the 
following factors: 
 
• Analysis of the disturbance (search for information, attempt to determine 
the significance of the events in terms of process dynamics, changing 
diagnostic assumptions according to the situation, and ensuring the 
interpretation using additional information) 
• Evaluating possibilities for operative actions and implementing them 
(critical assessment of the method’s limits, prioritising the method 
considered the most functional for the situation, making situation checks, 
organising time usage according to the situation, and using external help 
for decision-making) 
• Coordinating co-operation (following other people’s activities, utilising 
input from others, organising shift operation, preparing for changes in the 
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situation, organising co-operation based on the shift members’ 
experience) 
• Noting the uncertainty and instability of the situation (using redundant 
information sources and preparing for changes in the situation) 
• Critical assessment of own activities (using additional information to 
ensure the correct interpretation, critical assessment of task priority, and 
reacting to obstacles preventing activity) 
• Communication (informing, bringing out justification clearly and in a 
concrete manner, aiming for interaction, communicating outside the 
control room, active participation in common interpretation, acting with 
others in a coordinated manner, informing regarding essential 
observations and activities, and discussing matters, unclear issues, and 
problems related to own activities in concrete terms). 
 
The objective is to develop for operators a model way of action in normal and 
disturbance conditions. This could then be used in training and included in plant 
operating procedures. 
 
3.2.4. Selecting operating personnel 
 
In addition to the basic requirements, the operating personnel’s selection 
procedure includes an applicant interview that is used as a basis for sending 
suitable applicants for psychological testing. One part of the testing results 
describes personality factors, of which there are five categories, and aptitude, 
including linguistic capability, logical thinking, ability to develop ideas, and 
spatial perception. Based on these, a feature profile for a good operator has 
been defined. In addition, a total of seven key personality criteria have been 
defined. The following are examples of them: 
• Always acts according to the rules, as it is difficult for a single individual 
to understand the entire workings of a nuclear power plant 
• Is calm and has a long-term focus, as the work contains repetition with 
little variation, and the situations require calm consideration 
• Does not long for varying human contact, since the work shifts are rather 
permanent 
• Balanced and mature personality, as predictability in all fields of activity 
is important, etc.  
 
Course success is evaluated in the fields of technology, group work, and human 
activities. Technology includes know-how (theory, plant operation, and plant 
dynamics), normal operation (preparation, performance, supervision, and use of 
procedures), and disturbance management (identification, analysis, 
interpretation, decision-making, implementation, supervision, and use of 
procedures). Group work includes co-operation (division of tasks, 
arrangements, management, and supervision) and communication (asking for 
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opinion, reaching a common understanding, reporting, and instructions). Human 
activities are evaluated in terms of behaviour, motivation, observation, and 
workload. 
 
The shift supervisor’s activities are especially evaluated in the following areas: 
• Ability and methods used to process information (how information is 
collected, how the information to be collected is selected, how much and 
what types of information are needed, how information is analysed, how 
it is synthesised, and what the used risk levels are) 
• Decision-making (how many different options are processed and how, 
what types of options are most likely selected, how critically thinking is 
reviewed, how much self-confidence the person has, how holistic the 
general picture of the situation is, and which factors affect the decision) 
• Communication (amount and level of communication) 
• Utilising surrounding resources (how much trust is placed in others, how 
much responsibility is delegated, how external knowledge is related to 
knowledge from own logistic reasoning, and what types of support is 
needed). 
 
When evaluating a disturbance, attention is paid to diagnosing the disturbance, 
selecting the method for eliminating the disturbance, communication, and 
coordinating common activities. A training event defined the nine commands of 
shift work leadership as follows: 
 
• Lead by example 
• Develop the shift’s co-operation 
• Provide feedback 
• Encourage individual self-improvement 
• Do not leave issues hanging 
• Show interest 
• Listen 
• Show what is important 
• Only require from others what you also require from yourself.  
 
Zack T. Pate (1995), President and CEO of Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO) stated that: “When a control room operator places his hand 
on the IN-HOLD-OUT switch and moves it to the OUT position, withdrawing 
control rods, he has more potential power in his hand than: 
• The captain opening the throttles of a 747 for takeoff 
• The NASA engineer who ignites the booster rockets in a space shuttle 
for launch” 
In the normal quiet and relaxed control room environment it is difficult to really 
understand how huge energy volumes operators control in the reactor pressure 
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vessel. The cockpit of a 747 is a more realistic environment than the control 
room if we think about sense of danger.  
 
3.2.5. A concept of man 
 
The operation and structure of the human brain is often compared to a 
computer. Researchers of artificial intelligence have tried to create computer 
programs whose operating principles resemble the human brain as closely as 
possible. Humans experience phenomena in their consciousness through the 
brain, but consciousness is often ignored in brain study. Consciousness is an 
important part of the holistic conception of man. Neurobiologists, cognition 
researchers, and psychologists who compare the operation of the human brain 
and consciousness to theatre seem to have a more realistic idea of the human 
brain than many previously presented views (Pihlanto 1997; Pihlanto 2002). 
One of such researchers is Baars, who has compiled research results from 
several disciplines into what he calls the “theatre metaphor” (Baars 1997).  
 
According to the holistic concept of man, the three ontological basic modes of 
human existence are (Rauhala 1989): 
 
• Consciousness (psychic-mental existence) 
• Corporeality (existence as an organic event) 
• Situationality (existence as relationships to reality). 
 
For Rauhala, the human is realised in these three basic modes of existence. 
The holistic concept of man provides an integrated view of individuals as 
complex physical entities, and inseparably locates them in their individual 
situation (Rauhala 1989, p. 27). The holistic concept of man constitutes a 
common theoretical platform for all Co-Evolute applications (cf. Nurminen 
2003).  
 
Baars is specialised in studying the operation of the brain. He is especially 
interested in what truly happens in the brain when a person thinks, sees, or 
remembers. According to Baars’ understanding, consciousness is a key factor 
in explaining the brain’s ability to interpret, learn, communicate and work (Baars 
1997, viii). The basic idea of this so-called theatre model is that an individual’s 
conscious experience is limited by the capacity of his or her consciousness. The 
audience in the theatre model can be divided into four groups, which are the 
motivation system, memory system, interpretation system, and automatic 
systems (Baars 1997, pp. 41–47). The theatre metaphor provides an 
opportunity to complement the holistic concept of man. The theatre metaphor is 
based on the latest findings in brain research, and the results can be applied in 
the framework of the holistic concept of man as developed by Rauhala 
(Vanharanta & Pihlanto 2001, pp. 15–16; Vanharanta et al. 2001, pp. 14–15). 
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This allows for building an understanding about human actions, including 
conscious and subconscious processes (cf. Nurminen 2003). 
 
Vanharanta et al. claim that the theatre metaphor has quite a limited area of 
focus, which strongly emphasises the role of subconscious processes as a 
consequence of the brain-oriented nature of the metaphor. Indeed, the 
processes of the brain are subconscious, but the processes of the mind are 
mainly conscious and, therefore, voluntary. For Vanharanta et al. (2001, pp. 14–
15), the theatre metaphor is limited in that it is a closed system which leaves out 
the effect of situationality.  
 
3.2.6. Self – Assessment 
 
Self-assessment can be considered an effective method in projects aiming at 
self-development, managing personal growth, clarifying roles, and commitment 
to targets. However, using self-assessment for evaluating one’s personal work 
performance reduces the reliability of the results (Stone 1998, pp. 272–273). 
One of the essential problems with self-assessment is the human tendency to 
overrate their personal performance in comparison with their peer group 
(Dessler 2001, p. 167). Therefore, the self-assessment of one’s personal 
performance provides somewhat biased and skewed results. In spite of the 
aforementioned disadvantages, self-assessment is used fairly often for 
evaluating personal work performance (Schuler & Huber 1990, p. 197; cf. 
Nurminen 2003).  
 
Beardwell & Holden (1995, pp. 243–244) argue that one central problem with 
assessment is our limited ability to make accurate observations about ourselves 
and others. Our assessment of ourselves and others is strongly founded on the 
factors affecting the assessment situation and our personal subjective views, 
but there is no question about whether people are capable of self-assessment. 
The question is more about whether people are willing to assess themselves 
and whether the assessment has a factual basis. Self-assessment provides 
better results when an individual compares the relationship between different 
qualities instead of comparing personal performance to other people (Torrington 
& Hall 1991, pp. 484–485). Correct interpretation of the results is critical for the 
assessment process to succeed (cf. Nurminen 2003). 
 
The results of the self-assessment process can be utilised for different 
purposes. Self-assessment can be used for motivating individuals, identifying 
areas for development, evaluating individual potential, evaluating individual 
performance, clarifying career development, expressing the expectations for 
individuals, as a basis for rewarding and hiring, and for obtaining feedback. 
Self-assessment can also be used for setting work-related goals, as a source of 
information for personnel-related functions, and for evaluating the efficiency of 
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the selection process. Mutual trust and respect are necessary for achieving the 
transparency that the assessment process requires (Torrington & Hall 1991, p. 
495). 
 
3.2.7. The self-assessment system, Deltoid 
 
The self-assessment system built based on the master’s thesis by Nurminen 
(2003), is called Deltoid. The competency model is a task type-based generic 
competency model, whose competencies have been selected based on task 
descriptions and literature. The general competency model for shift personnel is 
based on the human-oriented view presented by Goleman (1998). Goleman’s 
classification is completed with the cognitive functions model presented by 
Spencer & Spencer (1993). The formed competency classification is individual-
oriented and based on the frameworks of earlier studies. The classification 
combines competencies related to emotional intelligence and cognitive 
functions (Nurminen 2003). 
 
In the classification the competencies are roughly divided according to whether 
they are related to an individual or other people. The main classes (personal 
and social competencies) are further divided based on whether they are related 
to an individual’s feelings and identification, or the regulation of one’s own 
actions. The class comprising the regulation of an individual’s own actions is 
further divided into self-management, cognitive functions, and motivation 
(Nurminen 2003). 
 
The behaviour models that represent an individual’s conscious experience have 
underlying subconscious factors that interact with conscious experiences. The 
correlations between conscious experiences and subconscious factors are 
construed based on the description of the theatre model operation presented by 
Baars (1997). The connections between conscious experience and 
subconscious factors are by nature blurry to some extent. The subconscious 
factors are divided into 26 factors according to the Circles of MindTM model as 
construed by Vanharanta. These factors form four systems, which are the 
motivation system, memory system, interpretation system, and automatic 
systems (Nurminen 2003). 
 
The motivation system includes the functions regulating individual behaviour 
and emotional reactions. Functionally, the motivation system mostly resembles 
the limbic system, which controls an individual’s emotional behaviour. The 
memory system includes the explicit information that is mostly related to 
declarative memory and stored based on conscious lifetime learning. The 
interpretation system interprets the content of the consciousness under the 
spotlight by comparing it with the individual’s earlier experiences (Nurminen 
2003).  
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The automatic systems comprise the implicit information and skills that are 
mostly related to procedural memory. Procedural memory does not function 
based on conscious information retrieval but more on the brain’s attempt to find, 
through trial and error, the optimal memory structure for a certain stimulus. In 
time, the optimal memory structure is developed and found more quickly and 
automatically. In this kind of memory-based action, the individual might not even 
remember his or her past experiences and use the previously learnt models of 
operation subconsciously (Nurminen 2003). 
 
Deltoid works based on the estimated occurrence frequency of 120 behavioural 
or operating models essential for the shift personnel duties. The behaviour 
models are described in Deltoid as conscious experiences in accordance with 
the theatre metaphor. Each competency consists of four behaviour models, 
which are presented through questions or, better, statements. The descriptions 
of conscious experiences (behavioural models) used in the assessment of 
individual competencies, competency classes, and subconscious factors are 
based on linguistic terms. Therefore, Deltoid uses a fuzzy logic controller for 
modelling the ambiguity of human assessment, complex interdependencies of 
the model, and nature of the abstractness related to the concepts (Nurminen 
2003). 
 
The fuzzy logic controller typically includes fuzzification, fuzzy rules, fuzzy 
inference, and defuzzification. In fuzzification, the values entered by a person 
are translated into fuzzy sets of linguistic terms. Fuzzy inference uses the fuzzy 
rules to process the input of linguistic variables and determine a response for 
the input. In defuzzification, this response is clarified into a value in the desired 
definition set (Kruse et al. 1994, pp. 163–164; Kantola 2005; Kantola et al. 
2005). 
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3.2.8. First results  
 
Building the self-assessment model (Deltoid) combined the goal-oriented and 
innovative processing of the problem, and the empirical and practically proven 
functional testing of the solution. In the empirical part of the study, 82 shift 
personnel of the nuclear power plant units 1 and 2 tested the Deltoid application 
and completed self-assessment. The creative tension of the shift personnel 
emerged based on the self-assessments (Nurminen 2003). 
 
The creative tension of the shift personnel is analysed in three sections. The 
field operators’ assessment of the current and target situations, and the creative 
tension resulting from their difference are presented first, then, the operators’ 
and shift supervisors’ assessment. The assessments of the current and target 
situations and the creative tension are illustrated graphically. The assessments 
and the creative tension are shown in the same graphics. The longer a bar is, 
the higher its value (Nurminen 2003, cf. the first research paper). 
 
Field operators 
 
The results present the field operators’ assessments of the current and target 
situations and the creative tension by competency. The field operators consider 
conscientiousness and taking responsibility for their work as very important. As 
the creative tension of the sense of responsibility is quite low and the target 
situation is very high, it can be deduced that the field operators are very 
responsible. They also consider self-discipline, looking for information, problem 
solving, and stress tolerance as quite important competencies (Nurminen 2003). 
 
The highest creative tension is seen with field operators’ competencies related 
to cognitive functions. Especially the command and use of foreign languages 
and obtaining, maintaining, and sharing professional and technical information 
have room for improvement. Based on the field operators’ assessments, 
language skills are nowhere near as important in their work as professional and 
technical know-how. According to the field operators’ assessments, their work 
does not require special performance-orientation. Instead, commitment, or the 
ability to adopt the goals of the group or organisation, and staying on schedule 
despite obstacles and setbacks are considered important in the field operators’ 
work. Field operators’ assessments set a target level higher than the current 
situation for each competency, which is seen as creative tension as presented 
in Figure 2 (Nurminen 2003).  
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Figure 2. Field operators’ perception of their own competence level currently, in 
the future and creative tension (Nurminen 2003) 
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Operators 
 
Review of the operators’ assessments of the current and target situations and 
the creative tension by competency shows that, like the field operators, the 
operators set the target higher than the current situation for each competency, 
which is seen as creative tension as presented in Figure 3. This results in a 
fairly even creative tension. Based on the assessment of the four competencies 
related to self-knowledge, confidence and the awareness of one’s own 
emotions are not as relevant to their duties as self-assessment and objectivity. 
However, the creative tension is quite high for the awareness of one’s emotions 
and objectivity. The next eight competencies are related to self-management. 
The operators consider conscientiousness and taking responsibility for their 
work as very important. As the creative tension of the sense of responsibility is 
quite low and the target situation is very high, it can be deduced that the 
operators also assess themselves as very responsible. Self-management as a 
whole is a very important part of the operators’ work. This is seen in the higher 
target level of the self-management class in comparison with the other classes 
(Nurminen 2003). 
 
The highest creative tension is seen with operators’ competencies related to 
cognitive functions. Especially the language skills and obtaining, maintaining, 
and sharing professional and technical information have room for improvement. 
The creative tension is also quite high in analytical thinking, i.e. the individual’s 
ability to divide problems into parts. However, it must be noted that the target 
level is lower in the cognitive functions competency class than in the other 
classes. The operators’ current level of professional and technical know-how is 
much higher than that of the other competencies of the class. However, they set 
the target level even much higher than the current situation, so there is need for 
improvement. The high creative tension in language skills might be explained in 
part by the fact that operator recruitment has not always had language 
requirements. According to the operators’ assessments, their work does not 
require special performance-orientation. Instead, commitment, or the ability to 
adopt the goals of the group or the organisation, and staying on schedule 
despite obstacles and setbacks are considered as important in the operators’ 
work. Creative tension is also quite high with initiative and optimism (Nurminen 
2003). 
 
According to the operators’ assessments, one special area for improvement is 
communication including receiving and sending messages. Influencing, or the 
individual’s ability to persuade or affect others in order to promote their goals, 
as well as co-operation and teamwork skills are emphasised in their duties. The 
operators do not consider managing matters or people as especially important 
parts of their duties. The social competency class indicates a quite similar and 
fairly high level of creative tension (Nurminen 2003). 
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Figure 3. Operators’ perception of their own competence level currently, in the 
future and creative tension (Nurminen 2003) 
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Shift supervisors 
 
Like the operators and field operators, the shift supervisors’ assessments set a 
target level higher than the current situation for each competency, which is seen 
as creative tension as presented in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Shift supervisors’ perception of their own competence level currently, 
in the future and creative tension (Nurminen 2003) 
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Based on the assessment of the four competencies related to self-knowledge, 
their work emphasises self-assessment and objectivity. This can be deduced 
from the high target levels of the competencies. The current level of these 
competencies is also quite high in the assessments. However, the shift 
supervisors still consider that the areas have room for improvement. Confidence 
and awareness of one’s own emotions are not as relevant to their duties as self-
assessment and objectivity (Nurminen 2003).  
 
The next eight competencies are related to self-management. In this class, 
creative tension is the highest for self-discipline. This means that the shift 
supervisors want to develop their ability to control their emotions and actions. 
However, they do not consider self-discipline to be very important for their 
duties. The shift supervisors consider conscientiousness and taking 
responsibility for their work very important. Indeed, shift supervisors are 
responsible, which is indicated by the very high current level of the competency. 
Other, especially important, competencies in the shift supervisors’ assessments 
include reliability, looking for information, problem solving, and stress tolerance. 
Even the current level of these competencies is quite high in the assessments. 
However, there is room for improvement, as indicated by the creative tension 
(Nurminen 2003).  
 
For cognitive functions, most room for improvement is in language skills. 
According to the shift supervisors, obtaining, maintaining, and sharing 
professional and technical knowledge is very important in their work. Their 
current level in the shift field is already quite high. The shift supervisor’s creative 
tension is quite high with analytical thinking, but not with conceptual thinking. 
The shift supervisors show initiative, which must be important for obtaining and 
maintaining information, for instance. The other motivation-related 
competencies also show a clear creative tension even though the assessment 
of the current and target situations shows that they are less important for the 
duties of field supervisors (Nurminen 2003).  
 
According to the field supervisors’ assessments, understanding others is a 
special area for improvement for them. They do not consider understanding 
others as important in their work as training others and utilising diversity. The 
latter competencies also show some creative tension but not as much as 
understanding others. Influencing, communication (both receiving and sending 
messages), and conflict management are important in the work of shift 
supervisors. They especially want to improve communication and conflict 
management. This can be deduced from the high level of creative tension in 
these competencies. The shift supervisors feel that managing matters and 
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people is essential for their work. Leading people is especially important, and it 
is an area that the shift supervisors want to improve. Co-operation and 
teamwork skills are very important competencies in their duties. The current 
level of these two competencies is very high for the shift supervisors, but they 
want to improve their ability to work with others even further (Nurminen 2003). 
 
The highest creative tension is seen with the shift supervisors’ competencies 
related to self-management and cognitive functions. However, the current and 
target levels of the self-management class are considerably higher than the 
cognitive functions. The current and target levels of the social skills class are 
also very high. Based on the above findings, self-management and social skills 
are emphasised with shift supervisors. The shift supervisors showed creative 
tension with all subconscious factors. The current and target level assessments 
and creative tension vary clearly between different factors. In memory systems, 
the creative tension is clear and even with all factors. For facts, the current and 
target levels are especially high. Facts and the reliance on them are 
emphasised in the duties of shift supervisors. In interpretation systems, the 
creative tension is very even and high apart from spatial perceptive skills. 
Respectively, the target levels are also high for each factor, especially for 
syntactic analysis and social interpretation. The importance of interpretation 
systems is emphasised in close teamwork (Nurminen 2003). 
 
The shift supervisors set higher target levels than operators for competencies 
related to self-management, empathy, and social skills. The difference in the 
current levels is especially high with competencies related to cognitive and 
social skills, for which the shift supervisors set significantly higher levels than 
the operators. Based on the assessments by the shift personnel, it can be 
observed that the shift supervisors set a higher current level than the operators 
in all the competence classes. However, the operators set higher targets for 
improvement in different areas. This can be deduced from the operators’ higher 
creative tension compared to the shift supervisors. 
 
Based on the results, it can be said that the competency-based self-assessment 
system developed in this study (Deltoid) is suitable for identifying individuals’ 
current situation and personal targets. 
 
The shift personnel clearly showed creative tension, which means that the shift 
personnel have the desire and energy to develop themselves and their working 
methods. In the future, more attention should be paid to shift personnel training 
and on directing the training appropriately. Although professional and technical 
know-how is essential in the work of shift personnel, it also emphasises 
managing and developing other personal and social competencies, as shown 
by the creative tension in the results of this study. The training and development 
of shift personnel should be open towards different training events and methods 
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in order to enable development and learning in different and diverse areas. This 
can ensure that the company will have professionally skilled and motivated 
personnel with the ability to work together and the desire to learn and develop 
even more in the future. 
 
The empirical results of the thesis have been used in later studies related to 
competence simulation, which helps in making the training paths rational in 
relation to the available resources during training cycles. The collection of 
unique creative tensions according to the occupational competences can be 
simulated in order to form similar groups, which have the size and required 
competence level supporting a company’s strategy. 
 
Therefore, competence simulation supports achieving the vision of the company 
with rational and structured steps by investing in the target training of 
employees. Target training makes the training efforts more efficient since 
resources are put at the right places at the right time. Simulation, therefore, 
helps to plan and build the target training to fit organisational strategy, 
resources, and current situation in a co-evolutionary way, cf. the second, third 
and ninth research paper (Nurminen 2003). 
 
3.2.9. Further developments  
 
The developed self-assessment system was utilised for the needs of managing 
the development of nuclear power plant shift personnel. The objective was to 
test the self-assessment system in a company environment, and to find the 
potentially emerging creative tension within the shift personnel. The shift 
personnel whose competences were analysed using the Deltoid method had a 
rather high level of experience. When comparing their qualifications at recruiting 
time and then the time of evaluation, their competence has been affected by 
approx. 25 years of work experience and different training events. Since there 
have been very few career changes, the effects of training have been 
cumulative for the entire work period.  
 
Compared to other countries, Finland and Sweden have historically had a low 
number of shift personnel. In addition, the basic education level has not been as 
high as in Russia, for example, where the shift supervisor has an academic 
degree. The differences can be justified by looking at differences in plant design 
and the organising of activities. A boiling water reactor is rather straightforward 
in terms of dynamic behaviour. As long as the protection automation is fully 
functional, disturbances can be solved well. EPR, with its new digital I&C, will 
be more challenging. However, as there are now fewer nuclear technology 
engineers in the organisation than in the late 1970s, the thought that the same 
concept as before can be used from these very different starting points is 
worrying. The organising of operating activities should be analysed taking 
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account the new starting points. Instead of personnel numbers, the focus should 
be placed on having sufficient competences. 
 
All activities affecting the operation of a nuclear power plant and the availability 
of equipment must follow systematic methods to ensure that the plant operators 
are constantly aware of the status of the plant and its equipment. These 
methods have been documented in the extensive set of instructions. The 
importance of following instructions has been emphasised, especially as 
regards the procedures used in the control room. The technical, system-specific 
instructions should be as error-free as possible and be up to date in terms of 
plant modifications. The more generic instructions, which are plant-specific, are 
related to changes in the operating state and disturbance management. 
Instructions concerning disturbance and accident management should 
especially be developed constantly, since such instructions cannot be 
completely validated or verified. Nevertheless, theoretically reviewing the 
instructions provides good training for disturbances. To achieve technically 
correct instructions, the best-performing shifts may be used for their 
development. The instructions may, however, become too straightforward. 
Therefore, the procedures must be checked for understandability; each shift 
must apply the procedure correctly. 
 
In a nuclear power plant, the composition of shifts may remain similar for 
extended periods of time. This usually leads to the working methods and 
division of tasks becoming shift-specific. The operations management should try 
to prevent such developments by aiming for a good, standardised performance 
that is supported by a continuously developed set of instructions. A different 
kind of example is available from air traffic, where crew members change from 
one flight to another. Flight safety is highly dependent on the instructions that 
everyone is expected to strictly follow. At a nuclear power plant, however, the 
shifts have the same composition for a long time. This leads to slightly different 
working methods between the shifts, and the management's important task is to 
resist these developments so that deviations are under control.  
 
By utilising the SOM maps we can focus the training activities and practical 
training so that all shifts can perform their duties well. By using the simulation 
feature, we can also find a means of improving the overall performance for a 
single shift.   
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Figure 5. An example of competence simulation 
 
Based on the empirical results, it can be concluded that competence-based 
Deltoid self-evaluation application clearly recognises individuals’ own current 
reality and their development needs (personal vision). Consequently, the 
competency-based self-assessment tool created for this study, i.e. the Deltoid-
application, is suitable for the planning of basic training and retraining of control 
room operators. It is also a good working tool when forming shift crews with an 
even competence distribution, thus satisfying the demands of the control room 
work. The Deltoid method could also be used to assess factors related to 
disturbance management during simulator training, for example.  
 
3.3. Competencies of the maintenance personnel    
 
As Reiman and Oedewald argue, maintenance activity at the NPPs is complex, 
distributed, and difficult to coordinate and control both safely and efficiently. 
However, it has been surprisingly little studied and developed within the human 
factors paradigm. The work activities are very much based on the (unofficial) 
organisation, the proficiency of the personnel and the culture of maintenance at 
the particular plant. Due to these features, it is often hard for a single worker to 
see the big picture and how one’s own work contributes to the overall safety 
and reliability of the plant. Furthermore, the safest and most efficient way of 
maintaining the plant and organising the maintenance activities is not self-
evident. Thus, maintenance has been organised and reorganised in various 
ways across the nuclear industry (Bourrier 1999; Reiman & Oedewald 2004a; 
Reiman & Oedewald 2004b; Reiman & Oedewald 2007). 
 
Human resource management, organisational climate and culture were also the 
issues that were deemed as most important challenges in the context of safety 
management by NPP managers in five European countries (Kettunen et al. 
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2007). Vicente (2004, p. 189) writes that “a technological system won’t succeed 
unless sufficient attention is paid to organisational issues, such as how 
decisions about safety are made in the face of outside pressures”. Accident 
investigations have also uncovered many organisational (cultural) antecedents 
of the accidents. The following research is partly based on the empirical results 
of the master’s theses by Jaakko Nirhamo (2002), Sami Saarela (2002), Pasi 
Mäkiniemi (2004), and Päivi Rinne (2008).  
 
3.3.1. Maintenance organisations 
 
In implementing planned maintenance strategies, the most important “tool” of 
company management is the maintenance organisation. Maintenance must be 
able to carry out its assigned duties efficiently and flexibly, while avoiding 
unavailability costs. Maintenance operations can be carried out in a central or 
distributed way, or maintenance can be separated into its own unit. Moreover, 
the many variations of the above are possible. All models are always company-
specific, and they are affected by, among others, the company size, number of 
production plants, and company location (Hagberg et al. 1996, pp. 42–50). 
 
In a central maintenance model, maintenance functions as an individual 
organization unit separate from operation. It is characteristic to this organisation 
model that the operation personnel runs the equipment and the maintenance 
personnel is called to repair it. In a distributed maintenance model, maintenance 
functions are fully under operation. This keeps the maintenance resources close 
to operation, which allows for short maintenance response times. (Rossi 1993, 
s. 25). 
 
In a separated maintenance model, a company uses maintenance or its parts to 
form a separate profit centre, which is later many times turned into a company 
of its own. The ownership of the separate company can be distributed between 
the company and external owners, or the separate company can have full 
ownership. The latter alternative is the case of pure outsourcing. 
 
The internal information transfer between the electrical and instrumentation and 
control system maintenance department, as well as the interactive information 
transfer with other interest groups were studied by Nirhamo (2002). The results 
provided information about the information systems’ compatibility to 
maintenance and the atmosphere of the working environment. Moreover, open 
questions provided suggestions for development and improvement. The results 
of the survey show that, according to the personnel, the maintenance system – 
including the information systems, working environment, and working methods 
– is on average satisfactory (Nirhamo 2002). 
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The results of the study of Saarela (2002) produced a lot of information about 
information transfer inside and between departments, the use of information 
systems, decision-making, and the overall fluency of work at the plant. With 
regard to information transfer, a central result of the research was that 
information transfer works well inside mechanical maintenance but it is much 
less effective between mechanical maintenance and other departments. 
According to the respondents, maintenance information systems supported well 
the maintenance functions, and the information systems are used fairly often. 
However, the information systems and updating of documents in the system are 
complicated to use and, therefore, possibly the information in the systems is 
incomplete and not all information is recorded in the systems. According to the 
respondents, work planning and resource management are on a fairly good 
level, and maintenance operations are well organized Saarela (2002).  
 
The results of the study of Reiman and Oedewald (2004a) showed that the 
maintenance personnel were committed to their tasks and they perceive their 
work as highly meaningful. The personnel were able to perceive very well how 
their tasks contribute to the organisational goals. Most of the workers were also 
very proud of their plant and their own proficiency. General job satisfaction was 
quite good. Weak sense of collaboration and a perceived lack of positive 
feedback were experienced as the most negative aspects of the culture. 
Perceived lack of sufficient resources and an unequal distribution of labour were 
experienced as lowering the sense of control and causing work stress (Reiman 
& Oedewald 2004a). Younger people consider themselves as having a higher 
development orientation, but they do not see the company as supporting this. 
Instead, they experience the maintenance organisation as strongly emphasising 
the values related to hierarchy (Reiman & Oedewald 2004b). 
 
The study of Reiman et al. (2005) aimed at characterising and assessing the 
organisational cultures of two Nordic nuclear power companies’ maintenance 
units. The study pointed out that job meaningfulness was found to exhibit a 
high, significantly positive correlation with job motivation and job satisfaction. 
Maintenance work appeared to produce a feeling of meaningfulness when there 
are technical problems to solve with safety significance and time pressure. This 
is a paradox in the sense that one of the goals of maintenance is to avoid 
problems and keep the technology running reliably. The maintenance task 
should be focused on maintaining the entire plant, not some individual pump or 
valve (Reiman et al. 2005).  
 
However, this approach to maintenance is too linear in terms of work 
psychology and current activities. When equipment-specific thinking guides 
maintenance activities, it is naturally important that the equipment for which the 
maintenance personnel are responsible operates flawlessly. This, in part, 
affects worker satisfaction. The meaningfulness and job motivation are also 
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based on the control of well-operating technological process and the ability to 
solve problems when they occur. Since the requirements for the training of 
maintenance personnel do not match those of operating personnel, the 
personnel do not always have the necessary competence to understand the 
significance of the equipment in terms of the overall system, or the safety 
significance of the equipment. Developing maintenance activities is left to too 
few experts. Managing the overall system, safe and disturbance-free operation, 
and understanding the prioritising of work could significantly increase motivation 
and work commitment.   
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the maintenance culture were studied in the 
survey as well. The maintenance personnel at the other company saw their 
strengths mainly in the know-how and experience of the workers and in the 
attitude and motivation (responsibility) of the personnel. In addition, ability to 
react to problems, methodical approach, and flexibility were emphasised, as 
were good tools and procedures and the good condition of the plant. The 
current age structure of the personnel and inadequate attention paid to the 
problems of knowledge retention were perceived as central weaknesses. 
Furthermore, leadership and personnel values of the organisation were 
identified as needing improvement (Reiman et al. 2005). 
  
According to Nakajima (1989, p. 1), in the 1950s and 1960s the Japanese 
applied the preventive maintenance (PM) concept originating in the United 
States to their companies for improving equipment maintenance. Later, the 
concept of productive maintenance (also PM), reliability planning, and other 
equivalent maintenance methods were applied. Thus, of the advanced 
maintenance philosophies, Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) is, in fact, 
based on the American productive maintenance (PM). It is a version modified 
for the Japanese culture and business environment. In most American 
organisations, the maintenance personnel handle all the maintenance work and 
the employees are divided into two groups: operation and maintenance. The 
Japanese companies have improved on this American PM concept in a way 
that allows every person in an organisation to participate in the maintenance 
work at their plant. 
 
TPM is often said to be productive maintenance carried out by all personnel. 
The concept is based on the principle that each member of an organisation 
must participate in improving the equipment – from line management to top 
management. Therefore, operating personnel perform maintenance on the 
equipment they use or participate in the maintenance work for other equipment. 
They also make sure that the equipment remains in good condition and they 
develop their skills to identify potential problems before they lead to equipment 
failures (Nakajima 1989, Willmott 1994, Willmott & McCarthy 2001). 
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TPM is an approach for managing personnel, the use of equipment, and 
maintenance. It is a sequence of functions that prevent quality errors and 
failures while making work safer and easier for the personnel (Shirose 1992, p. 
7). The transition from preventive to productive maintenance clearly improved 
the results, but it did not eliminate errors and failures. TPM was developed in 
order to target these areas. TPM is primarily based on the operation of small 
groups, but it changes productive maintenance to involve all the personnel of a 
company. It increases co-operation at all organisational levels (Shirose, 1992, 
p. 9). 
 
In practical situations, one may hear someone say “That’s not my problem” 
when a maintenance issue arises. This kind of language indicates that there are 
discrepancies between the interests of operation and maintenance. Previously, 
the system may have been missing a “problem owner”, but in TPM, each 
problem has at least one person who has taken or been assigned responsibility 
and who can say “This is my/our problem” (Hagberg et al. 1996, pp. 104–105). 
 
Thus, TPM is a way of managing “maintenance people”. It creates the right kind 
of atmosphere for working together and aims to provide an environment in 
which people care more about their work and workplace. TPM creates methods 
for changing attitudes and undesired working habits. The principle of TPM is to 
provide a tidy, challenging, and motivating working environment that supports 
and contributes to performing work (Nirhamo 2002).  
 
3.3.2. Competencies of the maintenance personnel 
 
A generic competency model is formed based on general competencies, which 
can be used in different organisations. The model is created by utilising 
statistical analyses, and it is often based on quite extensive empirical studies. 
Such models have been developed and presented by, for instance, Boyatzis 
(1982), Spencer & Spencer (1993), and Zwell (2000). Mäkiniemi’s work aims to 
create a generic competency model for a serviceman working in maintenance, 
which could be utilised in different organisations as is or modified according to 
the special needs of an organisation. The objective is to create a task-related 
model that would specifically take into account the task requirements of the 
performing level of maintenance. 
 
Competencies can be chosen by different methods depending on the situation 
and possibilities. One method is studying the top-tier performers at work and 
trying to define which of their qualities, characteristics, and behaviour models 
contribute to an excellent work performance. Another method is to form a group 
of top performers and their superiors, and compare their views on the required 
competencies (Zwell 2000, pp. 212–215). Of course, the formation of the model 
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can be supported by literary studies on competencies, and the available generic 
models (Zwell 2000, p. 215). 
 
The construed servicepersonnel competency model is primarily based on the 
generic models presented in the competency literature, and the views of 
personnel working in maintenance (Mäkiniemi 2004). 
 
In self-assessment, an employee evaluates his or her own abilities, skills, or 
strengths and weaknesses. It is thus based on the individual’s subjective view 
of his- or herself as a performer of work. In several cases, self-assessment is 
better suited than other evaluation methods for determining many factors 
essentially related to performance, such as motivation and commitment to work. 
Many human resources and recruitment professionals consider self-assessment 
to provide important information about employees’ suitability for certain duties, 
for instance (Liikamaa 2000). 
 
The validity of results has often been considered a weakness of self-
assessment. The subjective view of one’s own proficiency should be utilised 
with care, for example, when choosing employees for specific duties. If self-
assessment is used together with other evaluation methods, the validity of the 
results is often better in personnel recruitment (Smith 2000b, pp. 325-326). 
The main advantage of self-assessment lies in the management of employees’ 
personal development. It helps employees to develop their metacognitive 
evaluation skills and supports their reflective learning, which is a prerequisite of 
professional development. Metacognitive skills allow for precise and accurate 
self-assessment, which is characteristic of trained and experienced 
professionals (Smith, 2000b, p. 326). 
 
The purpose of this research has been to form a model for the essential 
professional competencies of performing level employees and positioning them 
in the already developed Evolute application framework. The work focuses on 
servicemen, engineers, mechanics, and other maintenance employees who use 
their technical skills in the maintenance and service of machinery, systems, and 
properties. 
 
The application being developed functions as a self-assessment system for 
maintenance personnel, in which employees evaluate their own current and 
target situations from the point of view of the competencies needed in their 
work. Thus, one central goal of the application is to determine for employees 
their personal creative tension, or the difference between the current and target 
situations. This information supports the metacognitive evaluation of one’s 
personal work and the resulting reflective learning, which are essential for 
professional development. It may also provide valuable information about 
personnel training needs and the focus areas of the necessary training to the 
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persons responsible for training in the organisation. It could be utilised in 
recruitment alongside other methods for selecting a suitable person for a 
position. 
 
The most significant individual competency class in Conchoid is the cognitive 
functions class. The reason for this is that when maintenance personnel work in 
technical duties, they often need to solve the problems causing equipment and 
system failures. A person successful in this kind of work often has a 
sensation/thinking cognitive style, in which rational deductions are made based 
on concrete sensory experiences. Therefore, the serviceman competency 
model also especially emphasises skills related to problem solving, cause and 
effect relationships, and rational thinking, which are clearly cognitive functions. 
For the further development of Conchoid, it is essential to validate the system 
with an appropriate sample of maintenance professionals (Mäkiniemi 2004). 
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Figure 6. Service personnel’s perception of their own competence level 
currently, in the future and creative tension (Mäkiniemi 2004) 
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3.3.3. Multimedia applications in future maintenance systems 
 
The Digital Media Institute (DMI) of Tampere University of Technology (TUT) 
has developed a multimedia-based application of maintenance management: 
the “Multi Demonstrator”. The work belongs to a research project titled “The Use 
of Multimedia in the Development, Planning and Modelling of Working Methods 
in a Factory Environment” (Visa 2001). 
 
The work has been continued in the “Maintenance and Management with 
Mobile Multimedia (4M)” project, which aims to study the use of wireless 
connections and multimedia in the field of maintenance. The work resembles a 
preliminary report by nature, and its purpose is to find areas for development in 
the current operation in the fields of information transfer and user-friendliness, 
and to present a suitable theoretical framework for constructing maintenance 
information systems. The result of the work should illustrate how maintenance 
operations could be carried out in the future with a more human-oriented 
system. 
  
Kerttula states that there is no established definition or meaning for multimedia. 
Multimedia is still new, and it is used in many different contexts. In the technical 
sense, multimedia is an interactive computer application that processes and 
combines at least three of the following media: text, data, audio, graphics, static 
images, animation, and video (Kerttula 1996, pp. 11–13). 
 
The multimedia application by DMI is a preliminary model of the possibilities of 
technology. Moreover, the study provides a review of current maintenance 
trends with regard to operating models, implementation philosophies, and 
maintenance systems. They indicate the direction of development for 
maintenance. However, maintenance is studied as a larger concept, a 
“maintenance system”, which more clearly shows the advantages and 
disadvantages related to the development work. The people who carry out 
maintenance must be more deeply involved in the review, as part of the overall 
system. 
 
Maintenance information systems are missing a good theoretical framework. 
Moreover, the systems have not considered the significance of the nature of 
information enough. When creating or looking for a new information system for 
maintenance, it is possible to follow a new kind of approach for the field of 
maintenance and its management. This enables utilising multimedia in 
maintenance. The Multi Demonstrator has used three-dimensional graphics, 
videos, audio, images, and hypertext that provide a new kind of platform for 
constructing and developing information transfer and know-how in an 
organisation. 
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In the future, the number of retiring employees will grow, and the labour market 
will suffer from the reduced availability of proficient employees. The major issue 
affecting the operation of companies may be the availability of qualified, trained, 
and experienced personnel. Qualified young people can choose their employer 
from several options, and just salary is not enough to attract qualified 
employees or keep them in the company as a long-term resource. For many 
employees, salary is less important than a challenging and stimulating working 
environment, proper tools, active participation, good atmosphere at work, and 
opportunities for personal development. One of the largest challenges for 
companies is to understand that they need to provide working conditions and 
tools that are as attractive and user friendly as possible. This also applies to 
maintenance (Nirhamo 2002). 
 
The Multi Demonstrator maintenance management software prototype has 
been applied in the three-dimensional modelling of a reactors’ main recirculation 
pump, and the presentation of the service documentation. The ideas presented 
give preconception how these new tools can be applied in the nuclear power 
plant maintenance. Multi Demonstrator contains the entire service procedure for 
the main circulation pump. The service procedure text includes hyperlinks to 
descriptive photos and clarifying video clips. The easy navigation environment 
enables the user to view the documents in a hierarchical directory tree 
structure. 
 
Users can open a service document by clicking the subject title of their choice in 
the directory tree structure. The application also includes digital video with an 
audio track recorded in connection with service procedures. The videos and 
photos have been linked to the hypertext documents by hyperlinks. The user 
can access the hyperlinks and use them to see the photos or videos. Moreover, 
the pages include computer-generated three-dimensional models of other 
nuclear power plant components.  
 
The three-dimensional models provide a more illustrative visualisation of the 
main recirculation pump and its components than two-dimensional drawings. 
The models are used to provide the user with an opportunity to find information 
in a three-dimensional environment (Nirhamo 2002).  
 
In the future, the use of a maintenance information system can be supported 
with a variety of equipment. A maintenance engineer can access all the 
databases with a laptop computer. He or she can use applications, such as 
Multi Demonstrator as well as a maintenance system based on a three-
dimensional plant environment. Using a video display, he or she can navigate 
the three-dimensional plant model to find the necessary equipment, and select 
the relevant information about the equipment from a menu. Equipment ID 
enables the engineer to locate it on the plant floor plan, and the location can be 
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viewed on the three-dimensional model. He or she can display a piece of 
equipment, system, or subsystem. Maintenance personnel can find information 
about the equipment with the help of the remote diagnostics control room or by 
themselves (databases). They can also find information online about equipment 
suppliers or spare part availability. An expert working in the remote diagnostics 
control room or a different location can contact the maintenance person or other 
people, have conversations, and transfer information via the system (Nirhamo 
2002). 
 
A position-specific introduction and training programme should be developed for 
new employees. During these events, more experienced maintenance 
personnel and the organisational units responsible for training would teach the 
“newcomers” about the operation of the equipment and the plant. With 
applications such as Multi Demonstrator and three-dimensional plant models, 
new employees could familiarise with the plant before entering the plant area. In 
field work, experienced personnel should be partnered with the newcomers 
whenever possible. This kind of apprentice-journeyman model would transfer 
tacit knowledge. Older and experienced professionals can support the 
development of young employees through mentoring where they help the young 
obtain information and learn (Nirhamo 2002).  
 
3.3.4. Comparison of two maintenance departments  
 
The study aimed at characterizing and assessing the organizational cultures of 
Nordic nuclear power companies’ maintenance units. Both companies can be 
considered as high reliability organizations by showing a good performance 
record and few incidents (Reiman et al. 2005). 
 
At other plant, current maintenance organization evoked mixed feelings. 
Several interviewees complained about the matrix form and found it confusing. 
On the downside there were indications that the new maintenance organization 
had led to negative changes in the perceived ownership for the technology—
previously the maintenance organization had been separate for each of the 
three stations. Several of the interviews included indications of a general cost 
pressure that affected the maintenance organization: “it is talk about costs all 
the time” and “costs have got a too high focus”. On the other hand, several of 
the interviewees said that they were personally strong in their ambition to keep 
the plant in a state of high quality. The prioritizing of tasks and managing of the 
increased workload were seen as demanding since the workers lacked the 
overall picture of the goals of the plant and of the organizational responsibilities. 
In order to manage the situation, the social aspects of the organization were 
emphasized by the personnel (e.g. good team spirit). Furthermore, gathering 
and interpreting systematic information of the entire plant condition is extremely 
demanding in the current situation. This may lead to increased events because 
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the knowledge concerning the plant’s state either does not exist or is not shared 
sufficiently. Introduction of complex and large matrix organizations makes it 
more difficult to structure the communication. In fact, the more “matrix” used, 
the more important communication seems to become for supporting the 
functioning of the matrix (Reiman et al. 2005).  
 
The study also gave implications that organizational changes do not seem to 
affect the safety climate or safety culture as defined by the employees valuing 
safety. Instead, the changes affect more the psychological work characteristics, 
such as meaningfulness of work and sense of control. Changes that seem to 
deteriorate safety are experienced as highly stressful, especially since safety 
remains highly valued. Developing only the safety values and safety attitudes of 
the organization is thus not beneficial, since the safety attitudes are at least as 
high as before the change (most likely even higher) (Reiman et al. 2005).  
 
It is interesting to compare the results of this study with the results of the studies 
by Nirhamo 2002, Saarela 2002, and Mäkiniemi 2004. The differences of 
concern are related to:  
• Gathering and interpreting systematic information of the entire plant 
condition 
• Organizational changes do not seem to affect the safety climate or safety 
culture 
• Only a few employees explicitly raised the safety thinking as strength and 
a few emphasized the managerial and leadership aspects 
• The line manager “sells” the technician to the particular business area 
that needs the resources  
• Work through routines and formal procedures 
 
3.3.5. A recommendation for a maintenance philosophy  
 
Maintenance should be developed gradually, following the principle of 
continuous improvement, towards a comprehensive productive maintenance 
philosophy. Out of the available alternatives, this type of maintenance 
philosophy is the most advanced and human-oriented, and it is based on co-
operation, which improves information transfer. Operation and maintenance are 
essential functions in a nuclear power plant. These kinds of changes take more 
than one or two years to happen. It would be good to establish hyper 
information systems, according to Nonaka, to carry out change projects 
(Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi H. 1995). A phased plan must be developed for the 
project, and followed in phases according to its intermediate goals. Currently, 
maintenance is based on preventative maintenance (PM) and reliability centred 
maintenance (RCM), which is a short way from TPM. The earlier 
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implementation philosophies accumulate in TPM, so that all current efforts will 
be utilised.  
 
During the last few years, the focus of skills has been shifted in maintenance 
due to the technological development. Technical systems involve even more 
digital instrumentation and control system, which has increased the number of 
maintenance and service tasks that require understanding of digital techniques 
and electrical engineering. This has also increased the requirements for know-
how and skills, as the operation of instrumentation and control system 
equipment and their significance in the overall system must be understood 
better.  
 
The duties clearly require two types of skills: comprehensive understanding of 
the plant operating processes, and special know-how of one’s personal field. In 
addition, the skills that are related to project management and coordination 
during outages are required. In maintenance, digital instrumentation and control 
systems have become a wide field of know-how. A very important future area 
for improvement is work management, and its required independent work 
quality assessment procedures. Digital protection and control systems are more 
abstract than systems in mechanical engineering. The procedures of 
mechanical engineering and their verifications are the result of long-term 
development. Equivalent procedures must be developed for digital 
instrumentation and control systems.   
 
For improving the safe operation, it is suggested that (Nirhamo 2002):  
 
• A cross-functional workgroup should be established for the task when 
developing maintenance information systems  
• The development of current systems should emphasise user-friendliness, 
information transfer options, and integration with current systems 
• Training, information transfer, and information recording at the electrical 
and I&C department should be developed towards future ICT 
development 
• The general maintenance philosophy should be developed towards the 
principles of total productive maintenance (TPM), or a human-oriented 
maintenance philosophy that in itself promotes transparency, information 
transfer, and cross-functional co-operation 
 
The maintenance management should be developed in balance to ensure the 
safe and disturbance-free operation of a nuclear power plant by motivated 
personnel. 
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3.3.6. Conclusions  
 
As a working environment, a nuclear power plant requires a comprehensive 
understanding of the operation and processes of the plant. Even though 
individual work tasks require special skills and knowing the details, the 
component or piece of equipment in question must always be understood as a 
part of the entire system. Therefore, each new employee must have a basic 
degree from a relevant educational institution. During employment, this basic 
degree should be complemented with know-how concerning the nuclear power 
plant processes, technical systems, safety features, and the special skills it 
requires. Traditionally, maintenance has been equipment centred. The 
operating personnel thoroughly understand the operation of the nuclear power 
plant. In the future, these two functions should be brought closer together 
through increased co-operation. The maintenance training programme should 
be developed into more systematic and equal in quality to the operating 
personnel training programme. 
 
3.4. Safety Culture-Areas for improvement 
 
Safety culture has been shown to be a difficult concept. It is especially vague to 
those carrying out practical safety work. Those involved in practical safety work 
require explanations concerning how safety culture will alter their work, and how 
it relates to any earlier means of promoting safety in a company. There are also 
many different definitions and emphasis areas in research. Researchers are still 
involved in the analysis of the concept and its neighbouring concepts.  
 
Safety culture development is a change and learning process that is led inside 
an organisation. It draws upon both the quality management principles and 
behavioural sciences (in addition to earlier safety research). Safety culture can 
be indirectly measured using factors that are thought to reflect the culture. The 
emphasis of safety activities is shifting more and more towards anticipation and 
providing information. When problems start to appear during the development of 
safety management systems, more attention is usually paid to how people could 
be made to follow the created system, and for them to remain motivated 
towards safe behaviour. When a management system has been built, it is 
observed that the system will only work if the people are also managed. Safety 
management must be supplemented by safety leadership (Ruuhilehto & 
Vilppola 2000). 
 
Due to the many aspects of the phenomenon, culture has many different 
definitions. One of the most common definitions is that “culture refers… to the 
habits, skills, tools and techniques that have been adopted by a community and 
are typical of it at a certain point in time” (Juuti 1994). A generally accepted idea 
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is that culture has a visible layer and an unconscious layer. The relaying factors 
are the values or ideas of what is desirable (Ruuhilehto & Vilppola 2000). 
 
There is not just one, comprehensive benchmark or method for safety culture 
and it cannot be measured directly. Due to the complexity and layered structure 
of the concept of culture, such benchmarks are not likely to appear. 
Furthermore, cultural changes are slow and difficult to observe. The goal set for 
the measurement also affects the selection of the measurement method. 
Attitude or atmosphere benchmarks are usually requested when safety culture 
is concerned.  
 
Instead of one comprehensive benchmark, safety culture researchers are 
aiming at methods that measure the different components of the culture. Safety 
culture can be indirectly measured using factors that are thought to reflect or 
indicate the culture. According to the different layers of the culture, these factors 
can be divided into, for example, visible activities, conscious attitudes, and 
unconscious beliefs. The safety culture model from Cooper (1998) provides a 
good, practical starting point. 
 
In recent years, regulations have guided the safety activities of companies 
towards the systematic identification and management of their risks. Safety 
management is a concern for everyone, and it is an essential part in all of the 
company’s functions. More and more often, the safety management or 
leadership systems are integrated into the company’s other activity 
management systems. The systems are created using the principles of 
continuous improvement, and they include the appropriate goal-setting, 
planning, implementation, and follow-up procedures. Many companies have 
been able to remarkably improve their safety level by taking systematic action. 
 
  
3.4.1. The management of safety at nuclear power plants 
 
A good place to start is with the words of Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of the 
nuclear navy and founder of a safety culture with a remarkable record. 
 
“Quality must be considered as embracing all factors which contribute to reliable 
and safe operation,” he wrote. “What is needed is an atmosphere, a subtle 
attitude, an uncompromising insistence on excellence, as well as a healthy 
pessimism in technical matters, a pessimism which offsets the normal human 
tendency to expect that everything will come out right and that no accident can 
be foreseen -- and forestalled -- before it happens.” (in Oberg´s commentary 
2005, cf. Rockwell 2002) 
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Dr. Peter B. Lyons, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission stated 
that: “In my remarks today, I quoted one such leader, who set the standard by 
which subsequent efforts have been measured: Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, 
the father of the nuclear navy and of commercial nuclear power. I recently read 
the fascinating account of how Rickover created his organization and the 
influence it had on the inception of nuclear power, by author Ted Rockwell in his 
book The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference. I’m sure that many 
of you have read this book. If you haven’t, I’d strongly recommend it. Although 
I’m not sure that the admiral’s personal leadership style would make many of 
today’s leaders equally effective, I was struck by the timeless quality of the 
principles upon which he based his organization. These principles ranged from 
absolute adherence to high standards; to maintaining strong technical 
capability; to constant training; to respecting radiation; to facing facts and 
learning from experience; and to taking total responsibility for one’s decisions 
and actions. My remarks today have a strong correlation with these principles. 
We must each commit to renew them, such that they remain alive in our 
thoughts and actions and form the core of our commitment and integrity that 
drives us to make a positive difference (Lyons 2008). 
 
Nihil novum sub sole! There is nothing to add to the advice above. But looking 
at the complete citation in Ecclesiastes 1:9 “The thing that hath been, it is that 
which shall be; and that which is done, is that which shall be done; and there is 
no new thing under the sun” (21st Century King James Version) we should 
understand that accidents will happen if we do not try to prevent every way. 
 
Anyway, let us take a domestic citation for the safety management. This is by 
Technical Director Tamminen from the Loviisa nuclear plant. In two words: “Be 
honest”. 
 
In the same way as in the modern quality management, we need a variety of 
safety management tools to be able to improve safety of nuclear power plant 
operation. If we compare the tool-box of safety management with that of quality 
management we realise that we have a lot to do. 
 
An interesting application of Self-organising map is presented in Figure 7 (cf. 
Kohonen 2001). 
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Figure 7. Position of a nuclear power plant compared with other plants 
regarding a performance indicator. 
 
In this presentation, the data consists of six different variables from 435 nuclear 
power plants. Using Voronoi tesselation, it is possible to see n-dimensional data 
in a two-dimensional way (Preparata, F. P. & Shamos, M. I. 1985). The closest 
distance between the nuclear power plant unit values and the closest SOM cell 
defines the cell where it belongs. Similar units that are defined by these values 
are located in the same cell or near each other on the map. 
 
WANO uses ten performance indicators in its reporting. All nuclear power plants 
report the indicator information to WANO. Each year, WANO publishes an 
extensive report where the indicator values for a nuclear power plant are 
presented as bar diagrams in comparison with other units.  
 
However, information that is sufficient from a management perspective can be 
achieved more easily and in a descriptive format. Further information may be 
made available from the database that the bar diagrams are based on SOM 
methodology. The thesis works of Länsiluoto (2004) and Toivonen (2006) 
describe SOM methodology and its applications in more detail.  
 
Six indicators were selected from an indicator database, while removing the 
information concerning years and the nuclear power plant identification 
information in order to maintain confidentiality. In Figure 7, the red ball 
represents the position of the selected nuclear power plant in relation to others 
when studying a certain indicator. This indicator value is in the best section of 
the SOM map. The test method also tried simulation. The new placement could 
be seen on the map by changing an indicator value. Therefore, when wishing to 
improve the overall result, the indicator that affects the ranking the most can be 
selected, and the required improvement can also be determined. When nuclear 
  
111
 
power plants have several years of indicator information available, the change 
in indicators can be seen on the map, either individually or as an overall result. 
This allows us to see in a simple manner where the plant is located in relation to 
others, and what the direction of the change is; in other words, where we are 
and where we are going. Such information is, otherwise, not easily available. 
 
3.4.2. What says Drucker ? 
     
The industrial engineers in Japanese industry use the same methods, tools, and 
techniques as the Westerner to study and to analyse work. But the Japanese 
industrial engineer does not organize the worker's job. The Japanese worker 
very largely also takes responsibility for improving his tools. When a new 
machine or a new process is being introduced, the workers are expected to take 
an active part in the final adjustment, the final arrangement, the specific 
application of machine and tools. 
 
The mechanism for making the worker take responsibility for job and tools is 
what the Japanese call "continuous training." Every employee, often up to and 
including top managers, keeps on training as a regular part of his job until he 
retires. The weekly training session is a regular and scheduled part of a man's 
work. It is not run, as a rule, by a trainer, but by the men themselves and their 
supervisors. The training session does not focus on any one skill. It is attended 
by all men on a given job level and focuses on all the jobs within the unit. 
 
The Western concept assumes that the purpose of learning is to qualify oneself 
for a new, different, and bigger job. The nature of learning is expressed in a 
learning curve. Within a certain period of time this student reaches a plateau of 
proficiency, where he then stays forever. 
 
In the Japanese concept the purpose of learning is self-improvement. It qualifies 
a man to do his present task with continually wider vision, continually increasing 
competence, and continually rising demands on himself. While there is a 
learning curve, there is no fixed and final plateau. All we have learned about 
learning in this century indicates that the Japanese concept is the correct one, 
and the Western concept actually a bar to true learning. 
      
Japanese institutions are far more rigidly departmentalised and sectionalised 
than most Western institutions. The individual member of a department is 
expected to be completely loyal to it, yet the individual employee tends to see 
beyond the boundaries of his own speciality and his own department. He knows 
what goes on. He knows the work of others, even though he himself has never 
performed it. He sees a genuine whole, and he is expected to be concerned 
with the performance of every single job in this genuine whole. He, therefore, 
can see his own place in the structure and his own contribution. 
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Finally, continuous training creates receptivity for the new, the different, the 
innovative, and the more productive. The focus in the training sessions is 
always on doing the job better, doing it differently, doing it in new ways. The 
commitment to continuous training makes the entire work force in a Japanese 
institution receptive to change and innovation rather than resistant to it. At the 
same time, training mobilizes the experience and knowledge of the employee 
for constructive improvement. There is also impatience with poor working 
methods, desire to do a better job, demand for more intelligent, and more 
systematic management.  
 
However, in Japan there is a tremendous fear of the consequences of personal 
misbehaviour, i.e., tremendous pressure for conformity and also genuine fear 
that the enterprise itself may go under.  This makes the Japanese willing to go 
to very great lengths to maintain the competitive position of their employer. 
 
3.4.3. Weaknesses inherent in the functional organisation 
 
An integrated management system should provide a single framework for the 
arrangements and processes necessary to address all the goals of the 
organization. These goals include safety, health, environmental, security, quality 
and economic elements and other considerations such as social responsibility. 
 
A management system, including organizational models, concepts and tools, 
should also cover human factor issues and other integrated management 
approaches that complement the traditional approach to achieving results, 
which was based on inspections and verification checks (IAEA 2006). 
 
However, very seldom in practise analytical basis for the structure of the 
organisation is documented in such a way, that it is possible to understand the 
guiding principles for fulfilling the requirements above. Sometimes, when a new 
director coming from another industry starts as managing director, he or she 
may simply adapt the organisational model of the former company in spite that 
the goal of the organisations may be completely different. 
 
In nuclear power plants various versions of functional organisation model are 
usual. There are some weaknesses which are inherent in the functional 
organisation. These are connected to processes and behaviors that cross 
organizational boundaries and that address organizational integration and 
interfaces. These cross-functional tasks are such as: 
   
• Work management 
• Plant modification works 
• Equipment performance and materiel condition 
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• Plant status and configuration control 
• Operating experience feedback 
• Training 
• Self-Evaluation and Corrective Action 
• Human Performance 
• Safety Culture 
 
Therefore special attention should be paid to these cross-functional issues. The 
management should understand where the critical areas which may deviate 
from the ideal organisation are. This might be a challenge for future research, 
and in a limited scope what is a proper administration to fulfil the requirements 
stated above. 
 
Event investigation is generally an efficient starting point for revealing the 
complex nature of safety management. The context of events reveals the 
complex interaction between people and technology in an organisational and 
cultural context. Event investigations should not only focus on events with high 
consequences; in most complex event a throughout investigation will reveal 
basic causes of great interest, particularly at the safety management level. 
Scientific studies of event investigation techniques and general descriptions of 
experience feedback processes have had a tendency to regard event 
investigations as too separated from a broader safety management context. 
Manuals for event investigation seldom describe how experience feedback 
techniques should fit into other safety management practices such as auditing, 
risk analysis, human resource management (Rollenhagen 2010).  
 
3.4.4. Action programme 
 
Some regulators have been active in developing general requirements 
regarding safety management and more detailed guidance to assess the 
approach taken by the licensee. They are using what can be called “process 
based regulation”, i.e. the regulation aims to make sure that the utility has the 
right processes, and the regulator checks that the processes ensure a high level 
of safety. To perform this, checking the regulator establishes the review and 
inspection procedures of the licensee processes. A different approach is when 
the regulator looks at the results of the processes of the licensee, which is 
termed “performance based regulation”. In this second approach, the regulator 
leaves to the licensee the establishment and control of the processes and 
checks if the results are acceptable. Both approaches have advantages and 
drawbacks. The main advantage of a performance based approach is that the 
licensee has complete flexibility on how to achieve the required outcomes; the 
main drawback is that when outcomes show degradation on safety, remediation 
can be painful. Neither of these methodologies looks into the scientific bases to 
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identify and understand the individual causes involved and their effects. We 
should focus on the importance of this approach using the potential of human 
behaviour and management sciences (Martin 1999).  
 
Although there is no scientifically rigorous correlation available, it could be 
inferred with little risk that excellent management is the basis for good safety 
and performance. It is also apparent that pursuing just a single goal, even if it is 
safety and not considering the overall picture, will lead to an unbalanced and 
unsuccessful situation (Martin 2002). 
 
Based on their assessment, Behavioural Science Technology, Inc. (BST) has 
developed a recommended plan for implementing culture change within NASA. 
The approach to cultural transformation is based on the following core concepts 
(Behavioural Science Technology 2004): 
 
• Guiding principles must underlie the definition of the desired culture 
• Guiding principles get to the essence of what needs to be given priority in 
order to assure that objectives are reached. Having guiding principles is 
important because achieving excellence requires relying upon many 
individuals making judgments continuously throughout their work. We 
cannot create rules for every situation and variation, thereby eliminating 
the need for judgment. 
• Both climate and culture are important 
• Leaders drive culture change (intentionally or unintentionally) through 
their behaviour 
• There should be one, single culture change initiative 
 
BST’s recommended approach involves a comprehensive plan to achieve 
cultural transformation within three years. This included specific implementation 
steps for the first six months and the longer-term plan (Behavioural Science 
Technology 2004). 
 
3.5. Research papers 
 
The empirical results of the research are presented in research papers which 
are attached to this thesis. A summary of each research paper is presented in 
the following. 
 
The first research paper 
 
The first research paper, entitled “The Deltoid Application for Competence 
Analysis and Development of Control Room Operators”, presents a new method 
to assess, develop, and test an application that enables better management in 
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the competence development of licensed control room operators in a nuclear 
power plant. This work has had three sub goals. The first sub goal was to 
specify the key competencies of control room operators and the unconscious 
factors behind them. The second sub goal was to create a fuzzy logic based 
self-assessment computer system, which makes it possible to see the current 
reality and personal vision more clearly. The third sub goal was to test the self-
assessment tool on control room operators and to find any potential creative 
tension to guide the annual retraining programme. 
 
Consequently, the competency-based self-assessment tool created for this 
study i.e. the Deltoid-application, is suitable for the planning of basic training 
and retraining of control room operators. It is also a good working tool when 
forming shift crews with even competence distribution thereby satisfying the 
demands of the control room work. 
 
The second research paper 
 
The second research paper, entitled “Control Room Operators' Competence 
Evaluation Based on a New Methodology”, is a continuation of the first one and 
it describes the analysis and visualisation of the group results using neural 
networks in order to determine relations and interrelations in the self-evaluation 
data, which would otherwise be difficult to uncover. Neural networks show 
which individuals’ perceived current and future levels of occupational 
competences are close to each other. The Self-Organising Maps (SOM) were 
used for the visualisation and clustering of the self-evaluation data of the 
operators who participated. 
 
The next step of the human resource management process involves 
competence simulation. Competence simulation allows for competence with a 
focus on and leverage for individuals, teams, and organisations. This means 
that the relative position to others on neural nets can be simulated as a result of 
alternative targeted development and training actions. Competence leverage for 
teams allows for finding rational and efficient educational paths for team 
members. The competence simulation also helps organisations in forming 
groups for training with a specific content, and developing future shift crews, as 
well as positioning individuals and teams within an organisation. This enables 
enterprises to become more responsive and realise better returns from the 
development and training of human resources. 
 
The third research paper 
 
The third research paper, entitled “Simulation with Occupational Work Role 
Competences”, proposes that people should be involved in performing 
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simulation or a what-if type of analysis of those human-systems in which they 
are involved. The benefit would come from increased understanding provided 
by such a participatory approach. The presented competence simulation 
illustrates some exciting new possibilities for competence focus and leverage to 
be applied in the future. 
 
Modern enterprises support the personal goals of their employees and, 
consequently, integrate them into their business strategies. The self-evaluation 
process that reveals the creative tension of employees is the starting point. In 
the beginning of this process, the personal and organisational goals may not 
match and, therefore, competence simulation can be used to find a better 
solution. Competence simulation helps to plan and build the target training to fit 
the organisational strategy, resources, and current situation in a co-evolutionary 
way. 
 
Competence simulation can also be used to test the impact of training and 
education packages, which are being used already, and the ones which are 
available inside an organisation and through external training organisations, 
such as universities, training centres, etc. An overall impact of the alternative 
training methods can be assessed by simulation, which allows for the 
integration of all trainings over all individuals. It is valuable to know if training 
has the impact that it is expected to have. Many targets and applications for the 
validation of training and education can be seen in future. The bottom-up 
perceived impact of training may differ from the view that an organisation has. 
 
The fourth research paper 
 
The fourth research paper “Utilisation of Process Operators’ Innovativeness in a 
Nuclear Power Plant” shows that, based on the empirical results, the people 
who are working in shift crews seem to be innovative, creative and, therefore, 
willing to develop their working environment. Typically, a nuclear power plant 
environment is placed in the area of a non-innovative environment. However, 
the development proposals made do not generally involve any radical changes. 
In other words, they mainly follow the principles of continuous improvement. In 
nuclear power plant operations, small and justified changes are recommended 
because of safety reasons. This also supports the classification of incremental 
innovations. 
 
Most of the proposals are related to the improvements of operation procedures, 
correction of printing errors, improvement of usability of procedures, or 
improvement of the whole procedure system to meet practical work 
requirements. This is understandable because operation procedures are the 
  
117
 
most important tool for operators and contain the technical and practical know-
how of the operation department. 
 
Process control improvements are the second biggest group, and most of them 
are related to the optimisation of control of nuclear power plant operations. 
Quite few improvements are proposed regarding the better use of human 
resources or work management. This can be interpreted as a certain kind of 
reluctance to change working habits. There seems to be quite a strong 
tendency to preserve familiar working routines. 
 
When it is examined as to who in the operation department has done most of 
the proposals, a conclusion can be drawn that about ten per cent of the 
operators are very innovative. Therefore, on the basis of these results, the 
nuclear power plant environment cannot be immediately classified as being a 
non-innovative environment. 
 
The fifth research paper 
 
The fifth research paper, entitled “A Self-Evaluation Tool for the Development of 
Maintenance Personnel’s Competences”, focuses on a new kind of web-based 
self-evaluation tool which can be used as a performance indicator to support 
maintenance personnel’s competence development. The self-evaluation tool 
comprises those competences which are important in maintenance personnel’s 
work. Some of these competences are generic, while others are differentiating. 
The self-evaluation tool utilises linguistics and is based on fuzzy logic. When 
using the self-evaluation tool, maintenance personnel evaluate their perceived 
current reality at work and the vision they have for the future. This difference 
between personal vision and current reality is called creative tension. 
The self-evaluation tool has been used in a case study where a number of 
sixteen mechanical maintenance personnel made the self-evaluation. Some 
examples of the results of this case study are also presented in this paper. 
 
Self-organising maps (SOM) were used to visualise and cluster the group 
results. The SOM is a two-layer neural network that maps multidimensional data 
onto a two dimensional topological grid. The data are grouped according to the 
similarities and patterns found, typically using the Euclidean distance as a 
distance measure. The results are displayed as a map. The map consists of 
nodes which can be divided into clusters. The SOM is an unsupervised neural 
network with no target outcome defined. The SOM is allowed to freely organise 
itself based on the patterns found in data. This makes the SOM an ideal tool for 
data analysing to illustrate the essential features of a data set, just as in its 
clustering structure and the relations between its data items.  
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The sixth research paper 
 
The sixth research paper, entitled “FOLIUM - Ontology for Organisational 
Knowledge Creation”, focuses on knowledge creation and learning concepts 
with the help of a new Folium application, which is ontology for organisational 
knowledge creation. Folium is built on the generic web-based fuzzy application 
“platform”. The development work of Folium is based on a solid theoretical 
framework, which is called Co-Evolute theories. They were developed at the 
Tampere University of Technology in Pori. With the help of Folium, a bottom up 
view is formed to capture the real understanding of an organisation’s knowledge 
creation activities. Folium can be used to help the organisation’s management 
in the decision making process, when target development plans are made to 
improve and support organisational knowledge creation. In this paper, the first 
test results from Tampere University of Technology in Pori are also presented. 
 
The seventh research paper 
 
The seventh research paper, entitled “Evaluating the Organisation’s 
Environment for Learning and Knowledge Creation”, focuses on organisational 
learning and ability to create new knowledge. It is vital that the organisation’s 
management has a systemic picture of the organisation’s daily working 
environment. The objective of the research has been the better management of 
developing a responsive environment for learning and knowledge creation. 
 
For this purpose, a new kind of decision support system was developed, the so-
called Co-expert system, which can be used to capture the bottom-up view of 
the organisation’s environment. The development work of the Co-expert system 
is based on Evolute’s theoretical framework, which has been developed at 
Tampere University of Technology, Pori. The new system facilitates the use of 
real knowledge instead of presumptive real knowledge in making decisions 
concerning development efforts. This paper also presents the results from the 
system’s first preliminary tests. 
 
The eighth research paper 
 
The eighth research paper, entitled “Transfer of Nuclear Safety Culture”, 
addresses the question of what the main difficulties are that should be taken 
into consideration in the transferring of nuclear safety culture from a Finnish 
supplier to Russian nuclear power plants. First, the concept of ‘Organisational 
Culture’, focusing especially on ‘Safety Culture’, is described. After that follows 
a short description of the concept of ‘Project Culture’. Then, the discussion goes 
on describing how the safety culture is transferred. And, thereafter, the 
discussion deals with the research methodology and research results. The 
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paper ends with the conclusion, according to which the assessment of the 
present situation, sharing the same vision, close co-operation based on 
equality, and complying with the decision-making system of the receiving 
organisation are of vital importance in order to implement the safety culture 
transfer project successfully.  
 
The ninth research paper 
 
The ninth research paper, entitled “Showing Asymmetries in Knowledge 
Creation and Learning through Proactive Vision”, focuses on knowledge 
creation and learning concepts that are difficult to articulate and manage in 
organisations. It first shows the asymmetries between how people in business 
and the academic world view their current situation, as well as how they would 
like to see the future. Subsequently, the paper presents the possibilities to use 
the established database to group the whole data set to show the asymmetry 
between the proactive vision and the current and future desires to improve 
knowledge creation and learning in the organisation. The paper also presents 
evidence supporting the use of this methodology to reveal the asymmetries and 
why it is so important to understand these in terms of management and 
leadership. 
 
The applications developed follow modern new methods where knowledge is 
created in groups and teams and where learning is encouraged to support 
growth and development. The importance of both contents, i.e. knowledge 
creation and learning, can be very difficult to quantify.  
 
The tenth research paper 
 
The tenth research paper, entitled “Responsive Organisations with Genius 
Management Applications”, focuses on organisational learning and knowledge-
creating activities which are vital to the organisation in order to succeed in tough 
competition and to cope with today’s turbulent business environment. 
 
Organisations typically have their own unique characteristics, which define the 
environment in which employees learn and create new knowledge. Therefore, it 
is important that the learning environment is analysed in order to focus and 
direct development efforts towards the right areas and topics. This can be very 
difficult with traditional management approaches because an organisation’s 
learning and knowledge-creating environment is of a highly abstract nature. 
This paper presents a new type of co-expert system, enabling the analysis of 
the learning environment, which organisations offer to their members. With the 
help of the created co-expert system, a bottom-up view is formed to capture the 
real understanding of day-to-day practices up to the management level. The co-
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expert system forms a new kind of meta-classification of the responsive learning 
and knowledge-creating environment. This new methodology with its methods 
and new classification possibility helps managers to understand new important 
management issues, as well as the systemic viewpoint embedded in its 
constructs. The first empirical tests with the created co-expert system have 
been successful.  
 
3.6. Summarising the research results 
 
Safety culture is a difficult concept. The word is used commonly and fluently, 
but it still remains vague. There are also many different definitions and 
emphasis areas in research. Ruuhilehto & Vilppola summarise three main 
directions which can be found in safety culture research. These include 1) case 
studies, 2) comparative studies, and 3) psychometric surveys.  
 
Safety culture development is a change and learning process that is led inside 
an organisation. It draws upon both the quality management principles and 
behavioural sciences in addition to safety research. Safety culture can be 
indirectly measured using factors that are thought to reflect the culture. The 
emphasis of safety activities is shifting more and more towards anticipation and 
providing information. 
 
Safety depends essentially on how people perform in their work. Is safety 
valued in general? How is it visible in everyday activities? Those involved in 
practical safety work require explanations concerning how safety culture will 
alter their work, and how it relates to any earlier means of promoting safety in a 
company.  
 
Safety management refers to organisational measures that seek to identify, 
assess, and control risks in order to guarantee nuclear equipment, personnel 
and environmental safety. These risks include, among others, occupational 
accidents, accidental releases of radioactive substances and in the worst-case 
scenario, a meltdown of the reactor core. 
 
Today, there is universal acceptance of the significant impact that management 
and organisational factors have on the safety significance of complex industrial 
installations, such as nuclear power plants. Many events with a significant 
economic and public impact had causes that have been traced to management 
deficiencies.  
 
The objective of this research is to develop an application that enables better 
management of shift personnel development. The application supports 
individual development by focusing on the competencies required for successful 
performance in the task, and by identifying the individual’s current state and 
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personal goals. By understanding these personal qualities, shift personnel 
development, and training can be better targeted according to the desired and 
actual needs. A generic competency model for service personnel working in 
maintenance has also been created. 
 
Nuclear safety 
An analogy that should be followed is the “Systematic Approach to Training” 
that is used for training activities; as a result of the development, the nuclear 
power plant would have a documented “Systematic Approach to Safety”. This 
documentation would describe how safety is related to practical work. This 
would turn safety culture into a concrete tool. Documented safety thinking 
provides the organisation with a common starting point for future development.  
 
Assessment of competences 
A clear strength of the Deltoid method is that the shift crew’s attitude can be 
seen with a glance in the summary picture. No other method can provide the 
same information to support operations management or to assist in focusing 
training. If the creative tension is positive, we thereby know that the shift crew’s 
basic attitude is satisfactory. When the same information is presented in a Self 
Organising Map, the differences between groups or individuals can be clearly 
seen. For the management, a positive creative tension is always a good sign. 
 
The Deltoid method is also suitable for determining shift compositions. 
Traditionally, the aim has been to ensure competence from different technology 
branches on the shift, and to provide equally strong competence within the shift. 
There used to be no method for this; the division has been based on a 
subjective assessment from the supervisor. The Deltoid method provides an 
opportunity for seeking a good composition by means of simulation. The shift 
personnel clearly showed creative tension, which means that the shift personnel 
have the desire and energy to develop themselves and their working methods. 
In the future, more attention should be paid to shift personnel training and on 
directing the training appropriately. 
 
The purpose of the competence assessment method is not to replace the 
procedure used for recruiting shift personnel. The method is based on the 
creative tension proposed by Senge, which is a fairly simple model in itself. The 
calculation model is based on fuzzy logic. The overall starting point is one of 
positive self-improvement. The result is an illustrative image of the direction of 
personnel competence development, as well as the areas for improvement. The 
method should be used in periodic follow-ups in order to assist personnel 
management. 
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Human performance related training of operators 
When developing working methods, the aim should be to achieve a systematic 
method that can, at a minimum, prevent common human errors of a certain 
type. On a more general level, cross-functional tasks are considered possible 
sources of errors and disturbances. 
 
In enhancement of human performance the following training themes might be 
useful: 
• Revising human error prevention strategy and techniques 
• Detailed training in how and when to use the error prevention tools to 
teach self-checking, peer checking, and independent verification 
• Case studies to reinforce an understanding of the subject matter 
• The importance of professional behaviour and attitudes 
• Providing training in the importance of maintaining situational awareness 
• Understanding how to make systematic decisions and advice on how to 
diagnose faults 
• Understanding how to maintain alertness and combat fatigue when 
working shifts 
• Improving team skills, including a team building exercise 
• Avoiding groupthink and other undesirable team behaviours 
• Understanding individual error inducing tendencies 
• The study of various human error models in current use 
• Human error reduction management techniques 
• Worker human performance standards and expectations. 
 
These are examples of how to improve the existing training programmes. 
Knowledge management should empower plant staff to integrate learning 
processes into their work practices and habits to improve the organisation’s 
performance and capabilities. 
 
As a working environment, a nuclear power plant requires a comprehensive 
understanding of the operation and processes of the plant. Even though 
individual work tasks require special skills and knowing the details, the 
component or piece of equipment in question must always be understood as a 
part of the whole. Therefore, each new employee must have a basic degree 
from a relevant educational institution. During employment, this basic degree 
should be complemented with know-how concerning the nuclear power plant as 
a whole, its processes, and the special skills it requires. Traditionally, 
maintenance has been equipment centred. The operating personnel thoroughly 
understand the operation of the nuclear power plant. In the future, these two 
functions should be brought closer together through increased co-operation. 
The maintenance training programme should be developed to be more 
systematic and equal in quality to the operating personnel training programme. 
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In the investigations of aviation accidents performed by The National 
Transportation Safety Board, the crucial role of maintenance in safety has been 
found many times. So why would the maintenance of nuclear power plants be 
less important?  
 
Recommendation related to maintenance practice 
Total Productive Maintenance is a way of managing maintenance people. It 
creates the right kind of atmosphere for working together and aims to provide 
an environment in which people care more about their work and workplace. 
Total Productive Maintenance creates methods for changing attitudes and 
undesired working habits. The principle of Total Productive Maintenance is to 
provide a tidy, challenging, and motivating working environment that supports 
and contributes to performing work. Total Productive Maintenance can be 
recommended as the main concept for maintenance. 
 
Transfer of tacit knowledge 
New employees should be recruited a few years before they have to take 
independent responsibility for their duties. It takes 2-3 years for new employees 
to learn the new duties well enough that they can take responsibility 
independently. For all experts, the work itself is a much more important way of 
learning than any course or training programme. Naturally, education is 
important, but its role should be seen as one teaching theoretical basics, which 
are elaborated upon and developed through practical work. Knowledge and 
know-how transfer should utilise the master and apprentice model, which 
combines several proven training and pedagogy-related elements. This model 
transfers both so-called tacit knowledge obtained through experience and more 
codified knowledge that can be expressed more easily. If nearly 70% of all 
learning takes place through informal channels, the change of the generation 
without losing an enormous amount of information is a critical factor.  
 
Developed constructs 
Based on the results (Deltoid), it can be said that the competency-based self-
assessment system developed is useful for identifying individuals’ current 
situation and personal targets. 
 
The maintenance related study (Conchoid) aimed to create a generic 
competency model for a service personnel working in maintenance, which could 
be utilised in different organisations as is or modified according to the special 
needs of an organisation. The objective was to create a task-related model that 
would specifically take into account the task requirements of the performing 
level of maintenance. The construed serviceman competency model is primarily 
based on the generic models presented in competency literature, and the views 
of personnel working in maintenance. 
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The “Maintenance and Management with Mobile Multimedia (4M)” project 
aimed to study the use of wireless connections and multimedia in the field of 
maintenance. The purpose was to find areas for development in the current 
operation in the fields of information transfer and user-friendliness, and to 
present a suitable theoretical framework for constructing maintenance 
information systems. The result of the work illustrated how maintenance 
operations could be carried out in the future with a more human-oriented 
system. The Multi Demonstrator maintenance management software prototype 
has been applied in the three-dimensional modelling of the reactor main 
circulation pump, and the presentation of the service documentation. The ideas 
presented give a preconception as to how these new tools can be applied in the 
nuclear power plant maintenance. The software provides necessary 
procedures, direct access to the technical data needed without going through 
organisational levels, and offers guidance in videos, which contain the tacit 
knowledge of experienced workers. This is a proposed construct for future 
development. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The Deltoid and Conchoid competence evaluation methods and the indicator 
application are applications that can be taken into use quickly. Renewing the 
training programme, creating knowledge management practices, and 
developing practical applications based on knowledge utilisation according to 
Nonaka’s SECI model will take more time. Issues related to maintenance work 
tasks that are important for safety should be defined and documented.  
In safety management, the following areas, among others, should be developed 
as a whole, as part of the safety enhancement programme: 
• Observation of plant activities 
• Plant inspection programme 
• Screening process for non-conformities 
• Corrective action programme 
• Operating experience feedback 
• Human performance 
 
All of the above issues for their part transform some areas of safety culture 
thinking into practical tasks. 
 
The methods presented in this thesis work do not overturn the present system 
that is used to ensure safety. According to the principle of continuous 
improvement, their purpose is to do their part in further improving the 
operational safety of nuclear power plants.   
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Table 3. Propositions and research results 
Research proposition Research paper 
1. Safety culture as a management tool 
does not work unless in the task analysis 
safety relevance of each task is specified 
in advance. 
Research papers VII, VIII, and 
experience from several plants 
support this proposition. 
2. Human performance related training is 
not adequately taken into account in the 
training programme of nuclear power 
plant operations. 
Research papers I, II, and III 
support this proposition. Such kind 
of training should be included in 
the training programme. 
3. Importance of nuclear power plant 
maintenance to safety should be more 
adequately taken into account in the 
training programme. 
Research paper V and VI support 
this proposition. 
4. In the design of work organisation, 
learning from experience should also be 
taken into account to prevent risks of 
organisational accidents. 
Research paper IV, IX, and X 
support this proposition. 
Experience from several plants 
also gives an indication that this 
aspect is not often included in 
discussions related to a change of 
working practices. The changes in 
nuclear power plant organisations 
should be based on a thorough 
analysis.   
5. Knowledge management, knowledge 
transfer and knowledge creation is an 
integrated part of safety management. 
Research paper VI supports this 
proposition.Knowledge manage-
ment should give priority to the 
way in which people construct and 
use knowledge. It is closely related 
to organisational learning. 
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A continuous high level of safety is a prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy. 
Operation of a nuclear power plant requires a sufficient infrastructure to cover 
the education and research needed in this field. Nuclear safety enhancement 
programmes provide the necessary conditions for retaining the knowledge 
needed for ensuring the continuance of safe and economic use of nuclear 
power, for the development of new know-how and for participation in 
international co-operation.  
 
The objective of this reserach is the development of new management methods 
to increase the safety of nuclear power plant operation and development of a 
methodology to make safety culture and knowledge management operational to 
support the safe operation of nuclear power plants. The research results and 
methods are also assessed and suggestions for future research are made. 
  
4.1. Contribution of the research 
 
Based on the empirical results, it can be concluded that competence-based 
Deltoid self-evaluation application clearly recognises individuals’ own current 
reality and their development needs. Consequently, the competency-based self-
assessment tool created for this study, i.e. the Deltoid application, is suitable for 
the planning of basic training and retraining of control room operators. It is also 
a good working tool when forming shift crews with an even competence 
distribution, thus satisfying the demands of the control room work. The Deltoid 
method could also be used to assess factors related to disturbance 
management during simulator training, for example. 
The Deltoid application is a new and flexible tool for human resources 
purposes. A clear strength of the Deltoid method is that the shift crew’s attitude 
can be seen with a glance in the summary picture. No other method can provide 
the same information to support operations management or to assist in focusing 
training. If the creative tension is positive, we thereby know that the shift crew’s 
basic attitude is satisfactory. When the same information is presented in a Self 
Organising Map, the differences between groups or individuals can be clearly 
seen.  
 
4.2. Assessment of the research results 
 
As a working environment, a nuclear power plant requires a comprehensive 
understanding of the operation and processes of the plant. Even though 
individual work tasks require special skills and knowing the details, the 
component or piece of equipment in question must always be understood as a 
  
127
 
part of the whole. Therefore, each new employee must have a basic degree 
from a relevant educational institution. During employment, this basic degree 
should be complemented with know-how concerning the nuclear power plant as 
a whole, its processes, and the special skills it requires. Traditionally, 
maintenance has been equipment centred. The operating personnel thoroughly 
understand the operation of the nuclear power plant. In the future, these two 
functions should be brought closer together through increased co-operation. 
The maintenance training programme should be developed into more 
systematic and equal in quality to the operating personnel training programme.  
 
The study presents knowledge management issues broadly, based on the 
Nonaka’s model. The idea is that, as an analogous counterpart to the Japanese 
“quality circles”, a “safety circle” should be introduced; this would allow for 
having discussions on safety issues related to the work, and for making 
improvement proposals related to them. A second analogy that should be 
followed is the “Systematic Approach to Training” that is used for training 
activities; as a result of the development, the nuclear power plant would have a 
documented “Systematic Approach to Safety”. This documentation would 
describe how safety is related to practical work. This would turn safety culture 
into a concrete tool. Documented safety thinking provides the organisation with 
a common starting point for future development. 
 
The main proposal of the thesis is that in all normal tasks, relevance to safety 
should be specified, training practices should be transformed to the direction of 
knowledge management, safety circles should be established and, for safety 
issues, a working methodology similar to TPM should be created. 
 
The indicator application allows us to see in a simple manner where our plant is 
located in relation to others, and what the direction of the change is; in other 
words, where we are and where we are going. Such information is, otherwise, 
not easily available. 
 
4.3. Assessment of the research strategy 
 
In this research, both conceptual and constructive research approaches were 
used. The conceptual research approach was used to define the concepts 
related to organisational culture and safety culture. The constructive research 
approach was used when building assessment systems for the competencies of 
operation and maintenance personnel. Different case studies were used to find 
out how the developed constructs work in practice. Based on the research 
results, it can be concluded that this research presents new approaches to the 
management and safe operation of nuclear power plants. 
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4.4. Future research 
 
There is growing interest in the nuclear safety field in the development and 
improvement of safety management systems. Accidents such as Chernobyl 
(Ukraine), Seveso (Italy, chemical), Challenger and Columbia (US space 
shuttles) have demonstrated the impact of human and organisational failures. 
These events made companies, public organisations, and the general public 
aware of the impact of organisational processes on risk and have reinforced the 
appreciation of the importance of robust safety management. Safety 
Management has thus been developed as a concept describing the systematic 
management processes through which the risks are controlled and a high level 
of safety is maintained in the day-to-day operations of an organisation. 
 
There are some weaknesses which are inherent in the functional organisation. 
These are connected to processes and behaviours that cross organizational 
boundaries and that address organizational integration and interfaces. These 
cross-functional tasks are such as: 
   
• Work management 
• Plant modification works 
• Equipment performance and material condition 
• Plant status and configuration control 
• Operating experience feedback 
• Training 
• Self-Evaluation and Corrective Action 
• Human Performance 
• Safety Culture. 
 
Therefore, special attention should be paid to these cross-functional issues. The 
management should understand where, from safety point of view, the critical 
areas are. This might be a challenge for future organisational research. 
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